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17 September 1984

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ANGOLA

FUEL DISTRIBUTION REPORTEDLY IMPROVED

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 29 Jul 84 p 12

[Text] During the second quarter of 1984, the branch office of SONANGOL [National Angolan Fuel Company] in Kwanza-Norte Province sold 1,583 tons and 588 kilograms of fuel (gasoline, gasoil, gas and petroleum) and 8,200 liters of lubricants, valued in all at 17,126,931 kwanzas, the Angolan news agency ANGOP learned from SONANGOL official Domingos Antonio Borges.

The fuel was consumed by various state and private agencies, Borges said, adding that, during that period, agricultural enterprises alone consumed about 191,500 liters of fuel. It is noted that, in the Ninth Advisory Council of the Agriculture Ministry, held recently in Ndalaatando, SONANGOL was blamed for the interruption of activity for 15 days at the Camabatela agricultural complex.

Supplies of petroleum to the public have improved considerably over previous years. SONANGOL distributed a total of 177 (200-liter capacity) drums to the municipal organs of the Domestic Trade Ministry. The drums disappeared, a result of the irresponsibility which is rampant in this sector.

SONANGOL has storage facilities for gasoil in Vila do Lucala, with a capacity of 203,153 liters, and another two 25-liter tanks [as published] for petroleum, which are not being used because the pipes have ruptured. The province is not in a position to store gasoline because there are no storage tanks, although there are plans to install them.

In that area, there is also a butane gas bottling plant with an 8,960-kilogram capacity, which will go into operation as soon as construction is completed. The SONANGOL provincial office blamed the private merchants for the irregularities which are observed daily in the distribution of gas to the public. For this reason, the Angolan Fuel Association has stopped supplying gas to merchant Alberto Rodrigues Cabral; he has diverted an incalculable number of empty gas canisters, which belong to the public.

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ANGOLA

TRANSPORT OFFICIAL VISITS KUANDO-KUBANGO

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 29 Jul 84 p 12

[Text] Menongue--Paulo Bernardo Bonga, vice minister of transportation, has been in this province for 2 days, leading a delegation from his ministry. The minister visited Cuito Cuanavale Municipio, accompanied by Provincial Commisioner Manuel Francisco Tuta ("Batalha de Angola").

During a rally in that municipio, the local residents presented their major problems, principally with regard to supplies of essential products because of the shortage of vehicles to transport them from the province capital to the municipios.

Speaking on that occasion, the vice minister of transportation said the party and government were trying to improve the nation's truck fleet, but the war which the puppet bands are waging against the Angolan people had hampered their efforts. In this regard, he appealed for greater vigilance to neutralize all those who are attempting to sabotage the nation's economy.

During his stay in the province, the vice minister of transportation visited the ministry offices in the province; he met with local government officials and with workers of the Transport Ministry delegation.

According to the Angolan news agency ANGOP, on leaving Menongue, the minister traveled to Huila Province and will proceed from there to Moxico and Lunda-Sul provinces.

Peasants' Associations Formed

Meanwhile, ANGOP has learned from local government officials that 14 peasant associations and a fishing cooperative have been formed to date in Kuando-Kubango Province.

Although this process has been hampered by the shortage of seeds, fertilizers, tractors and fuels, the officials contacted by ANGOP reported that the enthusiasm of the peasants is quite encouraging.

The creation of cooperatives and associations is one of the higher-level directives of the party and is aimed at instilling the spirit of collective labor

among the peasants, so that they may become increasingly productive. The directive was issued several years ago, and the results have been encouraging, particularly in Uige and Malanje provinces.

Hence, considering the enthusiasm of the peasants of Kuando-Kubango, it is important to provide them with the necessary means to create more agricultural production associations and cooperatives.

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ANGOLA

BANDAG TIRE RETREAD PROCESS DESCRIBED

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 31 Jul 84 p 3

[Text] BANDAG, a multinational which produces all the rubber processing equipment for the system of the same name (cold process tire retreads), has been operating in Angola since 15 July 1982. The company was contracted especially by the ETP (Public Transport Company), in view of the savings which this new process represents with regard to the recovery of tires.

Located about 500 meters from PETRANGOL [Angolan Petroleum Company], this plant has the capacity to process 76 tires per day; it employs eight Angolan technicians trained by the company itself and three foreigners. It is the only plant in the country to use the cold process; before now we have relied on the heat method of recapping tires, which is very expensive, not only in terms of the cost of the process but of the durability of the tires produced.

We visited the BANDAG facilities in the company of Antonio Simao Manuel and two other officials of the firm. Lopes da Silva, the Portuguese engineer, explained the advantages of recapping tires by the cold process. After the tire is inspected, the remaining tread is scraped away and the prevulcanized tread is affixed with rubber adhesive. After an air bag is inserted, the tire is placed in a kettle and heated to a temperature of 90 degrees [celsius].

Safe to say, this process is preferable to the hot process, which does not employ any prevulcanization, so the tires must be exposed to temperatures as high as 250 degrees [celsius], which reduces their durability.

Shortage of Old Tires Will Cut Production Rate

About 30 percent of the old tires are rejected, mainly tires which cannot be recovered by the system because they have been ridden on the rims for a long time or because they were damaged by misalignment. The company currently processes an average of 44 tires per day, or 1,200 per month. Last month, BANDAG made a great effort to recover 1,000 tire carcasses. As a result it will have to cut back its production rate next month to 22 tires per day, because it does not have enough old tires for its installed capacity. The carcasses (tires which appear to be spoiled or damaged beyond repair to those who are unfamiliar with the process) are scattered around the streets, yards and warehouses,

waiting to be noticed by someone who is aware that these dead or sleeping tires can be revived and who will put them on the path to rehabilitation and hence the path of technical and economic progress.

"In making retreads by the cold process, which is the BANDAG system, there are two imported components: one is the raw material to be applied, which is a fixed cost, and the other is the technical assistance which we are providing and for which we are paid (by the ETP), divided by the number of tires produced. In other words, the more tires are produced, the smaller the portion that is spent on technical assistance, and hence the lower the cost of the tire to the country," declared engineer Lopes da Silva, who is in charge of maintaining the equipment.

Advantage of Cold Process Retread Over New Tire

As we learned, in terms of durability, a recapped tire has a much longer life than a new tire, basically because the cold process retread has a greater thickness of rubber than the original (new) tire and has twice the road life of a new tire. Tires recapped by the heat process are subjected to high temperatures, causing overheating of the cord, which makes it impossible to recap the tire again by the cold process.

ETP To Expand BANDAG System, Train Angolans

One part of the warehouse (which is now used to store old tires) will be reserved for the installation of the ETP's Center for Technical Assistance for tires, which will have classrooms for theoretical instruction, a cafeteria and a cold storage chamber to maintain the tires at a temperature below 24 degrees [celsius] for a period of 4 months. The ETP will sponsor the first course in the technology of the cold process, to be administered in Angola for the first 6 months, followed by a 30-day internship in the United States or in Brussels. ETP has already begun to recruit candidates, who must have completed at least the eighth grade.

"We have a contract with BANDAG which is renewable annually. We reached the conclusion that we do not have to keep renewing these contracts; since the equipment installation contracts have already been met, we are thinking of placing Angolan cadres beside the BANDAG technicians, so that a few years, or even months, from now we can rely on our own skills," ETP general director Antonio Manuel said confidently.

Regarding the expanded application of the new system for recapping tires, geared particularly to his company, Antonio Manuel appealed to all the state and private agencies to turn in all their tire carcasses (which no one had considered repairing), especially now that there are plans to install a new service station, which can take care of 7 vehicles simultaneously in 20 minutes.

BANDAG Risks Shutdown

Aside from the shortage of old tires (which can be repaired in less than 8 working days), this specialized retread firm has for some time been storing 800 tires for customers who, according to the company director, have never

picked them up and run the risk that the tires will be sold to clear out the space. Another bottleneck is the shortage of benzene (produced by SONANGOL [National Angolan Fuel Company]), which will run out within days. It is noted that, for each day the plant is idle, 44 tires are not produced, with the consequent negative implications for the planned quotas.

Savings in Foreign Exchange

On going into operation, in 1982/1983 the plant produced 5,143 tires, corresponding to a savings, in this period, of \$666,532.80 in foreign exchange. In other words, if the ETP had had to purchase this number of tires, it would have spent \$1,028,600. "With this system of rehabilitation, each tire cost out at \$70.40," declared the ETP's financial director.

In the first 6 months of this year, the plant received 3,580 old tires and repaired only 2,174 of them (the remaining tires were rejected for reasons noted above).

"If we had had to import these 2,174 tires at \$200 apiece, we would have had to spend \$434,800. The cost per recapped tire was considerably less, at \$63.03. It should be noted that, in the first 6 months of this year alone, the country saved \$297,172.78, which comes to 19,410,950 kwanzas," added the financial director of ETP.

Company Charges Dollars to Foreign Firms

The ETP, which is the contracting company, has imported \$210,000 worth of raw materials to date.

The BANDAG plant, which is currently processing industrial tires (used for caterpillars, tractors, etc), has come to the rescue of such companies as the Port of Luanda and Paviterra, whose machines were idled for lack of tires.

In order to bring more foreign exchange into the company, it is currently recapping tires for Intertransport at \$90 per tire, which goes into the coffers of the company through the Department of International Operations of the People's Bank of Angola.

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ANGOLA

REPORT ON 'COMANDANTE JIKA' COMBAT SCHOOL

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 29 Jul 84 p 12

[Article by M. Correia]

[Text] The continuing state of war which has been inflicted on us for several years by the enemies of our revolution and the constant threat under which our martyred country is held by international imperialism through the racist Pretoria regime, its spearhead in Africa, have led us to take a series of defensive measures to safeguard our revolutionary conquests, since a revolution cannot be considered as such unless it can be defended.

Our armed branch, the FAPLA [Armed Forces for the Popular Liberation of Angola], which has been in existence for almost 10 years to the day, has demonstrated its fighting ability in the field many times through its successive routs of the enemy, notably the resounding victories over the UPA/FNLA/UNITA and mercenaries of several nationalities on the eve of our independence [and] over the regular army of South Africa in 1976, as well as the victories at Kangamba, Mulando, Mussenda, etc. Despite this glorious record--as we have said--it is absolutely necessary that our people maintain constant vigilance and, above all, the highest level of political and combat training, bearing in mind that "each citizen must see himself, necessarily, as a soldier," as we were taught by our late beloved Comrade President Agostinho Neto, and also that "the most important task at this moment is to defend our threatened country," as Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has told us.

It is in this context that a political and combat training course was initiated 3 weeks ago at the "Comandante Jiko" Political-Military School, to provide the leaders, officials, cadres and workers of the party, the mass organizations, the mass media and the National Union of Angolan Workers (UNTA) with the necessary political and ideological endowments.

The political-military training program is conducted every Saturday, starting at 0600 hours, and will last for 10 months, we learned from a reliable source yesterday when we went to the school to observe the various training sessions at close hand.

The classes at that political-military training center are currently being attended by party and government leaders, officials and workers of the party's national headquarters and its branches, of UNTA and of Radio Nacional de Angola. The next phase, which should begin soon, will include the OMA [Organization of Angolan Women], from the leadership to the rank and file.

JORNAL DE ANGOLA's news team focused its attention mainly on the platoon which included the party and government leaders, because of their total commitment to this training, without any complexes, even though their instructor was only a first lieutenant.

This group of leaders and officials were happily performing pushups, situps, jumping jacks and so on, on orders from their instructor.

Despite the advanced age of some of these comrades, they exhibited an impressive physical fitness.

The physical exercises, which lasted for about 50 minutes, were a real lesson and an example for younger people.

We noted that this class included Colonel Pedale, minister of defense; Roberto de Almeida, Central Committee secretary for ideological affairs; Mariano Puko, commissioner of Luanda Province; Evaristo Domingos (Kimba), minister of provincial coordination and of agriculture; and Bernardo de Sousa, first secretary of the People's Assembly, among others.

It is also noted that, obviously, the members of this group will not attend the political classes required of the other trainees.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

NEW APPOINTMENTS--In a dispatch published in the DIARIO DA REPUBLICA, Domestic Trade Minister Adriano dos Santos Junior named Francisco Elias Martins and Miguel Aguas Neto to the posts, respectively, of director of reorganization of provisioning of the population of Luanda Province and director of training of auto mechanics in the ministry's Wholesale Trade Department. The dispatch also terminated the service commissions of Victor Manuel Castro Ferreira and Albano Abrantes Jose, assistant general directors, respectively, of EDIMBA [National Enterprise for Distribution of Foodstuffs] and the northern office of the same enterprise. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 4 Aug 84 p 3] 6362

NEW DEPUTIES PRESENTED--Huila Province--Paulo Manuel, Afonso Chicanha and Jorge Antues, the three new deputies of Kipungo and Chikomba municipios and the commune of Kuleba, respectively, were recently presented by Paulo Manuel, coordinator of the Department of State and Judicial Organs, of the party's Provincial Committee. In Caluquembe, the provincial coordinator for state and judicial organs also inaugurated the seat of party cell militant on the municipal commission. In Ichimungolo, the [coordinator's] delegation spoke with the combat troops of that area. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 1 Aug 84 p 3] 6362

LUMBER PRODUCTION--In May and June, lumber production reached about 15,200 cubic meters: 10,000 in Cabinda Province and 3,000 in Bengo Province, according to an Agriculture Ministry report. The forestry sector, particularly in the lumber area, has functioned irregularly in recent times, which is reflected in the shortage of lumber on the domestic market. Of the 26 saw mills which used to be in operation, only 2 are in the process of rehabilitation, after President Jose Eduardo dos Santos issued an express directive, aimed at alleviating the lumber shortage which is being felt in the country, particularly in Luanda. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 2 Aug 84 p 12] 6362

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KEY REVOLUTIONARY FIGURE COMPAORE SPEAKS TO PRESS

Paris REVOLUTION in French 29 Jun-5 Jul 84 pp 18-19

[Interview with Capt Blaise Compaore by Andre Brecourt in Paris; date of interview not specified]

[Text] Capt Blaise Compaore, 33 years old and the "boss" of the paratroopers-commandos stationed in the city of Po, is a key figure in Burkina. He is the one who enabled Thomas Sankara to regain power on 4 August 1983. Considered the number two man in the government, he answered our questions at the time of his visit to Paris.

[Question] Since it took power on 4 August 1983, Burkina's revolutionary government has often been in the forefront of the news. The first 6 months of this year were filled with events. What is the present situation?

[Answer] Since it took power, the Burkinabe revolution has actually had many ups and downs, which were not our fault. They are due rather to those who cannot bring themselves to admit that the Burkinabe people intend to be the masters of their destiny. Those people will have to create a reason, especially since our revolution is growing stronger both quantitatively and qualitatively. The Burkinabe people are aware that they are today in the process of writing their own history. And that is extremely encouraging. Let us say that the revolution is growing stronger because thus far all its enemies have not succeeded in weakening it, despite their many plots and campaigns of deception.

[Question] What kinds?

[Answer] We consider them part of the normal course of history, because as long as we are committed to a revolutionary approach, there will inevitably be an attempt at counterrevolution. Since 4 August 1983, we have also had to deal with both internal and external enemies. In this regard, we can say that the teachers' strike in March was the first large-scale attack on the government. That strike was orchestrated from Paris by Professor Ki-Zerbo, whose ties to the Socialist Party [PS] are well known. There were many who were surprised at the severity of the decision opposing the strikers. The movement had to be broken, for if the government had shown weakness, other organizations were ready to go into action. That was part of a vast plan of destabilization. It was following this failure that reactionary forces decided to raise their action to the level of

violence, which is what we experienced with the conspiracy of 28 May, a conspiracy in which foreign complicity was proven.

[Question] Does such proof exist?

[Answer] Of course. For example, I can tell you that the military leader of that conspiracy, Col Didier Tiendrebeogo, former mayor of Ouagadougou, often visited the U.S. Embassy. During questioning, he explained that he was looking for work, which cannot be taken seriously. Everyone knows that his lifestyle wasn't that of someone destitute. What he wanted to obtain was a mobile radio station that could have been used in the conspiracy. The Americans have denied this, but Tiendrebeogo admitted his intentions. I can also tell you that he had received assurance that France and Israel would help to bring off that military coup d'etat. Taking advantage of the confusion thus created, the mobile radio would have announced that there were plans to fire on French citizens, which would have served as a pretext for French troops based in the Ivory Coast to intervene in order to assure the safety of French nationals. The airport would have been open to them thanks to the complicity of Lt Maurice Ouedraogo, who was responsible for its security.

[Question] Some observers believe that the sentences rendered were harsh....

[Answer] That's possible! But if the sentences were dramatic, there were also numerous acquittals. We have two lists in our possession. The first includes all those who were to be executed if the conspiracy had succeeded. It was exhaustive, believe me. The conspirators would not have used kid gloves. The second list included the names of the future members of the "new government."

We would not have been understood by the Burkina masses if we had not demonstrated firmness. Do you know that the people demonstrated in the streets to demand that an example be made of the conspirators? And that they expressed their views at length on the radio and in the press? The Revolutionary Court Martial noted the confessions of the conspirators and handed down the verdict now known. Things could not have been otherwise, especially since the anger motivating public opinion was aggravated by the fact that this conspiracy had foreign ramifications. This proves, if there is any need to do so, how much the Burkina people are devoted to the revolutionary process to which our country has been committed since 4 August 1983. In my opinion, that should raise some questions among those who are unwilling to understand the course of history.

[Question] You mentioned plots against your revolution. But hasn't it also had its own problems? For example, Burkina's friends have been disturbed by the dismissal of the minister of youth and sports, Ibrahima Kone, and the statements aimed at the LIPAD (Patriotic League for Development). What about this?

[Answer] I think that affair should not be dramatized. It is obvious that there is friction within the government coalition. How could it be otherwise? The situation in France between the PC [Communist Party] and PS is certainly similar. But insofar as we are concerned, that has nothing to do with the LIPAD and the Union of Communist Struggles [ULC].

The problem to which you refer is especially found at the executive level. Our comrade president assigned the minister of youth and sports the job of organizing, jointly with the CDR (Committees for Defense of the Revolution), the antiimperialist youth conference in a unified way. That couldn't be done. It was felt that Minister Ibrahima Kone was in some way responsible and the president took the necessary measures. However, tensions are subsiding and an exchange of correspondence has made it possible to clarify the situation. I repeat: let's not dramatize, let's not dramatize anything, even if the media has fanned the flames of this affair. As for those attempting to pit the LIPAD and ULC against each other, I can say that there aren't any contradictions, but rather there are differences, which do not jeopardize the government coalition in any way. The main enemy is imperialism and all progressive Burkina forces must unite against it.

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THIRD CONGOLESE PARTY CONGRESS ISSUES STATEMENT

Brazzaville MWETI in French 1 Aug 84 pp 4-6

[Text] Pursuant to Article 12 of the party bylaws and the provisions of Document No 84/034/PCT [Congolese Labor Party]/PCC/SG dated 20 April 1984 convoking the Third Regular Congress, the Third Regular Congress of the Congolese Labor Party was held between 27 and 31 July 1984 at the Congress Palace in Brazzaville, on the following theme: "Let us strengthen the leading role of the party and the links with the masses, and let us consolidate the conquests of the working people through the pursuit of the goals of 5 February 1979 with a view to a more profound revolutionary advance in unity, zealous work and peace."

The preparatory work for the Third Regular Congress involved all national levels within and outside of the party, through the preparatory and advisory commissions established by Documents Nos 83/063/PCT/PCC/SG and 83/064/PCT/PCC/SG dated 30 December 1963.

The organization of general assemblies and local congresses prior to the National Congress reflected, on the one hand, the fidelity of the Congolese Labor Party to the principle of permanent links with the base levels and, on the other, was dictated by the need to take the mass line into account in the leadership of the revolutionary process in our country.

The democratic discussions which developed in the course of these general assemblies and local congresses, both within the country and outside it, enabled the Central Committee to incorporate the precious contributions of the regional party committees, the National People's Army (APN) and the party committees abroad. These local congresses elected delegates to the National Congress in full democracy.

Comrade Denis Sassou-Nguesso, president of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party, president of the republic, chief of state and president of the Council of Ministers, presided at the opening session of the Third Regular Congress. Also present were his brother and friend, President David Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and more than 140 foreign representatives of friendly and brotherly parties in Africa, Europe, Asia and Latin America.

This ceremony included:

--The salute to the colors;

--Presentation of the flag of the congress;

--Greetings from the Pioneers, characterized by a moving cultural presentation and by the reading of extracts from the Pioneers' messages, region by region. The Pioneers urged the delegates to the congress, the party and the Congolese people to protect the revolutionary gains acquired through the noble struggle of the party and the state since the 5 February 1979 Movement, under the far-seeing leadership of the president of the Central Committee, Comrade Denis Sassou-Nguesso, whose reelection to head the party and the state they urged; and

--Greetings from the APN, which renewed its indestructible confidence in the president of the Central Committee, whose reelection to head the party and the state it also urged.

This brilliant ceremony ended with the presentation of the 4-hour report of the Central Committee by its president.

The participants in the congress followed this assessment report, which clearly traced the activity pursued in the course of these last 5 years by the party, the mass organizations and the state in the various sectors of national life, with great interest.

This moral report, which the delegates to the congress approved, provided the necessary clarification for the understanding of the justification for the concerns of the party and the state as set forth in the political, economic and sociocultural documents submitted to the congress for its evaluation.

On the political level, the president of the Central Committee redefined the People's Republic of the Congo as a land of peace with a people mobilized for independence, justice and peace, and resolutely committed at the side of the other peoples of the world struggling for a prosperous mankind without the exploitation of man by man. In order to allow the congress delegates to assess the efforts undertaken in the past 5 years at their true value, the characteristic aspects of the political situation before the victorious holding of the Third Special Congress in March of 1979 were recalled. Basically, this situation was characterized by the following facts: a hostile attitude toward the party and democracy, antiparty conduct, refusal to take up the question of a return to democratic life and the rehabilitation of the Central Committee, in the belief that the Congolese Labor Party and its mass organization had caused too much disorder to justify any credibility. All the evils were blamed on the party and salvation was to be sought elsewhere.

Taking this situation into account, the Third Special Congress, the crowning achievement of the 5 February 1979 Movement, allowed the Congolese Labor Party to redefine its political line, to undertake an ideological clarification, to rebuild the unity of the revolutionary forces and national unity and to reassert that the current stage is that of the national, democratic and popular revolution, with a clear content on the political, economic and sociocultural levels.

The victories won on the political level reflect the faithfulness to the commitments made at the Third Special Congress and the development of a new dynamics in the functioning of the party, both at the summit and at the base.

By launching the party again, by putting order in the administration of the state, and by ridding itself of the will for power as a line of conduct for the leadership cadres, and by reestablishing peace and tranquility for the people, the Central Committee believes it has done away with the basis of the 5 February 1979 disputes.

During the 5 years which have elapsed, the Congolese Labor Party has satisfactorily carried out its tasks of orientation and control. However, shortcomings have been observed, resulting in part from a lack of a suitable body with responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the decisions of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau.

The mass and social organizations have made contributions of many sorts to the consolidation of the party, but they will have to deal with the low level of motivation in their base structures.

In the National People's Army, the party has promoted the development of political structures in the armed forces, and has launched a dynamic policy of cadre training. Under its impetus, our armed forces have developed considerably. However, with a view to strengthening the leading role of the party and correctly applying the principle of single command, reforms have become necessary in the structures of the National People's Army.

On the economic level, it is important to recall that the economic situation prior to the Third Special Congress of the Congolese Labor Party was catastrophic, and was more particularly characterized by economic chaos and the chronic insolvency of the country.

In 5 years, an effort to effect recovery has been undertaken. The implementation of the supplementary and transitional programs has been completed to an appreciable extent. The first two sections of the 1982-1986 five-year plan have been satisfactorily carried out.

It is interesting to note the improvement in public finances, the launching of recovery for certain state enterprises, the establishment of new production units, the encouraging mobilization of financial resources, the creation of infrastructures for unifying the territory and the building of roads.

The reorganization of management of the whole of the state economic sector must represent an absolute imperative.

On the sociocultural level, substantial resources were mobilized to deal with the problems of education, health, labor, transportation and housing. Difficulties still exist and will be overcome as they are encountered, while each generation must play its historic role.

The president of the Central Committee stressed the problem of man, because he is the actor and the beneficiary of his own actions. Man is the decisive

factor in all labor, whether political, economic or sociocultural. The problem of the training and education of the Congolese citizen must be of greater concern to the party, the mass organizations and the state.

On the foreign relations level, the report of the Central Committee studied the situation in the world and the contradictions in which imperialism confronts the peoples committed to peace and justice. The report allowed the identification of the major conflicts existing in the world. They are often created by the imperialists, who fan and exploit them. It is important to combat imperialism resolutely.

The Congolese Labor Party warmly welcomed all the foreign delegations attending the Third Regular Congress, who have come to bear witness to their active solidarity with the Congolese revolutionary people.

The People's Republic of the Congo supports all the just causes being defended throughout the world by the progressive forces. It remains faithful to the principles which guide its cooperative relations with the other nations, to wit "a policy of openness, good neighborly relations, solidarity with the liberation movements, independence and international cooperation based on respect for the sovereignty of others and mutual interests, free of haggling or the alienation of our choices and principles." It is by applying these principles that the People's Republic of the Congo has won fame and a hearing on the international scene.

The participants in the congress then approved, without amendment and by a unanimous vote and acclamation, the following agenda:

1. Approval of the agenda
2. Verification of elected officials
3. Installation of:

--the presidium of the congress
--the secretariat of the congress
--the police force for the congress
--the technical commissions
--the accounting commission.

4. Approval of internal regulations
5. Approval of the report of the president of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party to the Third Regular Congress of the PCT
6. Study of the report of the Central Committee to the Third Regular Congress of the Congolese Labor Party, including:
 - political portion
 - economic portion
 - sociocultural portion
 - approval of the report of the accounting commission.

7. Approval of motions and recommendations
8. Election of the president of the Central Committee
9. Election of the Central Committee.

On the basis of this agenda, the participants in the congress undertook to verify the attendance of elected officials. Out of the 803 congressional delegates to the Third Regular Congress, the following were counted:

- 801 congress delegates present
- One congress delegate excused
- One congress delegate absent.

The delegates to the congress installed the presidium of the congress, which was composed as follows:

Presidium:

- president of the presidium--Denis Sassou-Nguesso
- honorary presidents--President David Kenneth Kaunda, Alvaro Cunhal, Pak Song-ch'ol, the heads of the foreign delegations to the Third Regular Congress.

Members:

- the members of the outgoing political bureau of the Central Committee
- Obami-Itou Andre, Pounqui Ange Edouard, Mounthault Hilaire.

Secretariat:

- head of the secretariat--Camille Bongou

Members:

Jean-Jacques Nicolas Mvouenze, Norbert Ngoua, Ambroise Gambouele, Alphonse Obelitala, Jean-Francois Tchibinda, Gabriel Moukanza, Clement Mierassa, Jeanne Dambendzet and Jean-Francois Obembe.

The delegates to the congress unanimously and by acclamation approved the internal regulations of the congress.

They then studied the political, economic and sociocultural documents of the Central Committee, as well as the report of the accounting commission.

1. Political Document

The delegates to the congress carefully examined every detail of the political report of the Central Committee.

They assessed the just nature of the analyses of the international situation by the Central Committee, and indicated their great concern about the ever

increasing aggressive activities of the imperialists, whose barbarism is sharply imposed upon the peoples in contempt of the rights of man and the international laws. The participants in the congress, in this connection, invited the forces of peace and progress to close ranks still further to face up to international imperialism with a view to safeguarding peace, justice and the well-being of the peoples.

On the domestic level, the delegates to the congress urged all the active forces in the country to redouble their vigilance and strengthen the conquests of the working people with a view to a more profound revolutionary advance. The members of the party should by their ethics, combativity and efficiency strengthen the leading role of the party and its links with the masses. The delegates to the congress recommended, moreover, more method and discipline in the encouragement of the base organs of the party and the mass organizations.

The participants in the congress took up questions pertaining to illicit enrichment and the arrest of the former president of the military committee of the party.

After profitable discussion, the delegates to the congress referred the issue of illicit enrichment to the legislative authorities. Generally speaking, the requirements pertaining to the ethics of party members greatly concerned the delegates to the congress, who decided to strengthen the party bylaws in this connection. The question pertaining to the arrest of the former president of the military committee of the party was referred to the Central Committee elected at the Third Regular Congress of the Congolese Labor Party.

2. Economic Document

Where the economic document is concerned, the delegates to the congress focused on the world economic situation, characterized by the crisis in the capitalist system, the effects of which are seriously threatening the economies of the Third World. The participants criticized the greed of the imperialists who, reaching like an octopus, take for their sole profit the meager resources of the peoples of the Third World.

On the domestic level, the delegates to the congress reasserted the need to provide our country with basic infrastructures with a view to opening up the back country. They expressed satisfaction with the praiseworthy efforts made by the party and the state to provide our country with a viable road network which can, on a regular basis, guarantee interregional trade and the supply of the urban centers, and the social achievements which are contributing in clear fashion to improving the living conditions of the people.

The delegates to the congress urged the working people to labor more industriously to guarantee the total success of the 1982-1986 five-year plan in order to ensure a radiant future for our young people.

The participants in the congress then took up the second 1987-1991 five-year plan. On this precise point, they noted a series of pursuits working toward the harmonious complementary functioning of the two plans.

3. Sociocultural Document

The delegates to the congress expressed their satisfaction at the efforts made by the party, the mass organizations and the state to deal with the sociocultural problems of the popular masses. They noted that the achievement of concrete activities to the benefit of the people is contributing to the effective strengthening of the leading role of the party and to guaranteeing its continuing links with the masses.

The catastrophic situation inherited from the period preceding the Third Special Congress in March 1979 prevented the achievement of more important results during the 5 years which have elapsed, although very substantial financial and material resources, never before equaled, were mobilized in the fields of education, health, social affairs, culture, arts, scientific research, sports, leisure and employment.

With particular regard to culture and social conduct, the participants in the congress stressed their serious concern about the cultural aggression of which the peoples of the Third World in general and the Congolese people in particular are being made the victims through the media--films, television, newspapers, periodicals, books, etc.

They urged the people to become aware of the scope of the sociocultural problems and the need for all to contribute to resolving them.

Following the study of the political, economic and sociocultural documents, the delegates to the congress confirmed that prosperous economic development is the basic condition for the correction of the evils confronting the Congolese people.

They praised the concern evidenced by the president of the Central Committee and the whole of the party for the harmonious development of the country, with the protection of the necessary unity which must exist among the political, economic and sociocultural sectors.

To this end, additional supplementary measures were urged, in the form of motions, resolutions and recommendations, to allow the Central Committee elected by the Third Regular Congress to direct and control the political, economic and sociocultural activities over the whole of the national territory efficiently.

4. Report of the Accounting Commission

The delegates to the congress studied the conclusions of the accounting commission on the financial and material administration of the Central Committee for the period from March 1979 to July 1984.

They evaluated the efforts made during the 5-year period, which have led to the establishment of a party financial policy, a financial system and a management system making control of the party's finances possible. The participants in the congress praised the creation of a party economic sector,

the main goal of which is the accumulation of resources, since the dues of the party members cannot be the sole source of financing for party activities.

They recommended that the economic units of the party which have been created or which will be created be made as profitable as possible so as to contribute to the operational budget of the party.

The delegates to the congress noted that between 1980 and 1984, the party budget developed substantially and this, linked with proper administration and control established on all levels, enabled the Congolese Labor Party to regain its credibility with both domestic and foreign, private and state suppliers. They discharged the Central Committee elected by the Third Regular Congress of its responsibilities, with praise for its excellent management.

After hearing and analyzing the explanations on the points of disagreement raised by the regional congresses, the participants in the congress dismissed them.

In conclusion, the whole of the report of the Central Committee elected by the Third Regular Congress of the Congolese Labor Party in March 1979 was approved, with amendments, by unanimous vote and acclamation.

5. Messages to the Congress

All throughout the sessions, the participants in the congress listened with great interest to the messages delivered by the 76 delegations representing friendly and brotherly parties who came to share 4 days of democratic and constructive discussion with the Congolese Labor Party.

All of these messages voiced the solidarity of the various parties with the national liberation battle being waged by the Congolese people and their vanguard, the Congolese Labor Party. Within this context, President David Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, honorary president of the presidium of the congress, conveyed to the Congolese people and the party the message of friendship and brotherhood from the Zambian people. President Kaunda urged the Congolese people's masses to strengthen their unity, rallied around the Congolese Labor Party and its leader, Denis Sassou-Nguesso.

With a view to still greater triumphs, President Kaunda urged the delegates to the congress to renew their confidence overwhelmingly in Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the combatant for freedom, unity and progress and worthy son of Africa, who is loved and adored in Zambia.

The national delegations, for their part, remained faithful to the will of the masses, greeting the congress while demanding the reelection of Denis Sassou-Nguesso as head of the party and the state. They made a solemn commitment to reflect the motions, resolutions and recommendations approved by this congress in concrete actions.

6. Motions, Resolutions and Recommendations

The delegates to the congress approved 44 motions, resolutions and recommendations pertaining to the main political, economic and sociocultural concerns of the people.

7. Election of the President of the Central Committee

Taking into account the will and the demand of the people expressed throughout the national territory through the meetings, support marches and motions of confidence in favor of Comrade Denis Sassou-Nguesso, both by the base structures of the party as a whole and by the mass organizations (UJSC [Union of Congolese Socialist Youth], URFC [Revolutionary Union of Congolese Women], CSC [Congolese Trade Union Confederation], UNEAC), the delegates to the congress unanimously approved, with a standing and lengthy acclamation, the reelection of the president of the republic as president of the Central Committee for a new 5-year term.

The delegates to the congress praised the exceptional qualities of the leader emeritus, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, and proclaimed the just nature of the will of the people, who have chosen to call him the man of the masses and the man of concrete action.

Comrade Denis Sassou-Nguesso thanked the participants in the congress for their fidelity to the people and the confidence they had just placed in him, and he promised to use every available resource to strengthen the leading role of the party, to guarantee its links with the masses, and to create the material and spiritual conditions capable of improving the life of the people's masses.

8. Election of the Central Committee

On the recommendation of the president of the Central Committee, the delegates to the congress unanimously and by acclamation, and in accordance with the new statutory norms, elected a central committee with the following 75 members:

1. Denis Sassou-Nguesso	15. Andre Mouele
2. Louis Sylvain-Goma	16. Lucien Goueguel
3. Lekoundzou-Itihi-Ossetoumba	17. Richard Eyeni
4. Jean-Michel Bokamba-Yangouma	18. Dominique Bouhouayi
5. Raymond Damase Ngollo	19. Jean-Jules Okabando
6. Pierre Nze	20. Victor Tamba-Tamba
7. Francois Xavier Katali	21. Ange-Edouard Poungui
8. Jean Ganga-Zandzou	22. Jacob Okandza
9. Andre Obami-Itou	23. Alphonse Ondonda
10. Jean-Pierre Nonault	24. Ossebi-Oko
11. Raymond Ndombi	25. Sylvestre Mbongo
12. Josephine Mountou-Bayonne	26. Zephirin Mafohana-Makosso
13. Alphonse Mouissou-Pouati	27. Gabriel Oba-Apounou
14. Christophe Moukoueke	28. Albert-Servais Obiaka

29. Alphonse Mboudo-Nesa	53. Francois Yvon Enkoura
30. Jean-Baptiste Tati-Loutard	54. Clement Mouamba
31. Antoine Ndigna-Oba	55. Pierre Moussa
32. Fulgence Milandou	56. Daniel Abibi
33. Wilson-Abel Ndeessabeka	57. Jean-Francois Obembe
34. Serge Raymond Mviri	58. Alphonse Gondzia
35. Gabriel Emouengue	59. Celine Eckomband
36. Jean Royal Kississou-Boma	60. Elise Gamassa
37. Ngouonimba-Nczari	61. Alice Badiangana
38. Michel Gangouo	62. Jeanne Dambendzet
39. Jean-Jacques Nicolas Mvouenze	63. Ballay Megot
40. Paul Mbot	64. Vital Balla
41. Boniface Bouka	65. Mbys Assolant
42. Edouard Okombi	66. Paul Ngatse
43. Norbert Dabira	67. Emmanuel Elenga
44. Michel Ngakala	68. Jean-Marie Mokoko
45. Hilaire Mounthault	69. Guy Pierre Garcia
46. Benoit Moundele-Ngollo	70. Norbert Ngoua
47. Camille Bongou	71. Richard Bongo
48. Bernard Combo-Matsiona	72. Maurice Claude Malela Soba
49. Charles Madzous	73. Jean-Francois Tchibinda
50. Alphonse Foungui	74. Clement Mierassa
51. Celestin Goma-Foutou	75. Edgar Diafouka Bambela
52. Ambroise Noumazalaye	

The Central Committee, in turn, elected a political bureau of 13 members, the responsibilities of which will be defined later in the course of the establishment of the Central Committee structures.

The Political Bureau is composed as followed:

1. Denis Sassou Nguesso	7. Pierre Nze
2. Camille Bongou	8. Raymond Damase Ngollo
3. Louis Sylvain-Goma	9. Francois Xavier Katali
4. Ange Edouard Poungui	10. Jean Ganga-Zandzou
5. Lekoundzou-Itihi-Ossetouumba	11. Hilare Mounthault
6. Jean-Michel Bokamba-Yangouma	12. Antoine Ndzinga-Oba
	13. Bernard Combo-Matsiona

The Central Committee also elected the members of the Central Party Control and Verification Commission. The commission is made up as follows:

--President--Andre Obami-Itou

--Vice president--Charles Madzous

--Members--Edouard Okombi, Josephine Mountou-Bayonne and Richard Bongo.

In conclusion, the delegates to the congress congratulated the party leadership for the activities undertaken in preparation for the Third Regular Congress of the party and the successful material organization of the congress, particularly where the working documents were concerned.

They expressed their satisfaction with the atmosphere of comradeship and the spirit of understanding which prevailed all throughout the discussions, which were characterized by the desire to place the general interest above personal interests.

Recognizing the fact that no congress in the People's Republic of the Congo had ever been as well-prepared for and organized, the participants in the congress congratulated the president of the Central Committee and asked him to strengthen the style of work which is currently being used within the leading organs of the party. They invited the Central Committee elected by the Third Regular Congress to see to it that the intermediary and base structures of the party improve their work methods with a view to greater efficiency.

Finally, the participants in the congress exhorted the militants of the Congolese revolution and our entire people to rally under the banner of their revolutionary vanguard in order to wage the battle for the effective construction of the socialist society in the Congo for which the founder of the party, Comrade Marien Ngouabi, sacrificed his life.

The next regular congress of the Congolese Labor Party will be held in 1989.

Brazzaville, 31 July 1984. Document approved by the congress.

5157
CSO: 3419/887

FACILITIES FOR TOURISTS DELAYED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 27 Aug 84 p 1M

[Article by Richard Paris]

[Text]

The reintroduction of tourism to Mozambique could be delayed until June 1985, says a spokesman for the country's appointed representative in Johannesburg.

Nearly six months after the Nkomati Accord, it appears that no real progress has been made to provide facilities for tourists.

Mr David Haddon, the managing director of Thomas Cook-Rennies, the company acting as the Mozambique tourist office in South Africa, said at the weekend that there were shortages of nearly all commodities.

"Maputo by Christmas" is being too optimistic, he said.

Other points he made:

- Maputo has nothing to offer holidaymakers — not even a cup of coffee outside the Polana Hotel.
- The country's currency is not linked to any other, and is grossly overvalued. The black market puts the rand's unofficial value about 1 600 percent above the official rate.
- Mozambique currency is not accepted at the Polana, the only hotel suitable for visitors. At the official rate of exchange, accommodation costs R100 a night.

Potential

● While SAA and the Mozambique airline LAM have agreed on a return airfare of R100 between Johannesburg and Maputo, it costs R160 return to fly from Maputo to Inhaca — a 10-minute flight.

● Shortages are commonplace. A dish of prawns at the Polana costs R40.

● By law visitors must buy R40 worth of the local currency at the airport, but there is nothing to spend it on.

● Accommodation on Inhaca Island, the first place to be opened to tourists, is rustic and costs R76 a night.

Speaking after a visit to Mozambique, Mr Haddon said: "Mozambique does have potential, but I believe businessmen and others have been making statements which indicate that tourism is about to take off there. This is definitely not the case."

CSO: 3400/2142

FORCES SAID READY TO CONTAIN EXTERNAL AGGRESSION

Kaduna SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN in English 15 Jul 84 pp 1, 4

[Text]

THE Chief of Army Staff, Major-General I.B. Babangida at the weekend assured the nation of the Armed Forces preparedness to contain any external aggression.

Major-General Babangida told newsmen during a brief interview in Abeokuta that Nigeria was more than ever before battle-ready for aggression of any kind.

The Army Chief who was in company of other top army officers was in Abeokuta for this year's Army Shooting Range Classification Exercise held at Alamala Army Cantonment along Abeokuta/Aiyetoro road.

Major-General Babangida who put the present strength of the army at 150,000 also appealed to Nigerians to be ready for any eventuality.

Major-General Babangida who was also asked questions on military equipment said that although the present austerity measures affected its procurement programmes, all was well.

He said that it was not true that the army was living in plenty amidst want, adding that austerity measures now prevalent in the country affected every facet and institution, including the armed forces.

He also disclosed that the phasing out of illiteracy among the rank and file of military personnel would be a gradual process spread bet-

ween 1984 and 1989.

Major-General Babangida refused bluntly to comment on Nigeria and British relationship over Umaru Dikko's affair. On the shooting range exercise, he said, "So far so good. The exercise is a continuous one and we learn a great lesson from it."

Earlier, General Babangida had during the shooting exercise scored 30 points, Col. Diya of Ogun State, (30 points) Brigadier M. Nassarawa, Army Adjutant General (20 points) and Col. Dogonyaro, (24 points).

Major-General Babangida had earlier enforced discipline when he sent some commissioned officers who missed all their targets during the shooting exercise for grass-cutting exercise "to serve as punishment for wasting ammunition".

CSO: 3400/2139

TASK FORCE TO PROBE ILLEGAL BUNKERING SETUP

Kaduna SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN in English 15 Jul 84 p 16

[Text]

THE Federal Military Government has set up a task force to probe all known cases of illegal bunkering in the country.

The task force comprises detachments from the armed forces and the police.

This was disclosed on Wednesday by the Naval Commander in charge of Tactical Naval Task Force, Warri, Commander A.B. Ajumogobia when he paid a courtesy call on the Bendel State Military Governor, Brig. J. Useni in his office.

He told the governor that the Warri Naval Base would take responsibility for all ports in the Delta area of the state as well as check all illegal bunkering and smuggling activities.

Commander Ajumogobia called for public co-operation in the bid to eliminate illegal bunkering and other forms of smuggling capable of destabilising the national economy.

He disclosed that the ship needed for the naval base duties would arrive within a fortnight.

Replying, Brigadier Useni commended the Chief of Naval Staff for granting his request for the establishment of a naval base in the state.

This, according to him, had become necessary to provide the necessary security in the Delta area since external attacks could come from anywhere.

Brigadier Useni called on the officers of the base to work hard in ensuring that the base was developed to the standard of existing ones in the country.

CSO: 3400/2139

70,000 HECTARES OF LAND LOST TO MINING IN PLATEAU

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 13 Jul 84 p 10

[Article by Andrew Orolua]

[Text]

SEVENTY thousand hectares of valuable farmland had been lost to mining activities and gullies in Plateau State, the Military Governor of the State Navy Captain Samuel Atukum has said.

He said at the launching of the national annual tree planting campaign in Jos that the effect of mining activities on land in the state had led to serious environment degradation.

The conservative estimate of which experts put at 7,200 square kilometres, representing about 100,000 tonnes of soil being lost to gully erosion in the state.

The governor said in attempt to reclaim these lost land, the government had spent over one million Naira since 1979 on reclamation of over 100 hectares of mine-land along Vom-Kuru Road.

He observed that the potential areas for food crops production in the state had been on the decline as a result of scant vegetation cover, loss of top soil by erosion and other agents.

He said although the administration was gearing efforts towards alleviating the problems caused by these erosion against by implementing fuel and pole plantation projects, the actual requirements of afforestation are beyond the meagre resource of the state.

He regretted that the state was not included in the arid zone afforestation programme. He said the exclusion of the state by the

civilian administration was an unfortunate affair, adding that the criterian used in curbing our areas termed "Arid Zone" did not take into account actual physical problems existing in some parts of the country, particularly the virtually tree-less 694.68 square kilometers of Jos Plateau.

The governor appeal to the Federal Government to give mineland reclamation due attention as other mining activities and include Plateau State as one of the beneficiaries of the "arid zone afforestation programme". He further urged that the people of the state make it their personal duties to ensure the expansion of wood land by planting tree every year.

The State Commissioner for Agriculture and Natural Resources Mr. S. U. Mama, had earlier in his address said that what was require to put a stop to forest resources depletion was to make the people develop forest consciousness.

He said the ministry plan to achieve this through constant information to people on the usefulness of tree planting. He said the Ministry of Agriculture has raise over 700,000 eucalyptus seedling for this year planting programme out of which 3,000 each will be given to local government.

Mr. Mama said each of the post-primary and primary school in the state have been given 500 and 250 seedling respectively for planting this year.

CSO: 3400/2136

DELTA STEEL COMPANY GETS IMPORT LICENSES

Kaduna SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN in English 15 Jul 84 p 16

[Article by Clement Eluaka]

[Text]

THE Federal Military Government has approved import licences worth 73 million Naira for the Delta Steel Company (DSC) for the purchase of spare parts and raw materials.

This was disclosed to newsmen in Aladja, Warri, by the acting general manager of the company, Mr. Tachia Jooji.

Mr. Jooji said that of the amount, 26 million Naira has been processed into letters of credit while supplies worth eight million Naira have been received by the company.

According to him, as soon as the company gets its full supplies of raw materials, its production out-put would increase, adding that it was too early to quantify in terms of Naira, revenue accrued to government annually from Delta Steel.

This, he said, was because the company was commissioned in 1982 and used most parts of 1983 for guarantee tests of its equipment for peak performance of its finished products. He said that production started in earnest this year.

Mr. Jooji stated that lack or adequate power supply was one of the major constraints militating against the company in its production out-put.

This, he explained, resulted in the use of only two of the four giant furnaces used for the burning of scraps for the production of steel.

Answering a question, Mr. Jooji explained that contract of the company's power plant was among those reviewed by the Onosode Project Review Panel, adding that he hoped the Federal Government would enforce it so that the project can take-off to supplement power to the company.

On the termination of the company's retainerships of private clinics, the general manager re-emphasized that he saw no point in paying millions of Naira for such clinics when the company runs its own hospital with about 25 doctors and 120 nurses.

"Funds must be conserved by all means" he added.

Meanwhile, the management of the company has rejected the report of a probe panel which investigated the fire incident that destroyed some equipment worth about 3 million Naira in the company.

Speaking to newsmen who paid a familiarisation visit to the plant in Warri, Mr. Jooji said management rejected the report because it was inconclusive and very vague.

According to him, the report was vague that it neither identified the cause of the fire nor was it able to generate a remote motive for it.

He said because the management was dissatisfied with it, hence it had handed the issue to federal government intelligence agencies comprising the NSO, Police and the Army intelligence.

Mr. Jooji said that as soon as investigation were completed, government would make appropriate recommendation as regards its findings.

Commenting on the repairs made to the conveyor belt which was destroyed by the fire, the acting general manager said that the incidence nearly crippled the company's production output but for the competence of Nigerian engineers and technicians in the company.

Answering a question, Mr. Jooji told the newsmen that immediately after the fire, the company contacted some expatriate technicians to do the repairs but after a series of dialogues, arranged about 150 of its own technicians and engineers to repair the belt.

The company, he said, saved 3 million Naira by repairing the belt locally.

CSO: 3400/2139

PRICES OF ESSENTIALS IN KADUNA GO UP BY 200 PERCENT

Kaduna SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN in English 15 Jul 84 p 16

[Article by Tajudeen Ajibade]

[Text]

EFFORTS made by the government of Kaduna State to flood the markets with essential commodities, have been thwarted by middle-men, in connivance with some officials of big supermarkets and government agencies.

And because of their dubious role in distributing such items, prices of all commodities have gone up by almost 200 per cent.

Investigation by our reporter in Kaduna during the week, revealed that the officials are allegedly selling commodities to their known middle-men who, in turn, resell at exorbitant prices to the members of the public. It was gathered from some women who always stand in queues for all the commodities, that officials entrusted with the selling of these items hoard the materials and sell them to middlemen.

Those interviewed at the premises of big supermarkets such as Leventis, Kingsway, PZ,

GBO and John Holt—all in Kaduna — complained of the lukewarm attitude of officials and law enforcement agents in checking the dubious role of the companies.

They alleged that commodities such as rice, semovita, milk, detergents and flour allocated to middlemen were openly sold at a higher price outside the stores without any intervention. Some of the officials also have agents outside where they usually direct customers to go and purchase commodities, provided they can buy them at higher rates.

It is also alleged that intelligence personnel detailed to monitor such sales were always busy looking for their own share of such commodities.

At the Kaduna Central Market, some traders alleged that big-time

A venture manager in one of the big stores said to be involved in the deal dismissed the allegations when contacted.

CSO: 3400/2139

GROUNDING OF AIRCRAFT FOR SPRAYING MAY CAUSE CROP FAILURES

Kaduna SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN in English 15 Jul 84 p 16

[Article by Emman Udoka: "Aerial Spraying of Pesticides Paralysed"]

[Text]

AERIAL spraying of pesticides on farm lands has been paralysed in most parts of the country, following the grounding of nearly all aircraft involved in the exercise.

As a result, large quantities of (especially grain) crops may be lost this time to pests.

A prominent rice farmer from Bauchi State told the Sunday New Nigerian in Kaduna how he lost "nearly half" of his crop to pests last growing season due to lack of aircraft spraying of pesticides.

According to the source, concerned farmers who resort to the Federal Department of Pest Control Services for assistance, are given motor vehicles which "cannot do the spraying well."

Contacted at the Department's Office in Kaduna during the week, the Director, Dr. B.K. Na'Isa, speaking through his secretary, preferred to withhold his comment on the situation "until after two weeks or so," when efforts reportedly being made to "mobilise" contractors for the job, are expected to materialise.

However, an official of the department, who expressed surprise at the secrecy shrouding the issue, hinted that the prevalent difficulty in obtaining import licence was responsible for the situation.

"The jobs were contracted out long ago. But the contractors have their own problems, which include lack of import licence for materials they need for the job," the official said.

The Sunday New Nigerian also learnt that acting on suspicion that the contractors might have collected mobilisation fees and abandoned the jobs, crack detectives were deployed from Alagbon Close, Lagos, a few months ago to investigate why the spraying of pesticides has been "abandoned."

Some officials of the contracting firms were reportedly arrested and whisked away to Lagos for interrogation.

But when it was discovered that other problems were responsible for their inaction, they were released, the source added.

CSO: 3400/2139

DECLINE IN PEANUT PRODUCTION BLAMED ON LOW PRICE

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 16 Aug 84 p 16

[Article by Sani Haruna]

[Text]

GOVERNOR of Bauchi State, Brigadier Muhammed Sani Sami, has said poor pricing policy was the major cause of the continuous decline in the production of groundnut.

He said unless the Nigerian Groundnut Board (NGB) offered good price for groundnut, farmers would be reluctant to grow it.

He said for the same reason, our farmers smuggled the produce to neighbouring countries where they got higher prices.

Brigadier Sami told the zonal manager of the board in Bauchi, Malam Abubakar Monju, when he visited him that it was disturbing that Nigeria, which was one of the leading groundnut producers in the world, had turned a major importer.

He urged the board to do everything possible to reverse the situation, for the good of our economy and welfare of the people.

Department, Railways, Nigeria Airways, Labour Office, and the NYSC Secretariat.

He commended the board for establishing a 500-hectare seed multiplication farm in Goram near Bauchi and advised the board to explore all avenues of restoring the country's lost glory in groundnut production.

Earlier, the zonal manager had said the board had planned tight security measures to ensure that our groundnut was not smuggled out of the country this season.

He said as a morale booster to farmers, the board had increased the price from 450 Naira per metric tonne last year, to 650 Naira per tonne this year.

He mentioned other incentives given to the farmers and expressed optimism that soon the situation would change.

Earlier Brigadier Sami visited the P & T., NEPA, Immigration

CSO: 3400/2136

ROADS SAID INADEQUATE TO GET PRODUCE OUT

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 1 Aug 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Mambilla's Travails"]

[Text]

THE Nigerian Television Authority carried an astonishing report on its network programme last week about the Mambilla Plateau of Gongola State.

According to the report, badly-needed foodstuffs produced in the area, famous for its rich fertile lands, could not be evacuated due to the infamous reason that there is no motorable road leading into or out of it. The visual reports showed trucks, desperate enough to attempt a drive up the mire that goes for the roads, sunk to their trunks and bogged down. Other cameras caught milkwomen throwing away milk they could neither consume nor sell; sweet, unadulterated milk Nigerians trapped in the cities are dying to

quaff. Tea leaves from the successful plantation established there a few years ago, were seen rotting away.

In a circumstance such as we are, these things can hardly be said to be unthinkable. However, it is at times such as now where hunger has threatened security and where food wherever found, is sold at incredibly high prices, that such reports assume extraordinary meaning.

The Mambilla story correctly underlines the topsy-turvy planning of successive Nigerian governments. In our travail and travel as an independent nation, experience has shown that the various governments have hastened to build good road networks and other white elephant projects in the cities where the elites stay, leaving the rural

areas high and dry. The Mambilla case illustrates also what goes on in similarly remote areas that hold out promises of being the nation's breadbaskets. If federal authorities are looking for any further reason before re-thinking altogether our planning processes, this assuredly is one.

Meantime, vital foodstuffs wasting away on the plateau must be retrieved. The federal government must link Mambilla and other food regions with centres of consumption.

Let's face it, government could very easily be cheated out of its goal of ensuring food sufficiency for the country, if as it happened in the past, the rural areas remain neglected in the supply of basic infrastructures.

CSO: 3400/2136

NIGER FARMERS BOYCOTT RICE MILL

Kaduna **SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN** in English 5 Aug 84 p 1

[Article by Tajudeen Ajibade]

[Text]

THE six million Naira Baddeggi Rice Processing Mill near Bida in Niger State may not start production in September as scheduled.

An official of the mill told the Sunday New Nigerian at Bida that the shortfall in the quantity of paddy rice produced by farmers in the state has made the opening of the mill in September unlikely.

According to the official, the mill would require 30,000 tonnes of paddy rice annually from local farmers when in full operation.

But as at now, the mill has only 4,000 tonnes of paddy rice in stock, which were bought from farmers in Borno, Gongola and Bauchi states.

"Surprisingly", the official said, "not a single tonne of rice has come from farmers in Niger state", where the mill is located.

Sunday New Nigerian investigations revealed that besides the apathy of local rice farmers, the functioning of the mill might be adversely affected by the clash of interests between the Nigerian Grains Board and the Niger River Basin Development Authority, over the purchase of paddy rice from local farmers.

As a result of the infighting, many local rice farmers have refused to sell their rice to the mill.

The Principal Mill Engineer, Alhaji Shehu Yero, at a separate interview, expressed sadness at the attitude of the local rice farmers.

According to Alhaji Shehu, the mill would produce 2,400 bags of milled rice per day, when in full operation.

He expressed optimism that this would help alleviate the scarcity of the commodity in the country and reduce rice importation as well as force down the price.

Alhaji Shehu then appealed to local farmers to plant more rice in order to sustain the project and thereby boost food production in the country.

He urged interested paddy rice farmers to sell their produce to the mill through the Nigerian Grains Board's zonal offices or depots in the country.

The Baddeggi Rice Processing Mill, now nearing completion, would require a workforce of about 120 workers of all categories, as the production process it uses is not labour-intensive.

CSO: 3400/2139

NIGERIA

BORNO ASPHALT PLANT TO START PRODUCTION SOON

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 6 Aug 84 p 16

[Article by Waziri Garba]

[Text]

Borno State owned Marini Asphalt plant which had been idle since its inception three years ago, will go into production soon, the state Commissioner for Works and Housing, Malam Isiaku Aliyu Jafiya, has said.

The asphalt plant was set up by the defunct civilian administration in the state to produce various forms of concretes necessary for the local construction of roads but had not been put to use since the machines were installed in 1981.

Work at the plant, which cost the state government more than one million Naira, was hindered by lack of fund to purchase other auxiliary items necessary in starting the project, the New Nigerian learnt.

The "auxiliary items" include a standby generator, trucks for conveying crushed stones to the plant, bitumen (coaltar) and other "ingredients", estimated at about 900,000 Naira.

However, when the money was not forthcoming, machines at the plant remained idle since then.

Sources at the state Ministry of Works told the New Nigerian that the Marini Asphalt plant, capable of producing 95 to 135 tonnes of asphaltic concrete and bitumen "may be out of order soon if it is not put to use immediately because the machines are depreciating gradually".

The commissioner, said the government was not going to leave the plant to waste away because, according to him, "it is a priority project".

CSO: 3400/2136

WARNING ISSUED ON NOT CURBING POPULATION

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 17 Aug 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Our Population"]

[Text]

SOME 145 countries and international organisations, including 18 from the world's least populated countries of Africa and Asia, turned up at the 9-day U.N.-sponsored Mexico conference on population last week. At departure, delegates approved a final document titled 'Mexico Declaration.'

The document noted that global population growth rates had fallen from 2.03 to 1.67 per cent but that total population was projected to grow by about 90 million annually until the year 2000. It said 90 per cent of the population increase will be in the developing countries which would have a combined population of some 6.1 billion by the end of the century.

The declaration called for an early action to control population growth, curb death rates and resolve problems arising from immigration.

No matter how hard we try as a nation, Nigeria cannot escape having to come to terms with the issues raised at Mexico. There are many who would describe our position on population today as worse than untenable. The country's population is spoken of by foreign organisations and individuals usually in terms that suggest its rate of growth is cataclysmic, multiplying itself by 3 per cent each year and set to double every 20 years.

For all that, the Nigerian is surely more likely to react in embarrassment than alarm when confronted with such statistics. He simply has no figures to go by — any figures. He labours under UN-inspired guestimates that put our number at between 80 and 100, even 120 million. Irrespective however of whether there are 50, 100 or 150 million Nigerians, there is already a large measure of the usual manifestations of overpopulation: environmental degradation, malnutrition, high unemployment rate, social turbulence etc.

Therefore, aside from determining just how many we are, our nation will do well to examine the arguments for bringing her population growth under firm control. From the point of view of politics and economics, the country seems an uncontrollable enough place as it is. This having given rise to vague but falacious belief that we are helpless in the grip of forces we cannot control. But we surely do have a choice and do not need to drift into position of willing victims of fate. A nation, no less than an individual, possesses will-power to direct its own destiny, to learn from the experience of others and the power to choose to be ugly or beautiful.

Since it stands to reason that we want the best for ourselves, there is an ample need to plan all aspects of our national life. The time to plan our population growth is now.

POLICE SAID NOT WELL EQUIPPED FOR RELIGIOUS RIOTS

Kaduna SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN in English 8 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Etim Inyang]

[Text]

THE Inspector-General of Police, Mr. Etim Inyang, on Friday told the tribunal of inquiry into the Jimeta disturbances in Yola that the police were not adequately equipped to execute their duties in clashes between religious groups.

He said that all major recommendations by the Aniagolu Panel of Inquiry into the Kano religious disturbances in 1980 that affected the Police Force had been implemented except equipping it for operational purposes, and attributed this to lack of funds.

Mr. Inyang said that the Police Force was not supplied with records of aliens by either the NSO or the immigration department as recommended by the Aniagolu Panel.

Also testifying, the Director of Immigration, Alhaji Lawal Sambo, said that the recommendations as they affected his department had not been implemented in full.

He said that the department was not yet responsible for the registration of aliens and that the provision of sufficient operational staff and equipment had not been met.

Alhaji Lawal told the tribunal that no joint patrol unit comprising the Army, Police, NSO and the Department of Immigration was formed before the military take-over. He added that his department could not take over the registration of aliens from the NSO because the defunct National Assembly did not enact a

law to effect the transfer.

He said that French was being taught in the immigration training school in compliance with the acquisition of language skill for immigration officers recommended by the tribunal.

Alhaji Lawal also said that most junior members of staff were being recruited from the areas where the department's offices were located to ease language problems.

Earlier, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mr. Justice Lawal Uwais, said that the tribunal had six weeks to submit its report to the Head of State and warned that anybody who refused to attend this inquiry when summoned would be summarily punished with a fine or imprisonment.

He said that the tribunal would sit in public, except when it would not be in the public interest for any particular matter to be publicly disclosed.

The tribunal, which began sitting at the defunct house of assembly hall, Jimeta-Yola on Friday, was set up by the Head of State, Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, to probe the circumstances; involvement of groups or persons and determine the motives behind the disturbances.

The tribunal is also to identify the political, social, economic and other problems which caused religious disturbances in parts of the country, the role of law enforcement agencies, including the Army, and to assess the loss of lives and property during the disturbances. (NAN).

CSO: 3400/2139

BRIEFS

TIN MINING INCREASE--LAGOS--A government plan to make the nation's tin mining companies more viable has been set in motion. The plan, which involves the rationalisation of the tin mining companies operating in the country, has been in the government's drawing board for some years now. But Minister of Mines, Power and Steel, Alhaji Rilwany Lukman who disclosed this said, that a machinery for the implementation of the plan had been set up, explained that the objective was to "bring the five companies now working separately to form one strong company, and by so doing, save operational and overhead cost. "This, he said, would make the tin industry more viable". A review of the structure of the tin mining industries has become necessary, because of the declining fortunes from sales of the metal. This has been brought about by low and unstable market prices for the metal whose sale is now governed by quota allocation which producing nations have imposed on themselves. Alhaji Lukman explained that the tin companies, when fully rationalised, would keep the same level of output but at lower cost. The present structure of the tin mining companies, he said, was suitable 15 or more years ago when their total output was about four times what it is currently. "Now that we are producing less, there is the need to adjust". Though the rationalisation plan is expected to take a long time to be accomplished, Alhaji Lukman explained that some savings had already been made by harmonising the operations of the different companies and by organising joint workshops. [Text] [Kaduna THE DEMOCRAT WEEKLY in English 19 Aug 84 p 10]

RIVER BASIN AUTHORITIES--Military Governor of Kaduna State, Air Commodore Usman Mu'azu has commended the decision to establish River Basin authorities in all the states. Exchanging views with the General Manager of the newly established Kaduna State River Basin Development Authority, Alhaji Imrana Yaridu at the Government House on Tuesday, the governor, said government would do everything possible to encourage the development of agriculture in the state. He expressed the hope that the authority would play a major role in accelerating agricultural activities of the people and would contribute immensely towards improving the lots of rural farmers. Earlier, the general manager had expressed concern over the non-activities at the Kangimi Dam since it was established in 1970 and appealed to the government to allow the authority the use of facilities at the dam like the fishing industry. Alhaji Imrana said the authority was finding it difficult to settle about 96,000 Naira rent for the zonal office in Kaduna. [Text] [By Aliyu Modibbo] [Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 16 Aug 84 p 9]

STEEL COUNCIL SACKS 300--THE National Steel Council, Exploration and Mining Division, Kaduna, has laid-off about 300 junior workers. The New Nigerian gathered that the staff involved were clerks, cleaners, messengers, labourers and watchmen who were on salary grade levels 01 to 02 and who have served the council for between five and 11 years. According to one of the retrenched workers, Malam Mohammed Abdu, a clerical assistant in administration section, workers affected were mainly from administration, accounts, drilling audit and laboratory departments. He said those affected in other departments would receive their letters of termination in due course. In the letter of termination addressed to the 300 workers and signed by H. Abdurrahman on behalf of the director of the council, it stated that "in view of reduction in our exploration activities due to financial constraint, the council is forced to act down on her manpower requirements. We regret to inform you that your services are no longer required with effect from August, 1984". [Text] [By Shitu Saude] [Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 18 Aug 84 p 16]

CSO: 3400/2136

SENEGAL

REVITALIZATION OF BUSINESS SOUGHT

Dakar AFRICA in French May 84 pp 107-08

[Unsigned article: "For a Revitalization of Business in Senegal:
The C.N.E.S. [National Council of Senegalese Employers]]

[Text] Saturday 21 April 1984 will no doubt constitute an important milestone in the history of Senegalese employers. [This is] not because of the great number of participants in the day of study organized by the National Council of Employers of Senegal (CNES). Nor is it because of their quality, which however was of a high level. In reality, what will be recalled of that day is the fact that for the first time in Senegal a public demonstration, extensively covered by the official media, was organized in the name of business as a national entity "whatever its form, dimensions, or nature may be," in order that it may play, and because it must fulfill, "a determining role in the projected society which is being formulated in Senegal," as M. Amadou Mactar Sow clearly stated. These words of the CNES president are the more meaningful since they were pronounced by a Senegalese who is chief of one of the largest and most modern industrial enterprises in Senegal, with wholly private and Senegalese capital.

Inadequate Management Structures

Some people will be surprised that one had to wait until 1984 for such a thing to be publicly stated. That is partly due to the socialist environment, which was hardly favorable to business, and on the other hand, to existing management structures which were not in a position to defend business nor to promote it. In the first place, these structures included such associations as the UNISYNDI (Industries and TP) [Public Work], the SCIMPEX (Importers-Exporters), and the SYPAOA [West African Employers and Artisans Union] (Small and Medium Businesses and Small and Medium Industries). These latter do hold the economic power. But they are mostly composed of foreigners with limited powers of intervention, which forces them to avoid the major fundamental questions and to confine themselves solely to economic and technical problems.

In addition to these associations, Senegalese businessmen grouped themselves within a GES [Economic Groups of Senegal]. Their political power

reflects their economic weakness. They are more concerned with safeguarding their personal interests, or even surviving, since their operating conditions are a little unreasonable and precarious, than with defending business against a socialist environment, whose support, they seek.

Finally, torn between the two types of management organizations, there were Senegalese company managers, trained in modern management concepts, heads of companies of foreign origin, or of companies they bought back, and promoters of family or individual enterprises. Their training and their professional concerns sharply distinguish them from the businessmen grouped within the GES but they hesitate, however, to cut themselves off entirely from activity within the normally constituted management associations, and so they accept being members and who participate in them more or less discreetly.

Such a situation is hardly satisfying to either the Europeans, who are aware of the limits of their authority and are concerned about being replaced by the [local] nationals; or the Senegalese managers, who are increasingly worried by the rising economic difficulties, and who are aware of the effects this could have on their own future, and on the future of their country.

Creation of the CNES

These were the company managers who a few months ago formed the National Council of Employers of Senegal.

Does the CNES have some ulterior political motive in setting themselves up outside the GES, which is firmly included within the domain of the PS? Should one see in its creation a more or less open disavowal of the chief of state's current policy? Certainly not. No one is questioning here either the wish of the chief of state to bring Senegal out of the crisis, nor his personal qualities. The popular consensus which confirmed him as head of state in 1983 demonstrates this. The great majority of Senegalese are behind him, and have confidence in him. The issue is therefore economic. The future depends on the success of economic recovery.

True, the deficit is burdensome but world economic recovery, which is being confirmed, permits one to maintain hope.

Recovery is possible, provided that the hazards of climate do not frustrate our efforts. It is a matter of capacities. However, the structures that the administration has developed, whether they be administrative bodies, state or mixed investment companies, have shown their inability to control economic development over these past 20 years.

The Role of Business

There is no question about the importance of the role private enterprise should play within the framework of economic recovery, and in consequence,

in any action favoring the advancement of business and its integration within the nation.

One must consider the creation of the CNES from this point of view and that is why its development is of particular importance. For the first time an authentically Senegalese management structure, headed by experienced businessmen familiar with modern industrial production and commercial development techniques, takes it place before the nation. For the first time a Senegalese management organization intends, not to defend its class interests or its individual interests, but to encourage business as an instrument of development and as such to participate fully in the projected society now being elaborated by those close to the chief of State. However, one must be realistic. Everyone in Senegal, for personal or ideological reasons, does not view the appearance of CNES favorably. Moreover, its current members, whatever their ability may be as yet only represent a relatively small portion of the economy even if an increasing number of foreign company managers are joining them.

Thus, it is to be hoped that in the more or less near future, the proliferation of management structures will end, for the benefit of a homogeneous entity which will have sufficient economic weight to make the voice of the private sector heard by the authorities and by the nation, and to engage and maintain, in its name, a fruitful dialogue with the authorities and the social partners.

In this way, and in this way alone can private enterprise fully carry out its mission of development, currently being hampered by the suspicion of a large part of the administration, and by the many obstacles arising from this.

9772
CSO: 3419/858

SOUTH AFRICA

COLORED ELECTION RESULTS REPORTED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 24 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Anton Harber]

[Text] The United Democratic Front has hailed yesterday's election results as conclusive evidence that the coloured people have rejected the new constitution and have called on all those elected to withdraw immediately.

And the UDF believes that the "overwhelming success" of the boycott campaign in the coloured elections will convince many doubtful Indians to join the boycott of next week's elections.

At a Press conference yesterday, Mr Popo Molefe, the UDF general secretary also said the continued detentions of leaders was exacerbating the already volatile situation.

And in Cape Town the UDF said: "This constitution does not have the support of the people. At least 82% of so-called coloured voters have not given coloured or any other political parties a mandate."

The UDF said the Rev Allan Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party, had received a mandate from less than 20% of voters in his own constituency of Swartkops in real terms.

Ms Sheryl Carolus, Cape Regional secretary of the UDF, said polls in the rural areas were "not a great deal higher" than in the urban areas and numbers of registered voters in a number of constituencies had dropped by as much as 30% since the old Coloured Representative Council elections.

"They do not have a mandate either in the Cape or anywhere else in the country," she added.

Pointing out that 751 of the 1 439 votes cast in Grassy Park had been special votes — more than the 688 people who actually went to the polls — Mr Manuel said "many questions" surround-

ed special votes cast in the election.

He claimed old age homes had "virtually been raided" by candidates, with elderly people being "forced to vote under threat of having their pensions cut off".

There was mixed reaction from other sources on the result.

In Pretoria, the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, blamed "demolishers" for the very low poll in some areas of the Cape Peninsula.

Also, a fair number of coloureds still showed no interest in exercising their political rights and would have to be taught about democracy by their leaders, he

said.

Mr Chris Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, said the Government intended to go ahead with the new constitution despite the relatively low percentage poll.

Mr Fred Peters, national secretary of the Labour Party, described his party's victory as "hollow".

His party had received a mandate, but "not to the extent we expected", he said.

Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the Progressive Federal Party, said the new Constitution would begin life with a credibility problem.

"In some instances the

Cape Peninsula candidates have become fully fledged members of Parliament in two or three-cornered fights with less than 10% of the registered persons voting," Dr Slabbert said.

- In Nairobi, South African Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu said the poll was being used to entrench racism and called on blacks in South Africa to voice their opposition to a constitution that ignored their needs.

"Coloureds and Indians are being co-opted to entrench racism and help perpetuate white minority rule as the junior partners of apartheid," he said.

- In Dar Es Salaam, the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity said the small turnout amounted to "a rejection".
- In Pretoria, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Louis Nel, said the low poll could be attributed to intimidation and boycotts in some areas.

Despite this, the elections "judged by international standards", were not a failure. They could be described as a success.

He denied that the Government had assisted the Labour Party to win.

- In Washington, the US State Department said it was

"concerned" by the detention of UDF leaders, and said it was in touch with South Africa "to seek information".

- In The Hague, the Dutch Government criticised the "wave of arrests" before and during the election, and indicated an official protest to South Africa might follow.


In the United Nations last week Holland said the elections would be "null and void" as they did not include South Africa's black majority.

The synods of the two main Reformed churches in the Netherlands yesterday sent a telegram to the SA Embassy protesting against the detentions.

Police yesterday confirmed that 152 people had been held countrywide. Charges include loitering, malicious damage to property, assault, using abusive language and other offences.

In the Witwatersrand area alone, 43 people were detained yesterday. In the Eastern Province, 24 people were detained by police, while there were 28 arrests in the Northern Transvaal, 18 in the Orange Free State, three in Soweto, 18 in the Western Province, six on the East Rand and two in Natal.

--Mr Kabela Lengane, leader of the Azanian Students Movement, said the detentions were a "knee-jerk reaction" and he warned that the student boycott might spread "unless the Government starts acting responsibly".



All the Results

TRANSVAAL

ALRA PARK

P Jacobs (LP)	2 800
P Roman (PCP)	280
I Sampson (FP)	313
LP majority	2 487
Spolt papers	31

Percentage poll..... 54,8

BOSMONT

D D Nienhoudt (LP)	834
A P Booysen (FP)	834
No majority	
Spolt papers	0

Percentage poll..... 32,2

EERSTERUS

W Campbell (PCP)	1 094
P Damons (FP)	1 378
L Deewrance (LP)	4 200
LP majority	2 822
Spolt papers	56

Percentage Poll..... 59,34

ELDORADO PARK

T Alexander (FP)	420
A Hansrot (RFP)	284
C Jacobs (PCP)	490
D Mateman (LP)	2 763
LP majority	2 263

Spolt papers..... 17

Percentage poll..... 36,3

KLIPSPIRUT WEST

B Anthony (FP)	767
D Prinsloo (PCP)	167
J Reeves (LP)	1 869
C Seefort (Ind)	369
LP majority	1 202

Spolt papers..... 28

Percentage poll..... 37,95

NEWCLARE

P Booysen (FP)	427
L du Prest (PCP)	351
G R Wessels (LP)	1 616
LP majority	1 188
Spolt papers	31

Percentage poll..... 26,7

NORTHERN TVL

C Abrahams (FP)	102
A Campbell (PCP)	62
J Smith (LP)	585
LP majority	483
Spolt papers	2

Percentage poll..... 58,24

REIGER PARK

T Adolph (Ind)	627
A Jaffra (FP)	86
J Rabie (LP)	3 835
LP majority	3 208
Spolt papers	81

Percentage poll..... 50,7

RUSTE TER VAAL

T Louw (LP)	3 542
S Petersen (FP)	1 137
LP majority	2 405
Spolt papers	52

Percentage poll..... 68,5

TOEKOMSRUS

A McNelis (Ind)	235
A H Otto (FP)	1 268
I Richards (LP)	1 792
LP majority	504
Spolt papers	30

Percentage poll..... 39,50

NATAL

DURBAN SUBURBS

C Kippen (LP)	621
P Marcus (PCP)	278
LP majority	343
Spolt papers	12

Percentage poll..... 18,8

GREENWOOD PARK

A Fynn (PCP)	98
T Potgieter (Ind)	183
D Young (LP)	1 317
LP majority	1 134
Spolt papers	17

Percentage poll..... 22,02

NATAL INTERIOR

N Bond (PCP)	483
E Dunn (LP)	1 573
LP majority	1 090
Spolt papers	31

Percentage poll..... 40,6

NATAL MID-EAST

N Baxter (PCP)	129
M Hopkins (Ind)	6
M Lewis (LP)	903
H Peterson (Ind)	368

LP majority..... 535

Spolt papers..... 22

Percentage poll..... 21,3

WENTWORTH

T Abrahams (LP)	1 336
M Fynn (PCP)	1 133
LP majority	203

Spolt papers..... 10

Percentage poll..... 26,61

ORANGE FREE STATE

A Appies (RFP)	214
A Julius (FP)	109
G Macalal (LP)	1 774
LP majority	1 560

Spolt papers..... 22

Percentage poll..... 57,39

HEIDEDAL

F Beukes (FP)	88
B Grobler (LP)	1 558
H Titus (Ind)	115
LP majority	1 443

Spolt papers..... 14

Percentage poll..... 49,6

EASTERN FREE STATE

P Saunders (LP)	Unopposed
G Louw	Unopposed
J Smith	Unopposed
LP majority	1 933

Spolt papers..... 0

Percentage poll..... 59,38

WESTERN FREE STATE

A Hankan (PCP)	156
G Roekrans (LP)	2 089
J Snyman (FP)	45
LP majority	1 933

Spolt papers..... 0

Percentage poll..... 59,38

CAPE ADDO

I Daniels (PCP)	970
P Hendrikse (LP)	4 388
C Jolles (RFP)	533
LP majority	3 418

Spolt papers..... 50

Percentage poll..... 46,7

BELHAR

A Poole (LP)	826
F Sellidor (Ind)	85
S Wessels (Ind)	662
LP majority	163

Spolt papers..... 11

Percentage poll..... 8,77

BERG RIVER

G Ceres (LP)	2 589
W Soles (Ind)	531
C Scheepers (Ind)	369
LP majority	2 058

Spolt papers..... 39

Percentage poll..... 25,44

BETHLESDORP

W Dietrich (LP)	5 958
S Marongo (PCP)	203
LP majority	5 755
Spolt papers	66

Percentage poll..... 29,8

BISHOP LAVIS

N Iesse (LP)	1 589
P Marais (PCP)	854
LP majority	735
Spolt papers	6

Percentage poll..... 17,72

BOKKEVELD

D Adams (LP)	2 519
Y Rhoda (Ind)	2 545

Ind majority..... 26

Spolt papers..... 40

Percentage poll..... 40

BONTEHEUWEL

J Delport (PCP)	52
P McKenzie (LP)	950
LP majority	908
Spolt papers	5

Percentage poll..... 8,8

BORDER

W George (FP)	788

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D Kanyiles (PCP).....	866	S Jonker (RFP).....	116	Percentage poll.....	30,14
K Webb (Ind).....	334	V Sass (LP).....	1 168	SCHAUDERVILLE	
LP majority.....	3 062	LP majority.....	943	W Africa (FP).....	1 024
Spolt papers.....	42	Spolt papers.....	6	G Jules (PCP).....	331
Percentage poll.....	81,8	Percentage poll.....	11,8	C Redcliffe (LP).....	3 935
HAARLEM		MID KAROO		LP majority.....	2 911
C Green (LP).....	4 411	B Japhtas (PCP).....	125	Spolt papers.....	30
A La Fleur (PCP).....	702	D van Staden (Ind).....	336	Percentage poll.....	32
G Tee (RFP).....	662	R Williams (LP).....	5 121	SILVERTOWN	
LP majority.....	3 709	LP majority.....	4 785	K Khan (LP).....	85
Spolt papers.....	85	Spolt papers.....	38	F Peters (LP).....	723
Percentage poll.....	44	Percentage poll.....	47,89	LP majority.....	627
HANOVER PARK		MITCHELLS PLAIN		Spolt papers.....	9
J Bennett (PCP).....	163	S Carolus (RFP).....	44	Percentage poll.....	7,88
K Lategan (LP).....	732	J Kennedy (PCP).....	143	SOUTHERN CAPE	
LP majority.....	589	L Landers (LP).....	946	G Bardien (PCP).....	207
Spolt papers.....	14	LP majority.....	803	C Ebrahim (LP).....	2 057
Percentage poll.....	8,5	Spolt papers.....	14	LP majority.....	1 850
HANTAM		Percentage poll.....	8,7	Spolt papers.....	38
L Hartzenberg (PCP).....	1 163	NORTHERN CAPE		Percentage poll.....	28,8
J Krieger (LP).....	3 631	C Botha (Ind).....	1 067	SPRINGBOK	
LP majority.....	2 468	A Davids (PCP).....	254	D Bassir (RFP).....	564
Spolt papers.....	48	L Jenneke (LP).....	3 204	J Engelbrecht (FP).....	527
Percentage poll.....	42,7	D van Wyk (FP).....	375	M Friedberg (LP).....	2 109
HAWSTON		LP majority.....	2 147	LP majority.....	1 845
A Adriance (LP).....	1 746	Spolt papers.....	51	Spolt papers.....	61
P Carolus (Ind).....	494	Percentage poll.....	48,7	Percentage poll.....	36,5
C de Bruin (Ind).....	462	NUWEVELD		STEINKOPF	
LP majority.....	1 252	P Bowers (PCP).....	919	A Baile (Ind).....	1 155
Spolt papers.....	36	S Easop (LP).....	4 809	C Cloete (FP).....	67
Percentage poll.....	23	LP majority.....	3 890	J du Plessis (Ind).....	288
HEIDEVELD		Spolt papers.....	91	G Links (LP).....	2 999
F Adams (PCP).....	213	Percentage poll.....	42,06	LP majority.....	1 244
A Johannes (LP).....	453	OTTERY		Spolt papers.....	47
LP majority.....	240	D de la Cruz (PCP).....	629	Percentage poll.....	38,72
Spolt papers.....	10	W Pieters (LP).....	474	STRANDFONTEIN	
Percentage poll.....	6,83	PCP majority.....	155	S Arendse (RFP).....	42
KALAHARI		Spolt papers.....	19	J Clavert (PCP).....	67
J Daries (PCP).....	83	Percentage poll.....	8,87	P Harris (LP).....	444
A Jolies (LP).....	6 226	OUTENIQUA		LP majority.....	377
J Smith (FP).....	464	S Herwals (LP).....	5 706	Spolt papers.....	9
LP majority.....	5 762	E le Fleur (PCP).....	3 252	Percentage poll.....	9,48
Spolt papers.....	82	LP majority.....	2 454	SUURBRAAK	
Percentage poll.....	52,5	Spolt papers.....	195	P Harmse (LP).....	2 454
KAREE		Percentage poll.....	41,8	C Hartnick (FP).....	1 601
J Stevens (Ind).....	1 80	PNIEL		J King (Ind).....	186
C Sweetland (LP).....	2 627	D Curry (LP).....	unopposed	LP majority.....	953
LP majority.....	1 347	RAVENSMEAD		Spolt papers.....	58
Spolt papers.....	54	G Blouws (Ind).....	306	Percentage poll.....	32,8
Percentage poll.....	32,04	J Christians (LP).....	2 038	SWARTKOPS	
KASSELVLEI		M Jacobs (PCP).....	168	A Hendrikse (LP).....	8 020
P Cloete (Ind).....	532	E Malie (RFP).....	41	A Thy (PCP).....	2 284
C Cupido (PCP).....	153	LP majority.....	1 732	LP majority.....	6 728
C Fortuin (RFP).....	164	Spolt papers.....	31	Spolt papers.....	47
J Pilcher (LP).....	1 191	Percentage poll.....	22,9	Percentage poll.....	46,5
LP majority.....	659	RAWSONVILLE		SWARTLAND	
Spolt papers.....	17	B Andrews (LP).....	2 132	G Leith (PCP).....	1 388
Percentage poll.....	14,46	P Carelse (Ind).....	540	J Dethuizen (LP).....	3 687
LIESBEEK		LP majority.....	1 582	LP majority.....	2 298
A Stanley (LP).....	271	Spolt papers.....	29	Spolt papers.....	41
D Williams (PCP).....	47	Percentage poll.....	17	Percentage poll.....	33,8
LP majority.....	224	RETREAT		TABLE MOUNTAIN	
Spolt papers.....	4	G Morkel (LP).....	822	M Arendse (LP).....	118
Percentage poll.....	5,24	L Veldeman (PCP).....	172	S Hoosen (PCP).....	115
MACASSAR		LP majority.....	750	LP majority.....	3
S Abels (Ind).....	335	Spolt papers.....	10	Spolt papers.....	1
L Henderson (PCP).....	436	Percentage poll.....	8,7	Percentage poll.....	4,14
C Herandien (LP).....	1 752	RIETVLEI		UPINGTON	
LP majority.....	1 355	C Britain (Ind).....	122	G le Fleur (PCP).....	512
Spolt papers.....	27	S Fester (PCP).....	37	M Swart (LP).....	5 657
Percentage poll.....	18,78	H Ross (LP).....	1 002	LP majority.....	5 145
MAMRE		B Simons (Ind).....	367	Spolt papers.....	85
A Croutz (PCP).....	286	LP majority.....	635	Percentage poll.....	42,42
A Williams (LP).....	4 847	Spolt papers.....	20	VREDENDAL	
LP majority.....	4 651	Percentage poll.....	16,18	C le Fleur (PCP).....	1 472
Spolt papers.....	83	RIVERSDAL		P Meyer (LP).....	2 579
Percentage poll.....	34	D Joseph (Ind).....	2 950	LP majority.....	1 107
MANENBERG		P Klink (LP).....	2 838	Spolt papers.....	50
J Delport (PCP).....	128	Ind majority.....	112	Percentage poll.....	40,4
R Lackay (LP).....	294	Spolt papers.....	49	WUPPERTAL	
J Samuels (RFP).....	18	Percentage poll.....	43,97	T de Leeuw (Ind).....	526
LP majority.....	168	ROBERTSON		E Jones (Ind).....	387
Spolt papers.....	8	E Jones (Ind).....	284	C Wylsard (LP).....	2 652
Percentage poll.....	4,7	W Meyer (LP).....	3 206	LP majority.....	2 126
MATROOSFONTEIN		LP majority.....	2 922	Spolt papers.....	55
A de Bruyn (PCP).....	225	Spolt papers.....	45	Percentage poll.....	34,1

COLORED ELECTION OUTCOME ANALYZED

'Loss for Constitution'

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 7

[Article by Brian Pottinger]

[Text]

WHAT began as an election has been dramatically transformed into a referendum.

On Wednesday nearly three-quarters of the coloured electorate cold-shouldered the new constitution. A similar proportion of Indian South Africans are likely to do the same on Tuesday.

The crucial question — as it has been from the beginning of the election campaign — is not who won but how they won. On Wednesday Allan Hendrikse's Labour Party won — and the new constitution lost.

Why were the polls so low given the efforts of the State to awaken interest?

The Government response is to partly attribute the poll to out-of-date rolls, lack of campaign money for parties, "negative" publicity and intimidation of voters by the boycott lobbies.

The first two reasons have some validity, the third and fourth substantially less.

Virtually every newspaper called upon the coloured electorate to vote while the SABC waged a ceaseless campaign. So much for "negative publicity".

Most of the serious incidents — firebombings and clashes with the police — took place in the Transvaal. Yet in that province percentage polls were higher than the Western Province, which was supposed to be the heartland of the intimidators.

In the Cape, the election day atmosphere was one of apathy rather than tension and in polling stations across the Peninsula bored policemen often outnumbered voters.

If there was intimidation it was that of peer-group pressure against individuals not to take part — and in the normal ebb and flow of politics that can hardly be called criminal.

Apathy

Perhaps there were other contributory causes to the low poll. Sheer apathy of voters, the SABC's clumsy propagandising alienated many people in the community and, of course, the eve-of-poll detentions hardly helped candidates seeking to justify their participation in the elections by claiming they intended opposing the apartheid system.

But the nub of the problem is that this new system is neither trusted nor supported by most coloured South Africans. The euphoria at having "captured" the Labour Party overshadowed a more fundamental truth — a few celebrity swallows do not make a constitutional summer.

This rejection of the "new deal" by a broad sweep of the newly enfranchised is — no less than the outcome of the white referendum in November — a political reality that both the Government and the country cannot escape.

What are the immediate implications of the poll?

It means, firstly, the boycott faction has dramatically upped the "legitimacy capital" the Government is going to have to invest to make the new deal work.

Some participating coloured MPs privately said they had hoped for a low poll so the Government would be forced to move swiftly to salvage some credibility for the institutions — and that means repeal of apartheid measures, redistribution of resources and phasing out of discrimination.

Secondly, it establishes the "boycott" lobby in South African politics firmly at centre-stage; the Labour Party's efforts in the early '70s pale in comparison to the mobilisation and organisation undertaken by the UDF and affiliates.

New life

It has breathed new life into old resistance organs such as the Natal Indian Congress.

Thirdly, it questions the credibility of the elected leaders. Feeling isolated, they may move closer to the Government and by a slow process of co-option end up genuine co-administrators of apartheid rather than dismantlers. Hopes that this constitution could be used to end apartheid rather than prolong it would then be dashed.

And finally, it irrevocably establishes the Labour Party as a predominantly rural-based "populist" party. Its future policies and direction will be shaped by this conservative element.

Another referendum is meanwhile pending in Natal on Tuesday when the elections for the Indian House of Delegates take place. At the centre of this frenetic campaign lies the cruel dilemma of a pacifist minority crushed between two supposedly implacable majorities — Zulu nationalism and white domination.

The mobilisation is taking place at two levels.

One is the nitty-gritty of campaign electioneering by the five establishment parties and 76 independents while at another level lies the activities of the boycott lobby spearheaded by the NIC. In organisation they are streets ahead of the establishment parties — one NIC source says they have visited all 125 000 Indian homes in Natal.

As in the coloured community the debate between the participating parties is drowned in a much wider one about participation itself. Thus far the exchange has been at the rhetorical and not physical level.

Personal relations between black and brown Natalians remain at a cordial level, although Indian voters are conscious of the implied rejection of Zulu interests if they vote — memories of 1949 run deep.

Ultimately, it could be this factor which persuades most Indians to stay away from the polls.

Establishment parties talk in terms of a poll average of between 35 and 50 percent. The NIC concedes the poll will be higher than the low watermark 8.8 percent in the SAIC elections but are working for a 15 to 20 percent showing.

Deja vu

Between the participating parties it appears the comparatively well-organised National People's Party of Mr Amichand Rajbansi is set to win the majority of seats.

The prognosis for a high poll is not good.

A low percentage poll in the House of Delegates elections, together with the House of Representatives showing, will leave South Africa with a terrible sense of *déjà vu*.

We were there before. At the NRC, the CRC, the SAIC, the management committees, the new black local authorities; all designed without consensus, executed without legitimacy and conducted without prospects.

The Government faces a tough battle to wrest success from the tricameral parliament against such a background of failed institutions.

(Report: B C Pottinger, 77 Burg Street, Cape Town.)

Second Fight for Bosmont

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 7

[Article by Brian Pottinger]

[Text]

NOT so long ago it would have been resolved in a sporting way — the two level-pegged candidates would draw lots to see who would win the election.

But since those early Union days the electoral procedures have been streamlined, technocratised and sanitised.

Mr Arthur Booyens of the Freedom Party and Mr D Nieuwenhout of the Labour Party are going to have to refight the Transvaal constituency of Bosmont after their 834-vote tie on Wednesday — the fourth in South African electoral history.

Internal Affairs officials said this week the date for the new election could be announced within a few days — thus sparking another round of election fever and enabling

the Labour Party to bring its full election machine to bear against the much smaller Freedom Party.

In terms of the law the Returning Officer has to declare a poll null and void if there is an exact tie. The vacancy remains and has to be refought.

The first electoral tie was recorded in the 1910 elections when the candidates for Vryheid both tied with 377 votes. It was settled as between gentlemen — by drawing lots.

The 1921 elections yielded two ties; in Marico and Witwatersberg. In the former the candidates tied with 1 211, and in the latter it was 943 votes. The electoral law — by this time less adventurous — called for a rematch. The old South African Party won both seats in the second round.

(Report: B C Pottinger, 77 Burg Street, Cape Town.)

Rural Voters Put Labor in Power

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 7

[Article by Brian Pottinger]

[Text]

THE Labour Party has emerged as a predominantly rural party — a remarkably similar constituency profile to that of the National Party in its earliest days.

In Wednesday's low-poll elections the party pulled in

support from rural areas — where just less than half the coloured population live — but failed to penetrate the Cape urban heartland of the coloured population.

The high rural support — less educated and more conservative than the city communities — could have a

powerful influence on the Labour Party's future.

The great void in support for the Labour Party or the constitution itself in the Cape urban areas will be of major concern in the future.

Setback

Main areas of support are:

- The 40 Cape rural constituencies where percentage polls were high in comparison with the dramatically low urban polls — up to 52 percent in Griqualand West.

- The Eastern Cape where the Rev Allan Hendrickse's personal stature and a strong party organisation brought reasonable polls — up to 46,5

percent in the Labour leader's constituency of Swartkops.

Statistically, however, the national impact of the Eastern Cape vote is not that significant as only 5,98 percent of the coloured community live in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan area.

- In the OFS the Labour Party also scored high polls in the three out of five seats that were contested.

But again the statistical figure is offset by the small size of the constituencies — in the OFS they average only 3 472 voters compared to the average 14 219 in the Cape.

- In the 10 Transvaal constituencies the Labour Party

also fared relatively well because of the tight party organisation.

Highest rural percentage poll was in the Northern Transvaal with 59,24 percent and highest urban was Reiger Park where Transvaal Labour Party leader Jac Rabie scored 50,7 percent.

Lobby

But again the actual number of votes cast was limited and the significance at a national level reduced — about six per cent of the coloured population lives in the PWV metropolitan area.

- In Natal rural areas the LP scored well against the

boycott lobby — it drew 40,5 per cent in the Natal interior, largely due to the personality of its candidate Mr E Dunn.

But the Labour Party's greatest setback was in the Western Cape's 20 Peninsula seats where 40 percent of the coloured population live.

Nearly 40 percent of the total coloured population lives in the 20 constituencies and an estimated 35,5 percent of the eligible voters are there.

On that basis it is estimated that no more than 7,9 percent of eligible voters in the Peninsula actually went to the polls.

(Report: B C Pottinger, 77 Burg Street, Cape Town.)

Inexperience Caused Low Poll

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 7

[Article by Stephan Terblanche]

[Text]

THE Government should not blame intimidation as the most important reason for the low percentage poll in this week's elections.

The most important factors include a lack of party funds, the use of outdated voters' rolls, delimitation according to the Population Register and lack of election experience among candidates.

These are the views of a man who helped the Labour Party to its landslide election victory, Mr Kobus du Plessis, director of Communitec, the public relations consultancy engaged by the LP to help it prepare for the elections.

Mr du Plessis says that the Government is giving more credit than is due to the United Democratic Front (UDF) and other boycott groups by blaming intimidation for the poor turnout.

"The elections turned out 100 percent according to our predictions, based on the problems we were experiencing," he says. "In the light of this we are very satisfied with the result."

"The late delimitation of constituencies prevented us from organising on a con-

stituency basis at an early stage, thus also placing a burden on the inexperienced party machinery. But the LP managed, nonetheless, to build up a strong organisation.

Problems

"One of our problems was a lack of funds. My consultancy was involved in raising funds for the party. Only a few companies made a reasonable contribution — but they were the exception."

Mr du Plessis said that outdated voters' rolls caused considerable problems, as

did a delimitation which used the Population Register.

"We would have a thousand voters in one constituency and 22 000 in another. In the Rev Allan Hendrickse's Uitenhage constituency we had to get some 1 000 people an hour through the polls.

"This placed a heavy burden on the party organisation. One more constituency in that area would have resulted in a higher percentage poll for the Eastern Cape."

But the most important factor contributing towards the low percentage of voting, says Mr du Plessis, was the inexperience of the majority of candidates — most of whom were taking part in an election for the first time. It was also a first for most of the party organisations.

CSO: 3400/2141

CONTINUED WHITE CONTROL OF SOUTH AFRICA FORESEEN

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 26

[Article by Simon Jenkins: "Apocalypse Never..."]

[Text]

THE significance of the Nkomati Accord has yet to be fully understood by Africa watchers.

It was never part of the script, and foreign observers professed amazement as the envoys of apartheid consorted with Frelimo's erstwhile guerrillas.

Not only that: South Africa was calling the shots. Where was the inexorable tide of black revolution? Well, little in Africa conforms to expectations.

Forecasting political events is usually left to journalists and polisters; their judgments can be read today, wrapped round the fish tomorrow and, with luck, forgotten.

Yet in Southern Africa they do matter. Here, prediction forms the basis, not just of policies, but of attitudes of mind — and for the past two decades, prediction, has been wrong.

Mention an interest in South Africa at a political function and you will be asked, after being acquitted of pro-apartheid sympathies, "how much longer do you give it, then?"

Always the crisis looms,

leaving us so imbued by the metaphor that we do not know how to gauge events which appear to contradict it.

Such thoughts are regarded as treasonable to the prevailing liberal ethic. Apartheid is one of the last moral issues to be regarded as simple in a world otherwise determined to find them complex.

It flaunts the oppression which every nation fears it shows towards minorities; by condemning it openly and vociferously, we hope to expiate some of our own guilt.

The suggestion that white rule in South Africa is not imminently doomed is therefore treated not as a political judgment, but as an admission of original sin.

The high point of the apocalyptic school was in the late '70s when South Africa's protective ring of white-ruled states collapsed under the leftwing militarisation of Angola and Mozambique, the growth of Swapo in Namibia and increased tempo of war in Rhodesia.

Internal was added to external pressures. Among them, nationwide riots and

a flexing of muscles by trade unions.

To the naive observer, these seemed precisely the portents of doom which liberal prophets had predicted.

Certainly it all had the effect of anaesthetising Western (and Eastern) policy-makers; why should they worry about South Africa when the march of history was about to relieve them of the problem?

It was an issue which brought left and right together in joint intellectual disengagement.

Let us not argue about it, they said, since the whole thing will look different in a few years.

The movement for boycott, sanctions, economic withdrawal, and cultural and intellectual ostracism drew its widespread strength from this general conviction that it would all be temporary.

By failing to disentangle moral feelings from proper analysis, Western observers produced predictions that were simply wrong.

They set their face against comprehending South Africa, while encouraging the frontline states to think they could also ignore her — or worse, that a few strong words would blow apartheid down.

For what it is worth, I believe the central failure was not in over-estimating the strength of black aspirations to overthrow white rule.

It was in not appreciating the power of Afrikanerdom, rooted as much in its determination to survive as in its economic and military might.

A loathing of how that power manifested itself, in apartheid, led to Afrikanerdom being grossly underrated.

The past three years have shown how great was that mistake. From losing a guerrilla war, the South African army has turned to the experience of winning one.

Observers overestimated the ability of Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique to sustain military operations, both against neighbouring states and even within their own borders.

They underestimated the growth of internal dissent in the front-line states, and South Africa's readiness to use that dissent to destabilise them.

Similarly, far from weakening South Africa's position, economic ostracism has strengthened it.

Those proposing it proved too optimistic, on

the one hand, about the world's ability to find a substitute for gold and, on the other, about South Africa's ability to develop import substitution (notably in armaments).

They exaggerated the economic capacity of the frontline states to reabsorb skilled labour; were not fully aware, indeed, of the debilitating impact of state socialism on post-colonial economies.

It was predicted, further, that the internal cohesion of the National Party in South Africa would disintegrate.

To illustrate the prediction, every sign of such disintegration was graphically analysed: the split in the Broederbond, absenteeism in the army, the growth of the ultra-right parties.

The vacillation of the Government over petty apartheid was another sign of uncertainty.

South Africa did not know where it was going; the old Afrikaner assurance had gone, rotted by too much money and too long a period in power.

Some of this was true, yet it does not appear to have led to the predicted result: a collapse of the white "will to rule" similar to that which occurred in Rhodesia.

The recent history of Afrikanerdom will, I am sure, be seen as a series of shifts in position, some nervous, some confident, to confront a changing real politik.

The first adjustment was demanded by the evolution of post-colonialism elsewhere in Southern Africa, the second by the need for a form of "neo-apartheid" more appropriate to a developed industrial economy.

South Africa's response to the first has so far been

remarkably successful, again defying all predictions.

The army has thrown overboard the apologetics of the Foreign Affairs Department.

Pretoria has stopped pleading with the world to love South Africa despite apartheid.

Instead, it has gone on the regional offensive, bluntly assuming that the enemy must at least shake your hand if your gun is in his back.

F

or none of this will the outside world love South Africa, say the policy exponents — but then, who cares?

Those emperors of suasion — notably UN resolutions — have no clothes. South Africa has for a decade been victim of a bluff: that world opinion mattered and better behaviour by South Africa would win it round.

The past two years have seen that bluff called and the black states of Southern Africa forced (with help from several successive years of drought) to treat with their newly assertive regional superpower.

They need South Africa more than South Africa needs them. The frontline states cannot possibly form themselves into an alternative force to confront South Africa economically, politically or militarily.

This has been apparent for some time; what has been lacking is a framework of regional understanding which reflects this unequal balance of interdependence.

The Nkomati Accord was a step towards one, helping to lift the fog of unrealism.

Having shown the region its readiness to bite, Pretoria's State Security Council is waiting to see how the

region responds.

It is banking on the governments in Maputo and Luanda loving power more than they detest apartheid.

South Africa has been able to play on that ambition and thus establish a new hegemony over them.

As a result, the context for predicting South Africa's future has changed.

The idea of southwards-rolling revolution seems ludicrous. If there is any revolutionary danger, it is of South African counter-revolution rolling northwards.

Equally, the role of the West is diminished. Washington's Chester Crocker continues his valiant struggle to see the Cubans out of Angola and a majority government in Windhoek (for which he at least deserves a long-service medal) but even a mutual withdrawal agreement is of less moment than Unita's increasing control of the hinterland and the need for Angola to talk turkey with Pretoria.

Internally, the shifts demanded of pragmatism are less easy to divine. Predictions of the results of liberalised government have not so far proved correct: black trade unionism has not led to general strikes and group-areas restriction and continued influx control have not produced vagrant bands of revolutionaries.

Far from collapsing, the National Party Government under Mr P W Botha has won a remarkable referendum victory; if anything, it is his enemies to the left and right who are in disarray.

It is abundantly clear that what is now termed "the white tribe of Africa" will be in rough and ready control of South Africa for the foreseeable future.

This may not be a comforting prediction, but it is not manifestly destabilising.

Stability in Africa can no

longer be considered inextricably linked either to democracy or to black majority rule.

This should already have demolished one traditional policy stance of successive American and European governments: that the continuation of white rule in South Africa is itself the major destabilising element in the region; that apartheid is communism's best ally.

T

his is patently not the case today. On the assumption that Pretoria's own regional destabilisation policy is at an end (for the time being) South African military force and certainly South African economic strength properly conducted may yet be seen as able to bring about relative peace and prosperity in Southern Africa.

The development of a non-apocalyptic scenario for South Africa will not alter the world's attitude to apartheid.

What it might do is affect the extent to which that attitude is reflected in policy.

Policies adopted by Western nations in the past — on the premise that white rule would soon end — appear to have achieved the reverse of what was intended (if they had any effect at all).

By isolating South African nationalism, they strengthened its internal bonds and postponed moves towards black advancement.

International affairs demand a language of realism, rooted in accurate analysis, not fantasy.

In Southern Africa, the past quarter of a century has been dogged by fantasy. The death of old predictions should at least clear the air. (Extracted for an article in the current issue of Optima).

PRESENCE OF BLACKS IN CAPE PENINSULA REEXAMINED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 27

[Article by Sampie Terreblanche: "I Was Wrong When I Said Blacks Should Be Kept Out of the Western Cape"]

[Text]

THE Government's policy on the "legal" and "illegal" presence of blacks in the Cape Peninsula is at the crossroads.

The position of the blacks in the Western Cape — and especially in the Peninsula — has become a focal point of the South African political and economic scene.

In no other part of the country have the interests of the different population and socio-economic groups developed — or been "rearranged" — into a position of sharper confrontation than in the Western Cape.

The population of the Peninsula consists of a variety of socio-economic groups and sub-groups.

The 500 000 whites can be divided into English and Afrikaans-speakers as well as a higher and lower middle-class.

The 800 000 coloureds are made up of about equal size: a middle class, an upper lower class and a lower lower class.

Of the 260 000 blacks, 160 000 are "legal" and 100 000 "illegal". The Indian population of about 20 000 forms the remainder.

Given this "variety" the Peninsula is a classic example of a situation where

the interests of different groups lead to a complex relationship of mutual conflict and complementarity.

In this dynamic and diversified situation the policymakers have the task of applying and adapting their policies in such a way that the interests of all the relevant groups are acknowledged and reconciled as far as possible, while taking the long-run interests of the country at large into account.

The Theron Commission took note of the promising upward mobility of the middle class and upper working class people in the coloured community.

During the past 10 years these two classes have made faster progress than we expected.

The commission was, however, very concerned about the position of the lower 40 percent.

We identified their position as one of chronic poverty — an unhealthy situation that perpetuated itself from generation to generation.

Given the precarious position of those caught in the vicious circle of community poverty, I — in my capacity as chairman of the study group on "Labour and Economics" — took the ini-

tiative for the adoption of Recommendation 42.

We not only asked for the maintenance of the coloured preference policy in the Western Cape, but also for a stricter application of it.

The purpose of this recommendation was to create a situation in which the employers would be "forced" or "convinced" to employ the workshy section among the coloured labourers.

We regarded their employment as a necessary part of a more comprehensive policy to break the vicious cycle of poverty.

We were of the opinion that if too many black workers were available in the Western Cape, they would, so to speak, "wedge in" between the lower and upper lower class of the coloured community which could perpetuate and intensify the poverty situation.

Looking at the situation in the Peninsula 10 years later, I had to change my mind.

Firstly, our optimism that the employers in the Western Cape could be "forced" or "convinced" to employ the workshy element among the coloured

labourers did not materialise.

It is easy for private enterprise to talk about their social responsibility towards the poor. Apparently it is much less easy to do something meaningful about it.

Employers strongly prefer to employ the growing number of "legal" and "illegal" blacks, not only because they are better workers than the workshy coloureds, but because they (and especially the "illegal" ones) can be employed rather cheaply.

Secondly, the experience of the last 10 years shows that those in the state of chronic community poverty are much less employable in the formal sector than the commission had hoped for.

Our approach was to try to solve these people's poverty problems by way of job opportunities in the formal sector. But people in a subculture of poverty prefer to make an unstable living in the undefined and grey world of the informal sector.

It would have been better if the commission had put greater emphasis on the importance of the informal sector.

We should have made a stronger plea for the "de-regulating" of the typical First World rules and regulations in order to create greater *lebensraum* for the poor and unemployed in both the coloured and black circles in the Peninsula (and in the rest of the country).

In mitigation, I must emphasise that the relative importance of the informal sector and its "welfare-creating" capacity for Third World and poverty people, were not yet fully appreciated 10 years ago.

The commission was of the opinion that the interests of the blacks and the poorer coloureds were directly in conflict with each other.

I now realise that if the informal sector can be allowed to "grow", the interests of these two groups can turn out to be complementary.

Thirdly, in focusing on the relative poverty in coloured circles the commission, in all probability, underestimated the extent of absolute poverty and the tremendous population pressure in the black states of the Eastern Cape.

Perhaps the commission was at that time still optimistic that the development strategy for the black states would create the necessary job opportunities.

Unfortunately it did not happen and there is a typical Third World "flight"

from the rural areas to the urban areas which may even increase in the years ahead.

Justifiable concern has arisen about the way the independent black states are spending the hundreds of millions of rands that are annually transferred to them via the Budget.

Apparently it has become necessary to attach rather strict "strings" to these funds to ensure that they will be spent in ways which will improve the living conditions in the black states.

Fourthly, our recommendation that the coloured preference policy be applied more strictly, was not implemented. Perhaps for the real reason that it was not implementable.

On the strength of evidence of the Department of Manpower, the Economic Committee of the President's Council made the following statement:

"...despite high unemployment among coloureds, it is very difficult to find unemployed coloureds ... despite this, employers still have to approach the Department of Manpower for work permits in order to employ black workers. These permits are readily granted, as appears from the fact that during 1981 exemptions were granted in respect of 46 753 instances out of a total of 49 273 applications (in other words, in 95 percent of the cases)". (President's Council 1/1984 par. 5.21 and 5.22).

The administrative burden of the coloured preference system encouraged employers to employ "illegal" blacks. Many of the big employers are actually budgeting in advance for

the possible payment of a fine for employing "illegal" blacks.

Their employment is not only "cheaper" but also without the bureaucratic red-tape!

Because coloured preference policy could not be applied and because of serious problems with influx control, the black population in the Peninsula has more than doubled in the last 10 years.

In the meantime a strong middle class has developed in the black townships of the Peninsula.

These people have the means and the inclination towards home ownership.

If 99-year leasehold could be allowed in the Peninsula — and especially in Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu — it would have a tremendous stabilising effect.

Finally, if we take the semi-Third World character of South Africa seriously into consideration, we cannot deny the fact, that squatting settlements on the periphery of our main urban areas are going to remain a permanent and a growing feature of the South African scene.

The only way to "accommodate" the squatters will be to "legalise" their way of life.

This can be done by "de-regulating" the economy, by accepting and promoting "self-building" and site-and-service schemes and by allowing planned squatting.

It is high time that we accept the fact that South Africa is a semi-Third World country, and that the population composition of the Peninsula has strong and permanent Third World features.

If we really want to acknowledge and to reconcile the conflicting interests of the different socio-economic groups and sub-groups in a way that will be beneficial to the community as a whole, and not to certain groups only, we cannot apply only the value system of the whites.

LOBBY WORKS TO SCRAP IMMORALITY ACT

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Brian Pottinger]

[Text]

THE scrap-the-Immorality Act lobby within the Government has been given a powerful boost by the overwhelming weight of evidence before a parliamentary select committee.

The committee was appointed to investigate South Africa's amendment of the Immorality Act and the ban on mixed marriages.

The 415-pages of evidence before the select committee has representations from more than 90 witnesses — and reveals only a minority rearguard of ultra-rightists unequivocally in favour of retaining the laws.

Such a powerful body of opinion offsets the findings of a controversial HSRC survey earlier this week which indicated 80 percent of Afrikaners, 40 percent of English-speakers, 24 percent of coloureds and 28 percent of Indians favoured the retention of the laws.

The select committee evi-

dence — published on Friday — reveals:

• Nearly all witnesses believed the laws could not be "improved" but would have to be either retained or scrapped altogether — precisely the evidence state legal advisers had given the Cabinet two years ago.

• The major English-language churches were strongly opposed to the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and Section 16 of the Immorality Act and called for their immediate scrapping.

• The powerful NGK through a battery of witnesses conceded the laws could not be defended scripturally and it was up to the State to judge the moment when it would be socially correct to scrap their provisions.

• The Labour Party strongly argued for the scrapping of the Acts, warned the provisions would be quite incompatible with

the new system and rejected the original Government justification for them — that they would protect coloured women from unscrupulous white men.

• A panel of medical experts argued there was no such thing as a "pure" race group and the law was thus based on a scientific impossibility.

Only isolated far-right groups — such as the Kappie-kommando and AWB — tried to defend the laws.

One witness claimed social interaction of any sort between different race groups was a "softening up" process which would lead to eventual intermarriage.

Adopted

Much of the evidence — particularly from the Labour Party delegation under Mr Miley Richards — highlighted the horrific cost the laws have levied on the lives of ordinary people.

In one Durban incident mentioned in evidence a

black woman, married to a white man, lived for years as the "maidservant" in her own house to protect her family. Her daughter's white fiancée committed suicide when he learnt his lover was actually coloured.

And the absurdity of the Act was also revealed in evidence by a panel of geneticists.

One of them told how his own adopted child had come up for race classification.

With all his knowledge he knew there was no scientific way of classifying the child "pure white". But a junior government clerk had no problems in identifying and registering the child as "white".

The hefty body of opinion either fiercely opposed to the laws or reserved in their defence has given another push to the already growing momentum in government to scrap the provisions.

Two months ago the select committee under Mr Piet Badenhorst, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, asked Parliament to expand its terms of reference so that it could recommend if it wishes the complete repeal of the two laws.

The move hastened already strong speculation that the Bills were destined for the scrap-heap in a major legitimacy-building operation by the Government aimed at bolstering the new tricameral Parliament.

LEBOWA GOVERNMENT GRANTS CITIZENSHIP CERTIFICATES

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 27 Aug 84 p 4

[Text]

THE Lebowa Government has granted 1 700 citizenship certificates to people belonging to "national states" who wished to regain the South African citizenship they lost along with millions of others when four homelands opted for independence.

To date, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei have opted for independence — thus depriving their subjects of South African citizenship.

At least 3 000 other applications for citizenship are known to have been received by the Lebowa Government and are in various stages of being processed. In a recent interview with the Rand Daily Mail, the Chief Minister of Lebowa, Dr Cedric Phatudi, said Lebowa would not turn away people wishing to become citizens.

"Whether you are a Motswana, a Xhosa, Zulu or of any other racial or tribal group, Lebowa will accept you. If you go to places like Lebokgomo (the capital of Lebowa) you will find all sorts of tribal groups.

"One's tradition does not need to be that of Lebowa. All the people need to do is

to apply and we will consider their applications.

"South Africa has accepted millions of foreigners wishing to become South Africans. Why should I turn away people?"

Dr Phatudi, however, admitted that the screws might be tightened by officials in Pretoria who did not wish to see such non-Lebowans becoming citizens of his homeland.

Dr Phatudi reiterated that Lebowa would not opt for independence.

"We are all South Africans irrespective of colour, creed or religion. Those who opted for so-called independence have deprived their people of South African citizenship. Lebowa will not take that path as long as I am leader."

Dr Phatudi is 72, and has won the last three elections in Lebowa.

● It is understood that in accordance with the National States Citizenship Act of 1970, a total of 3 000 people from "independent" homelands have regained their South African citizenship.

About 4 500 non-Zulus have also applied for KwaZulu citizenship.

CSO: 3400/2141

CHRIS HEUNIS' CLIMBING INFLUENCE EXAMINED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 12 Aug 84 p 26

[Article by Brian Pottinger: "How the Heunis Empire Grows and Grows and Grows"]

[Text]

A SEASONED political observer once called Mr Chris Heunis the Minister for Everything.

In successive years the tag has grown in accuracy until on the eve of the implementation of the new constitution the affable former lawyer stands in a unique position of power and influence.

That position is likely to be further enhanced when — as is widely anticipated — he assumes even more responsibilities for black constitutional development and administration.

This power by accretion has ironically been bought at the cost of one of the truly great administrative monoliths — that of Bantu Administration and its bizarrely named successors.

Expansion

Because if it is true that Mr Chris Heunis's Department of Constitutional Development and Planning is one of the great beneficiaries of P W Botha-style rationalisation, it is equally true that Dr Piet Koornhof's Department of Co-operation and Development is one of the great victims.

Most bureaucracies measure their empires in terms of manpower, assets and

profile — by Parkinson's Law their expansion becomes an end in itself.

Minister Heunis's Department has by contrast a small but dedicated staff, operates from unpretentious offices and maintains a low profile.

But it can and does measure itself in more subtle terms — the web of influence; the fundamental sort of influence that shapes the destinies of nations and guides the expectations of millions of people.

The accretion of power by the Minister of Constitutional Development is a direct function of Prime Minister P W Botha's abiding concern for co-ordination and streamlining of planning — itself an input from Mr Botha's long association with the military.

One of the first rationalisation moves undertaken by the new Prime Minister was the drawing of planning functions into his own office. They were later shifted to the newly created Ministry of Constitutional Development and Planning. The basis for the Minister's climb was laid.

In successive steps the once imperfectly defined Department of Constitutional Development and Planning moved into a posi-

tion of authority on a vast range of political and constitutional activity.

Linkman

The first and major task of the Minister was obviously to redraw the constitution that the ruling party's think-tanks had been kicking around and ineffectively seeking to implement for years.

The position was in itself a fundamentally important one.

Mr Heunis became the linkman between the Cabinet and the President's Council — ostensibly the crucible from which would arise the new constitution.

The new constitution did emerge and the indefatigable Minister succeeded in selling it to prospective partners more successfully than many of his own colleagues believed possible.

In the cut and thrust the Minister built substantial contacts among the establishment leaders in the communities targeted for inclusion in the new dispensation.

His position as chairman of the parliamentary select committee on the constitution placed him at the very centre of the roistering debate over South Africa's

new-look constitution.

A second, and major locus of ministerial influence, lies at the municipal and provincial level.

As chairman of the Council for the Co-ordination of Local Government Affairs, Mr Heunis is directly involved in mapping the highly controversial future of second and third-tier government.

In so doing he is responsible for perpetrating one of the great ironies of South African constitutional development; while trying to create a third tier system of maximum "devolution of power", he is unabashedly centralising ministerial power in the enabling laws he is passing.

Suspicion

The Government defends it by saying it is necessary to keep its hands on the levers until the train builds up momentum.

It is a seductive argument regarded with great suspicion by white local authorities, coloureds and Indians.

The third focus of Heunisian ministerial power lies in the realms of black administration — the biggie in terms of South Africa's political predicament.

First major encroachment on the preserve of the once hallowed Black Administration empire came when the Cabinet agreed to refer the pending three "Koornhof Bills" to the Select Committee on the Constitution rather than Piet Koornhof's Select Committee on Co-operation and Development.

The second encroachment was not far behind. The Cabinet Committee to investigate the position of urban blacks was constituted under the chairmanship of Mr Heunis. Co-operation and Development had lost

out. Constitutional Development scored.

Tireless

And now indications are that Minister Heunis — already chairing the Parliamentary committee dealing with urban black legislation and heading a Cabinet committee looking at urban black rights — will be assuming even more responsibilities relating to black affairs. It is the slow wind-down of Co-operation and Development in its present form.

But there is a fourth arena of ministerial responsibility bolstering Mr Heunis's influential position — that of planning. Under this heading falls a range of connecting development and forward planning work that puts the tireless Minister at the centre of much of the multilateral discussions between Pretoria and the self-governing states.

The diversity of issues handled by Minister Heunis is enormous, the complexities often daunting.

But neither range nor complexity appears to deter Constitutional Develop-

ment's top dog — indeed the fervour for accretion of power sometimes leads to the improbable — like the time the Minister inherited by proclamation the responsibility for implementing the Political Interference Act and then forgot he had the power.

The standard joke in Parliament is that if Chris Heunis was run down by a bus nobody would know exactly what the "new dispensation" was. Humorous, sure, but perhaps a touch of truth.

(Report: B C Pottinger, 77 Burg Street, Cape Town.)

The Power Graph of His Climb to Influence

KEY items on the power graph of Mr Chris Heunis's climb to influence:

- July 1982: Appointed Minister of Constitutional Development.
- As chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Constitution, hears evidence on the three "Koornhof Bills" on urban blacks during 1982 and 1983.
- 1983: Appointed chairman of the Cabinet Committee on political rights for urban blacks — a vital position in

one of the most sensitive arenas.

● January 31, 1984: Mr Heunis takes chair of the Council for the Co-ordination of Local Government Affairs — the focus of the third-tier government fight.

● During 1983 and 1984 chairs multilateral development meetings drawing in the self-governing homelands.

● November, 1983: Assumes by proclamation responsibility for administering the Political Interference Act.

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CREATION OF 'INTENSIVE DEMOCRACY' ADVOCATED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 12 Aug 84 p 24

[Article by Dennis Beckett, editor of Frontline: "How We Can Get Off the Tiger"]

[Text]

PERMANENT security, deeply sought after by white South Africans, seems an elusive goal.

Perhaps the answer lies in a route which has not yet been much examined. Namely, the active creation of intensive democracy.

By this I mean a structure in which democracy becomes a weapon for stability. It is a structure where society is criss-crossed by a multitude of largely autonomous democratic institutions; a structure where people are locked into democratic processes and most of the awful prospects which we foresee cannot take place.

For instance, in a society thus ensnared by web of democracy, it is impossible for tyrants to emerge or coups to be staged.

The diversity of power ensures that Thought Controllers and Big Brothers stay creatures of fiction.

There are no sudden and dramatic upheavals. Rather, there is as close as it is possible to get to a cast-iron guarantee of steady, practical progress.

Limbo

Most particularly, in South Africa's circumstances, there is the prospect of overcoming apartheid without the whites needing to fear becoming victims of its reverse.

As has often been said, white South Africa is in the position of a man riding a tiger. We cannot get off. We assume that if we relinquish control, to allow more than token black political participation, blacks will use their numbers to act against our interests.

True, if in the present social environment South African citizenship were somehow granted to all, it is quite likely that blacks would behave statically and look for black benefit by supporting whatever the whites most loudly decried. We have created that attitude.

There would, doubtless, be much of the chaos and catastrophe which whites predict, which is why citizenship is not about to be granted to all.

Yet we know that the harsh logic of arithmetic will eventually assert itself and white control come to an end. We assume this must necessarily involve our, white, downfall. One result is that the entire society hovers in limbo.

Dread of the looming alternative colours all we do and makes it impossible to face issues squarely on. To take but one example: we have a perfectly legitimate fight against urban crime, but we are not fighting it.

Instead, we are trying to deal with the problem by limiting the access of blacks to the cities. We try to stop the unstoppable, and in the

process, alienate ordinary, decent black people who do not want urban crime any more than anyone else.

We make it impossible for them to throw their lot in on the side of law and order.

To do so they must be "sell-outs", collaborators with the white man's purpose of discriminating against themselves and their relatives.

Bad Trip

We are living what we know to be a bad trip, despite its disguise of extravagant prosperity.

Given the existing social environment, and the ethnic make-up which we have done much to make rigid, we cannot imagine that the passing of white control can be other than disaster.

Yet, nor can we persuade ourselves that white control is forever.

We don't see a way out. We will not, justifiably, place faith in promises of goodwill.

Instead, we need to find a structural, guaranteed, way to assure us that we can relinquish our whites-only sovereignty and live on in peace and security.

The prospect of intensive democracy offers that. No guarantees, no promises, no pieces of paper which can be torn up. Instead, a system, a structure, which ensures diversity, continuity and stability.

As things stand there are

no democratic institutions to act as hedges against abuse of power. Even within white society, the privileged, we are only a democracy in the most rudimentary meaning of the term.

We have hardly any concept of a multiplicity of separate authorities with their own power bases.

We more or less accept that all power flows from the Government and, insofar as there are provincial councils, city councils, school boards, hospital committees, parks boards and the like, these either have minimal power or are simply expected to act as agents of the Government.

Benevolent

This might be contrasted with the American situation, in which literally millions of separate bodies, great and small, exercise fierce independence within the ascending framework of city, state and federal principles.

Creating democracy provides a way to dismount the tiger, bring an end to apartheid and create a healthy expectation that the consequences for ourselves will be, at least, not worse than they are now and more likely very much better.

If we dig that democracy in deep enough, stretch the web extensively enough, then, at minimum, there is no possibility of Amins or Bo-kassas making sudden grabs for power or even Nyereres or Mugabes coming up with grandiose one-party plans to change the economic structure.

At best, and more likely, we will find a dual flowering of benevolent forces.

On the one hand it becomes possible for black people in large numbers to actively and enthusiastically take part in official public affairs.

On the other white society is finally enabled to address social problems head-on instead of constantly missing the point.

We could effectively tackle the issues which the inevitable process of urbanisation raises, instead of vainly trying to deal with it by stopping

it.

Democracy, in this full form, provides for enormous diversity.

It provides for a system which is big enough and broad enough to contain the variety of individual outlooks and attitudes it incorporates.

Tolerance

It represents a kind of ultimate federalism, if you like. It allows for a modest power base for practically every form of social organisation one can think of.

In particular, it allows for cross-cutting representation wherever possible.

It might well be confusing, it is certainly limited in the sense that a society of this nature precludes dramatic change, even for the best.

But it is very conducive to stability.

Take, for a brief example, the case of a reasonably typical citizen — say a black industrial worker.

In a fully, intensively, democratic society this fellow is positively bombarded with a confusing range of democratic options.

Like his counterparts, of whatever colour or whatever nationality, he is only marginally interested in political issues anyway.

That is no matter, in fact it's fine. He does not need to be.

All that is necessary is that he is locked into the structure, that he should see his own fulfilment as being within the existing framework rather than outside it.

In a simplistic one-man-one-vote setup, such as would eventually come when the holding operation which is our present political dispensation eventually cracks, this imaginary typical person would have a vote to cast for an all-powerful central legislature.

He would, doubtless, cast it for some extremist black party, mainly because he has been born and bred to believe that the white man's meat is the black man's poison, and vice versa.

However, in our fully, intensively, democratic State, the same person has innumerable votes to exercise

and in respect of each of them he acts according to a different set of imperatives.

In some respects his interests are the same as his white colleague's, in some they are different.

In some respects his interests are the same as his neighbour's, in some they are different. And so on.

One effect is to attune him to democratic tolerance. Another is to accustom him to the concept of electing according to qualification and ability rather than simple ethnic identity.

In such a structure stability is assured. It is not dependent on conscious goodwill, it is assured by the very structure of the system itself.

In particular, in the South African context, the white man's security is assured.

It is no constitutional privilege, it is now built into the basic structure.

Security

I am well aware that this argument, presented in excessive brevity, will appear outlandish to many white South Africans, and even to black ones.

After all, practically everyone takes it as almost axiomatic that when "white" South African comes to an end "black" South Africa will take its place and everything will be upturned.

I am arguing that there need be no upturning at all, no sudden, wishful expectations of turnaround, no fears of chaos and dispossession.

Instead, the broad base of intensive democracy could provide for the practical, steady, progress of blacks at the same time as the security and stability of whites.

Of course, it would also have been outlandish if presented in Rhodesia a mere ten years ago.

At the minimum, I would claim, we need to be able to consider the possibilities of what forms of democratic society might yet come to exist.

We may be strong, but we are not so strong that we can afford to ignore the possibility.

BROEDERBOND INTERFERENCE IN UNIVERSITY ELECTION HIT

Port Elizabeth EVENING POST in English 13 Aug 84 p 6

[Editorial: "Broederbond Has No Place at UPE"]

[Text]

THE intervention of the Afrikaner Broederbond in the election of the next rector of the University of Port Elizabeth is a disturbing, if predictable, development.

It is predictable because the Broederbond has always seen as its function the claiming of positions of influence, especially in educational institutions, for its members. Although its influence is on the wane since the split in Afrikanerdom, it has nevertheless succeeded to a large extent in ensuring that Broeders continue to occupy key positions — all the rectors of the country's Afrikaans universities, for example, are members of the Broederbond. It is entirely consistent with Broederbond policies that the rector of UPE should, if possible, be a Broeder, too.

What makes this affair so disturbing is that UPE in the first place is a dual-medium university which even less than the Afrikaans universities should be tainted by

behind-the-scenes Broederbond activity in the election of its rector. Secondly, as the article in Weekend Post indicated, merit apparently has become a secondary consideration to Broederbond membership in the selection of candidates for the rectorship.

The pre-advisory committee, which puts forward the names of two or three candidates to the Senate and which is Broederbond-dominated, has recommended the sixth and seventh placed candidates on academic and other considerations as its top two choices. These two candidates are reportedly the only Broederbond members among the seven candidates!

This is an intolerable situation of which the Senate must take note when it comes to appointing a rector this Friday. Any suggestion that the appointment had been made more through Broederbond influence or affiliation than on merit would do the university incalculable harm.

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

PROFESSOR EXAMINES FUTURE POLITICAL SITUATION

'Pattern of Violent Equilibrium'

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 14 Aug 84 p 12

[Article by David Braun: "SA Whites Will Still Have the Whip Hand in the Year 2000, Says Top Academic"]

[Text]

While the South African State may well be able to survive all known forces that can be mobilised against it in the next two decades, it can probably no longer fully control the pace and nature of change, or prevent episodic unrest.

This is the view of Professor Hermann Giliomee, of the department of political studies at the University of Cape Town.

Writing in Energos, a Mobil-sponsored publication on South Africa in the year 2000, he says: "South Africa's political future clearly seems to fall into what has been described as a pattern of violent equilibrium."

He says there is no historical inevitability about majorities coming to power.

The key factor determining internal peace in a divided society such as South Africa is less the intensity of discrimination than the effectiveness of control.

"A comparative look at Israel and South Africa, which have enjoyed a remarkable degree of stability, and strife-torn Northern Ireland and Lebanon, makes it possible to see in sharper relief the prospects for internal peace in South Africa.

"The key to the current stability of both South Africa and Israel is the huge advantages these states enjoy from the point of view of control."

COERCIVE

He uses the word "control" to mean the ability to exercise untrammelled centralised political power, based on the loyal support of both the dominant race group and the coercive apparatus of the state (army and police).

Control also depends on the dominant group having the resources to impose its will on the majority, and on whether the subordinate group has an independent political and economic base to mount effective resistance.

"The whites in South Africa, like the Israelis, have, and for the foreseeable future will continue to have, undisputed authority, which they can use to safeguard their power and keep the internal peace.

"There is no 'third party' (like the British

force in Northern Ireland) which can interfere with the monitoring and suppressing of dissidents."

To ensure a proper business climate, the Government has an interest in avoiding measures which could destabilise society.

"In fact, the South African Government is becoming steadily more sophisticated in its threat assessment and conflict regulation compared with the 70s — when bungling politicians and bureaucrats, imbued with an almost fatal degree of over-confidence and racist complacency, constituted a dangerous liability."

He adds that South African whites do not show the faltering will to govern, or growing self-doubt and guilt which paralysed the ruling elites of pre-revolutionary France and Russia.

The National Party seems likely to retain its character, with a tough white middle-class constituting its primary political base, he says.

"In general terms, violence has tended to break out in societies where regimes apply controls which are erratic, hesitant and ineffective."

PARALYSED

Professor Giliomee contends that there is little chance of the National Party becoming paralysed by the apparent march to victory of a "lower-class reactionary white party".

He says the former will be able to count on strategic English support in elections, helped by the manipulation of news.

The Government seems

likely to retain its ability to control the leadership of black organisations and movements by rewarding collaborators and removing or punishing those who do not collaborate, he adds.

Non-collaborationist organisations, like the United Democratic Front and the National Forum, always face a crackdown the moment they show the potential for seriously challenging the Government's collaborators — not to speak of the State itself.

"At any lower level of political mobilisation, the State is quite happy to tolerate their existence, even if it is only to infiltrate the organisation to identify the activists."

Professor Giliomee

does not expect the ANC to overcome the formidable obstacles to waging a successful revolutionary war over the next 16 years.

South Africa's well-developed infrastructure allows for rapid mobility of the Government forces in rural areas, he says.

INFILTRATION

"In the cities, the Security Police will probably continue to curb the ANC by heavy infiltration of its lower levels.

"The ANC can only grow into a formidable challenger of the state if increasing numbers of unemployed and frustrated black youths skip the country and the ANC succeeds in establishing bases and camps in an

African state near South Africa.

"South Africa would in all likelihood maintain its strong-arm stance while harnessing economic incentives to force countries along its north-eastern borders to expel ANC guerrillas."

This will in all likelihood achieve the desired results. However, South Africa is running the risk of a major strategic miscalculation which could let the ANC in.

Professor Giliomee adds: "Pressed too hard, the government of a black state in the region, such as Angola, may decide to put itself squarely in the Russian camp and also become a fully-fledged sanctuary for the ANC."

Grim Future for Blacks

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 14 Aug 84 p 12

[Text]

Professor Giliomee paints a grim picture of the future of the homelands and black urban concentrations in the next 16 years, writes David Braun.

It appears that the situation in the homelands will deteriorate over this period, unless South Africa enjoys an unexpected economic boom.

"One expects that by the year 2000 conditions in the homelands will not be much different from today — except that there will be many more people grimly struggling to survive."

VIOLENCE

"And the homelands will be far more violent with large scale crime, violence, banditry, faction fights, cattle rustling and the occasional palace coups and revolutions."

"Fearing for their personal safety, whites will avoid visiting large areas of the homelands."

"Most homelands will probably be corrupt and despotic. Some of the homelands may well become the Sicilies of new black mafias."

He attributes much of this to the rapidly widening cleavage between those who can find work as migrants or in the

homeland economy, and those who cannot.

Homeland citizens will increasingly be caught in a double squeeze. On the one hand, growing numbers can no longer live from the land. On the other, residents will find it ever more difficult to find jobs outside subsistence agriculture.

The depression of social and economic conditions in homeland rural areas will be such that they will inevitably give rise to rapid and chaotic urbanisation in the form of squatting.

SQUATTERS

"Homeland governments will continue their attempts to curb squatting through removals, refusing to provide services in squatter camps and discriminating against squatters at the labour bureaux."

"Nonetheless, for the sake of sheer survival, squatters will continue to converge upon South African and homeland urban areas, pushing the rate of urbanised blacks up from the present 38 percent to well over 50 percent by the year 2000."

On that basis a further 10 million blacks will have to be settled in the urban areas by 2000, and despite Government attempts to deflect the stream, most of them will converge on the country's four metropolitan areas.

PRESSURE

There will be a breakdown of law and order as whites fight to prevent a lowering of their living standards in the face of tremendous pressure on their facilities and resources and migrants turn to crime to survive.

AZAPO LEADER EXPLAINS BOYCOTT, CAMPAIGN

Durban POST NATAL in English 15-18 Aug 84 p 10

[Saths Cooper, convenor of the National Forum and deputy leaders of AZAPO, interviewed by Ameen Akhalwaya; date, place not given]

[Text]

QUESTION: Is Azapo's policy only one of boycott? Why is it not seen to be actively campaigning against the tricameral system?

COOPER: Azapo's position is that we believe the "new deal" is merely one nail in the coffin of the oppressed and exploited masses.

There will be other manoeuvres by the ruling class to co-opt people and sow the seeds of division.

We have scrupulously refrained from being an organisation that merely reacts to whatever the racist/capitalist system throws out. It is against that background that we have been more positively concerned in our organisational strategy towards inculcating an active spirit of anti-collaboration, and thus strengthening resistance to the present status quo.

Our basic premise is that we should work to solidify the ranks of all the oppressed and exploited — that is, all those who have been denigrated and classi-

fied in various derogatory racist terms.

We believe we need to build a spirit of nationalism — while not omitting to fuse the social question — as a prerequisite for successful struggle.

The problem with restricting oneself to mere boycott calls and reacting to every little issue created by the ruling class is that it perpetuates political confusion and does not politicise people towards the essential ingredients required for a future anti-racist, democratic, free and non-exploitative society, for which we stand.

Credibility

Azapo has been deliberately underplayed in the media because of its uncompromising, principled position. Indeed, the day Azapo gets widespread minion status in liberal editorial columns, it will have lost all claims to revolutionary morality and its credibility.

We have organised

door-to-door campaigns, meetings and positive education programmes since before the tricameral system was announced, because we recognised that such an attempt at co-option would be undertaken by the ruling class.

In that process, we have been clear about not perpetuating a separate "Indianness" or "colouredness" or "Africanness" largely because such ethnicity is not what is required in a free Azania.

That is why we have organised resistance to co-option in all the locations and townships and group areas where we have a presence. The "new deal" affects the entire country, particularly the oppressed and the exploited.

QUESTION: Do you reject it simply because it does not include Africans?

COOPER: We reject it on the scientific and historical basis that no ruling class can ever usher in meaningful change or voluntarily

become the architect of its own doom. The Black Consciousness movement has consistently opposed all forms of collaboration. As we opposed the bantustan policy — and still do fervently; as we opposed the CRC and SAIC, so we oppose the tricameral kitchen parliaments.

On September 6, a coterie of self-appointed and self-aggrandising "leaders" will join the ranks of the Matanzimas, Sebes, Mangopes and Mphephus.

They're going to inscribe their names in history with the blood of their sons and brothers, that they will be condemning to death on the borders.

QUESTION: Isn't that being too harsh? After all, many say they are going in to fight for the rights of all South Africans?

COOPER: Do all South Africans want them to make such claims? They are self-appointed. They have not been chosen by organisations that have been active in the community. Many of these candidates have sprung up after the lucrative R40 000 offer was made known.

Testimony to their mala fides is that their meetings have been held behind closed doors. Often, police have been present. When such power-mad men get into real posi-

tions of power, what will they not do?

They are fledglings in the harsh, robust political arena which they do not clearly understand, otherwise they would not be making such mindless and naive claims.

You cannot enter a poker game not knowing the rules, when the dealer has a marked deck and cards stacked up his sleeve and when you are gambling, using the people as your stake.

Opportunists

The dealer has institutionalised violence through removals, resettlements, housing shortages, increased GST and unemployment, detention without trial, bannings and house arrests.

A handful of political opportunists cannot stop his catalogue of institutionalised violence. By going in, they will be legitimising such measures passed by a white minority regime.

QUESTION: But by

staying out, how different will it be?

COOPER: It would remove the element of legitimisation. We will not participate in structures and institutions that won't bring about change. Hence we won't be misleading the community. We will not be party to our own slavery.

QUESTION: If Azapo is bent on unity, why has it not been co-operating with organisations which have similar aims?

COOPER: Azapo and the National Forum are not the same. Azapo is an overt national political organisation which is prepared to co-operate with any organisation that is not part of the ruling class and not working within the system.

To that end, Azapo has engaged in communication with various resistance groups, even inviting them to share Azapo platforms. The impediment to unity is not of Azapo's making. For example, we have

not made acceptance of Black Consciousness a prerequisite for such efforts towards unity.

QUESTION: Then if the resistance movements are split, what chance is there of presenting a united front to oppose the system?

COOPER: I don't believe that there is such a dichotomy as to prevent co-operation and constructive, mature, political discussion. For as long as the oppressed and exploited can remember they have been subjected to undemocratic totalitarian measures. We ourselves should not become party to such self-repression.

Resistance

The more and healthier the different political resistance alternatives there are for the people, the more prepared we will be when we attain complete self-determination.

We believe in democracy, not as a slogan for the media and for platforms but as an essen-

tial element for struggle.

With the "new deal," the various resistance groups will have to realistically confront their own prejudices and accept the total responsibility that is part of true leadership and forge a common basis for principled struggle.

The National Forum, unlike Azapo, is not an organisation but is precisely what it is called—a forum for all groupings whatever their ideological position

and whatever the level of activity, whether sporting, cultural, religious, educational, social, trade union or political, they may be engaged in.

Together

For the first time in the history of resistance politics in this country, the various political tendencies that are active in the community have been afforded the opportunity of coming together under one roof and critically examining their policies and practices without ideological strings.

--QUESTION: What happens if the majority do turn out to vote?

--COOPER: The majority will not vote because the majority have not registered, and will not be party to their own oppression and exploitation. More importantly, the majority have a proud history of resistance since the first days of white settlerdom.

We are not stopping at a boycott. If we do, we again have to mobilise when another issue crops up. We will continue with our on-going programme of education to mobilise the people.

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

NATIONALISTS URGED TO BROADEN VIEWS, POLICIES

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 19 Aug 84 p 25

[Article by Darryl Phillips]

[Text]

THERE is a total onslaught against South Africa, and it is almost totally economic.

And because it is economic and diversified — indeed, to some extent sporadic — it has far more chance of final success than any military or guerrilla actions can achieve.

Worst of all, it is barely perceived or understood, and therefore inadequately countered.

Not only do we not know that we are under attack, but we are also so divided that I'm not sure we can handle the attack even if we were to understand all its ramifications and implications.

Our political leaders are so concerned with micro issues, with internal conflicts and sectoral interests, that they have lost sight of the macro issues. They ignore external conflagrations while they spend their time dousing sparks.

The internal division within Afrikanerdom has led our political leaders to turn their eyes inward — and this is precisely why we are not perceiving or meeting the real economic threat to South Africa.

Let's examine that threat.

Between the incredible technology of the United States and the unbounded efficiency and productivity of the East, we are being squeezed between economic forces that are already debilitating Europe, and must inevitably threaten our very existence.

We are being forced into a position of being no more than purveyors of raw materials and precious metals, which the technologies of our trading partners are replacing or will replace.

To counter this threat, we need to respond economically as entrepreneurial businessmen.

The Third World countries, notably in Africa, have political management only. We cannot afford to follow that example, for if we do we are in great danger of regressing, ultimately to become no more than a Third World country ourselves.

Challenges

Let's look at the West--at the First World to which we aspire. In the US business acumen and intelligence are harnessed with political leadership—businessmen are involved in the management of the country, and there is recognition that political management alone is inadequate in meeting the challenges from external competitors.

Problems are often solved beyond politics--indeed, the US President raids universities and businesses to find the best advisers, and frequently these advisers are not even members of his party!

Local or petty politics are not allowed to inhibit the country's ability to compete.

In our case politics may well inhibit our survival in our present form; to put it bluntly, if our top businessmen do not get involved in the management of our country they may as well start planning their emigration now!

And businessmen are prepared to get involved. But the degree of their involvement must be affected by factors such as in-fighting between race and culture groups, or the degree of subordination of economic reality to the political ideology they encounter.

If they are to assist in managing the country they must be allowed to involve themselves with a minimum of political constraint.

If the NP runs scared and attempts to appease its current conservatives, it will put the brakes on change and cause adverse international and internal reaction.

It will also remove our ability to counter the economic threat.

Our Government should become far more adventurous. It should accept the risk — indeed, it must be perceived to be willing to take the risk — of losing the support of verkrampies still in its ranks, and even of losing a fair number of seats, to win non-traditional support from English-speaking voters and access to the professional economic management expertise it so desperately needs.

If it does not, it will lose credibility internationally, across the entire spectrum internally, and drive the English-speaking voters back into apathy.

The social, political and economic effects of such a reversion to the past would be frightening, particularly in the light of the external threats to South Africa.

For the first time since 1948, the balance of power and the motive force for change lie with English-speaking South African voters.

Benefits

It is they who must compensate for the loss of right-wing support in the NP. Their support, if won, will change the traditional Afrikaner base of the NP.

Think of the benefits arising from a national government rather than a perceived Afrikaner government — a government representing the broad spectrum of language and cultural groups in South Africa.

But the Government is proving extremely slow in reacting to the new situation in South Africa.

The acceptance of the need for change is, unfortunately, intellectual. The emotive desire to attempt to maintain Afrikaner identity and unity (which history proves is a myth) is still too strong to enable the NP to shed its right lightly.

Old arrogances and complacency die hard. There is a blind faith in the leadership's ability to paper over — or even fill — the wide cracks in Afrikaner political thinking.

There are still NP representatives who are perhaps closer in their thinking to the CP than the "new wave" thinking of the Prime Minister and his supporters.

The fundamental conservatism of the Afrikaner is a barrier to change that we would do well not to underestimate.

It is difficult for the NP to accept that, in shedding its right, it will sacrifice rural constituencies. This is the NP's traditional strength, and many of the urban Afrikaners still cherish their links with the soil.

Distrust

The old entrenched north-south suspicion is still strong, and the motive force for change is largely Cape-based. The traditional distrust of Cape verligtheid persists.

This is compounded by the NP's federal structure, which, in the current climate, is a weakness. Provincial autonomy is jealously guarded, and provincial loyalties and contributions must be recognised — the Prime Minister is thus inhibited in the choice of his Cabinet, and cannot surround himself with men whose loyalty to the party totally transcends mere local loyalties.

There are major inhibitions in the wooing of English-speaking South African voters:

● The Government is not accustomed to explaining itself or its policies to this sector of the electorate.

● For too long there has been no need to heed the criticisms or the protests, as the legacy of 36 years in office is complacency.

● We have had a "thou shalt" Government with ineffectual opposition.

● English speakers are largely urban. As a result they have been considerably closer to the vital interracial and economic coalface than their largely rural Afrikaner counterparts.

It will thus take a huge psychological adjustment on the Government's part to open new and strong lines of communication with these voters.

Apathy

Apathy characterises too many English-speaking South Africans, which is one of the by-products of knowing that the NP was the entrenched Government.

English visibility within the NP is virtually non-existent. There are far too few English speakers holding office. The perception is largely that the NP offers no spiritual home to English-speaking voters or office-seekers.

Language, culture and religion have been the badges of the good Nationalist — axiomatically, therefore, a good South African.

This is a perception which has denied the NP more support and commitment from English speakers than any other factor.

Wouldn't it have been wonderful if more non-aligned English-speaking South Africans who were recognised businessmen

had been elected to the President's Council?

We are certain that some will be nominated, but their election would have been a superb indication of new thinking and accommodation.

All this makes the scenario somewhat depressing — a government wanting to change experiencing its greatest resistance from within its own fold, and unable to communicate effectively with a very large number of previously politically indifferent people who now hold the key to the effective implementation of change.

While we squabble internally about the hugely positive steps of the past few years (the referendum, Nkomati, possible SWA solutions), we debilitate these achievements and allow our enemies abroad to capitalise on our disunity, to question our intentions and integrity, to doubt the honesty of our acceptance of change.

If we accept that our enemies without pose a greater threat than our critics within, then the NP should accept that it must become internationally perceived as a truly national party.

It must motivate English-speaking support through highly visible acceptance that it needs and genuinely wants that support — that it offers a political home for these voters.

It must pay more than lip service to the motto on our coat of arms: *Ex Unitate Vires*.

It must build on the Carlton and Good Hope conferences. Widen their scope, talk to more businessmen more regularly and, above all, listen.

The NP has a poor track record when it comes to lis-

tening to the private sector. Business must become a welcome ally, and needed as a concerned and valuable part of the country's management.

Gaps

In South Africa, because the business sector is predominantly English-speaking, it is listened to economically, but not as an emotional ally.

The Government must be seen to want to bridge the emotional and political gaps. Business thinking is, I feel, far closer to government thinking on political issues than is the thinking of the more conservative current supporters of the NP.

If the Government succeeds in doing what is recommended here, we will score highly internationally, defuse criticism and disarm the protagonists of disinvestment.

More important, we may just achieve an elected government that is supported by a broad spectrum of voters rather than one that has to rely on specific sectoral support from deeply divided and fundamentally conservative language and culture groups, large sections of which essentially resist change.

And finally, in accepting that it needs the private sector, that there can and will be an effective and professional total management of the country, we may just be able to stave off the disastrous effects of the economic threat which is building up against us.

(Extracted from a speech given this week to Aisec — the International Association of Economics Students — in Grahamstown.)

INDIAN DOCTORS REJECT NEW CONSTITUTION

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 20 Aug 84 p 5

[Report by Sam Mabe]

[Text]

OVER 200 Indian doctors and dentists in Natal have called for the rejection of the new constitution on the grounds that it does not satisfy the political aspirations of all the people of South Africa.

The doctors, who are members of the Natal Doctors Guild (NDG) have published their names — 210 of them — in a full-page advert in the Natal-based Sunday Tribune.

In another full-page advertisement in the same newspaper, the National Medical and Dental Association (Namda) says poor clinic facilities, rising hospital and medical aid fees, staff shortages and overcrowded hospitals will continue.

It adds: "Voting will not improve our health. Health and finance are general affairs and will therefore be in the hands of whites. Indian and coloured parliamentarians will be powerless to improve our health."

"African people, who suffer most from ill-health, are left out of the new constitution. Equal rights for all will bring complete health," says Namda, in an advertisement supported by concerned doctors from six Natal hospitals and a medical school.

In the newspaper's centrespread, an advertisement with transposed pictures of Mahatma Gandhi and Mr George Sewpersadh, a Durban lawyer and President of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), announces a mass rally to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the NIC on Wednesday at the Natal University.

The advert recalls the launching of the NIC on August 1894 by Mahatma Gandhi in Durban.

"Ninety years later, on August 22, 1984, we come together to remember our great leaders who have stood with us. Protected us. United us. Against passes, repatriation, unfair taxes, group areas and dummy bodies.

"We have come a long way, let us on August 22 this year pledge together to continue our proud struggle for truth, justice and equality for all."

Meanwhile, the United Democratic Front, launched in Cape Town last August specifically to oppose the new constitution, celebrated its first anniversary with mass rallies held at major cities of the country.

CSO: 3400/2129

INDIAN COMMUNITY'S POLITICS ANALYZED

Durban POST NATAL in English 22-25 Aug 84 p 10

[Article by Dr Dawlat Ramdas Bagwandeen, vice-rector of the Springfield College of Education: "It's Still the Politics of Protest and Compromise"]

[Text]

A S August 28 looms closer, Indian politics as in the 1940s is assuming once more a complexity of labyrinthine proportions. Indian political thinking is again bedevilled by confusion and turmoil. It would appear that history is indeed repeating itself.

Today, as in the past, the Indian community is distinctly polarised into two main camps: those in the "accommodationist" mould advocating co-operation with the South African Government and participation in the tricameral system. This group sees the Government-initiated proposals as an opportunity for effective decision-making through negotiation politics.

The other camp comprises those who historically are described as "confrontationists", and who are in opposition to Government ideology and who are vociferously pleading for a total boycott of the elections. This latter group perceives the new constitution as a blueprint for the entrenchment of racism and a mere ploy to perpetrate white supremacy.

Thus while the one group accepts the overtures of the Government as an evolutionary step forward the other condemns such action as being ineffably retrogressive. The political dilemma presented is in fact a manifestation of the dichotomy characterising Indian politics since the time of Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa.

As is well known, Natal, upon being granted Responsible Government, sowed the seeds of disharmony by abrogating the franchise granted to passenger Indians. The Indian community was volubly aggrieved at the deprivation of a fundamental right. Gandhi inaugurated the Natal Congress (NIC) as a channel to gain redress for the Indian community.

Gandhi was a man of moderation and reconciliation. Rather than conflict and aggression, he strived assiduously for the implementation of pristine democratic values through non-violence. Consequently, Gandhian politics provided the synthetic excitement of a placebo when the Government was persuaded to grant some minor concession to the Indian community.

subsequent to representations being made.

When Gandhi left the shores of South Africa in 1914 following the Smuts-Gandhi Agreement, Indian political activity waned. Dr DF Malan, the Minister of the Interior in the Hertzog Government, resuscitated Indian political consciousness incidentally when he introduced the Asiatic Immigration Regulation Further Provision Bill, culminating in the Cape Town Agreement of 1927. The South African Government conceived the Agreement as a weapon to repatriate Indians while the Indian Government construed the Agreement as the point of departure for the social and educational advancement of its nationals in South Africa. Although Indian political organisations helped, deliberations were in the main between representatives of the two governments.

In 1932 the Indian community split on the question of co-operation with the Young Commission of Enquiry when the repatriation and colonisation of Indians in South Africa was once more under consideration.

Led by Advocate A Christopher, a veteran Indian politician and the son of an ex-indentured Indian labourer, local In-

dians formed the Colonial Born and Settlers' Indian Association (CB & SIA). This Association virulently objected to the participation of NIC representatives, AI Kajee and SR Naidoo, on the colonisation commission.

Despite the emergence of the CD & SIA, the leadership of the Indian political parties was essentially moderate.

They sought a *modus vivendi* on the basis of placating white prejudices and white hostilities. The leadership claimed a moral right to equality but capitulated on the issue of white supremacy. They demanded the gradual extension of opportunities for their people and presented their case by means of deputations and memoranda in a conciliatory and compromising fashion. Above all, as in 1984, so too in the 1940s, there was a serious and conspicuous lack of a cohesive bloc amongst Indians.

Clashes

The NIC and CB & SIA merged in 1939 to form the Natal Indian Association (NIA). But the formation of the NIA was not without its travail. The personality clashes, political intrigue, allegations, and recriminations that abound today were present in their manifold ramifications in the 1940s. The desire for unity was unfortunately relegated to a lower level.

AI Kajee, another veteran but moderate political figure, feared that other Indian leaders such as Sorabjee Rustomjee, SR Naidoo, and VSC Pather were colluding to oust him from the dominant position he had enjoyed in the NIC for a considerable time.

Further, rivalry between Sorabjee Rustomjee and Kajee began to

increase and the leadership focussed on personal ambitions and moral outrage instead of the real crux of the problems facing the Indian community.

Destroyed

Ultimately Kajee maintained the NIC should continue as a political organisation. The prospect of unity was destroyed. While Kajee and his coterie of supporters remained outside the NIA, declaring that despite the amalgamation the NIC was still in existence, the CB & SIA and part of the NIC merged into the NIA.

It is ironic that General Smuts, the Prime Minister of South Africa at the time, congratulated the Indian community for healing the breach in its ranks. But the Indians were, on the contrary, fragmented. No tangible unanimity existed.

Indeed, it was only when the Smuts Government promulgated the Trading and Occupation of Land (Transvaal and Natal) Restriction Act, commonly referred to as the "Pegging Act", in 1943 that there was a semblance of solidarity.

The NIA and NIC came together as the NIC (as founded by Mahatma Gandhi in 1894). But the new body clung to the old ideas: they still enunciated the philosophy of survival ethics in terms of moderate gradualism, seeking redress from the ideological rigidity of the Government by sweet persuasion.

The euphoria permeating the Indian community at the time because of the unification of the NIC and the NIA proved volatile, and it was dissipated as a result of several developments.

These were: the humiliation of the "Pegging Act"; the rejection and failure of the Pretoria

Agreement concluded between Smuts and Kajee in 1944; the controversy surrounding the clutch of forbidding Natal ordinances promulgated as a direct outcome of the Pretoria Agreement; and the disappointment and compunction over the inefficacy and ultimate disaster of the Natal Indian Judicial Commission, which had been appointed to investigate various aspects of conditions of Indian life in South Africa.

These events inexorably diminished the hope for negotiation politics between Indians and whites in South Africa by 1945.

The gap was widened when the whole complexion of the NIC credo underwent a drastic metamorphosis with the advent of a radical leadership. On 21 October 1945 the annual meeting of the NIC was held at Currie's Fountain Sports Ground in Durban.

The "Old Guard" was ousted from power by the "Young Turks" comprising university graduates and trade unionists. Even in the Transvaal the mantle of leadership fell on such individuals.

For example the leader of the Transvaal Indian Congress was Dr YM Dadoo, a highly venerated and dynamic personality who was also a vitriolic critic of the racist, white regime in South Africa. In Natal, the NIC cabinet came to be controlled by Dr GM "Monty" Naicker as President and George Singh, as Chairman of Committee.

The moderate, accommodationists had been effectively repulsed by the articulate and confrontationist elements. This genre of leaders gave birth to a new era in Indian politics. The Indian political struggle gradually broadened from the sectional and parochial interests of the Indian

community to the wider context of a democratic South Africa in collaboration with other liberatory organisations, such as the African National Congress.

Split

Thus the position in 1984 is very similar to that in the 1940s. As in the earlier period the community is deeply split.

The accommodationists are represented by such parties as the National People's Party (NPP), the Solidarity Party, the Progressive Independent Party, and numerous independent candidates who with unprecedented elan have offered themselves for election to the House of Delegates. Despite the overworked pejoratives and hysterical casting of suspicion of one party against the other, the inescapable conclusion is that the moderate attitude has begun to crystallise and firm.

In opting for the "ballot" or the "bullet", to which choices Amichand Rajbansi, leader of the NPP, had alluded in an SABC News Focus programme, the standpoint of the accommodationists is patently clear. However, there is no fundamental, clearly defined difference in philosophy or manifesto of the aggregation of parties and individuals who have begun their electioneering campaigns.

The common factor as expressed by Dr JN Reddy, leader of the Solidarity Party, quite obviously is "the strategy of critical participation" in contradistinction to "the strategy of active boycott".

But another important consideration is that the rationale now of party politics in the Indian sphere of activity has not been developed to the same degree of finesse.

as among the whites. It is therefore highly probable that the success or failure of candidates in the forthcoming elections will depend not so much on the party to which the candidate belongs but rather on the significance of the aspirant's standing and worth in the community.

The NIC in sharp relief remains true to its radical, confrontationist antecedents of the post 1945 era. In calling for a boycott of the elections the president of the NIC, George Sewpershad, maintains that the NIC

"is committed to the democratic way of life".

He condemns the Tri-cameral system as "suspect promises of reform and hollow gestures of invitation to the laager".

In 1984, then, unproductive political rhetoric and diatribe obscures the burning issues confronting the Indian community. The situation is painfully familiar of the hectoring and ranting of Indian politicians of the 1940s.

The jibes and invective of opposing groups today are as pedestrian as those of their predecessors. And there's the rub.

The Indian community needs to present a solid phalanx in order to be a monolithic force and catalyst for change. But such unity is sadly lacking.

In the final analysis, the difference in the 1940s and the present rationalisation of political activity is that in the former period the Indian community had to cope with a bizarre, race-obsessed white society which proved intransigent in granting any democratic rights whatsoever to the Indians.

In the latter period,

while racism is not completely expunged, nonetheless a modicum of power will be bestowed on the Indian community who will elect their own representatives as Members of Parliament, for whatever that is worth.

However, in 1984 as in the 1940s, Indian politics remains nothing more than the politics of protest and compromise.

For the Indian community this intractable problem cannot but be perpetuated until all citizens of South Africa share power as equal members of a South African nation.



THIS is confusing . . . they all say they speak for Mahatma Gandhi.

SOUTH AFRICA

IMPENDING DEMISE OF NRP FORESEEN

Johannesburg THE STAR REVIEW in English 25 Aug 84 p 6

[Article by Lucille McNamara in "The Nation This Week" column: "NRP Prepares Its Funeral Pyre"]

[Text]

BORN from the ashes of the Bloedsappe, the New Republic Party is now preparing its own funeral pyre as members begin looking left and right for a new political home.

And standing on the sidelines is the huge shadow of the National Party, waiting to snatch control of the much-dreamed prize... Natal.

As Natal prepares for its congress — to be held behind closed doors "so that people are free to speak their minds" — NRP leader Vause Raw is frantically trying to convince his followers that their party still has a vital role to play in the new constitutional dispensation.

He is going to ask both the Natal and Transvaal congresses to endorse his stand, "but if they don't, I will naturally have to resign as party leader".

But the odds are ominously stacked against him as his Transvaal leader Alex Anderson blatantly defied Raw's leadership and held talks with both Nats and Conservative Party members in an attempt to find alternative homes for "moderates" in the event of the NRP's death.

Raw promptly denounced the move, saying that the gulf between the NRP and CP was

so great that it would make any association "ridiculous".

But the CP's Johannesburg regional chairman, Mr Clive Derby-Lewis, said he was expecting significant defections by NRP members to the Conservatives.

He said NRP supporters liked what they saw in the CP that many were considering it as a new political home.

Mr Derby-Lewis said the NRP was disintegrating and predicted that it would probably be disbanded by the end of the year.

The second blow to Raw came when Natal leader Ron Miller announced that he would join the National Party if members agreed to bury the NRP. For him the stakes could be high, because it is being strongly rumoured that he could be appointed as the next Administrator of the province should he change allegiance.

"Any politician who wants to make a positive contribution would be interested," he conceded.

And as Raw watched the turmoil tearing at his party, he was dealt another blow by Prime Minister P W Botha who, sensing victory in the NRP stronghold, announced that Natal was ripe for the picking and called on Nats to welcome English-speakers

into their midst.

"The Nats have been trying to take over my party for years," said Raw, who faces the bitter prospect of watching NRP supporters in Natal handing his party on a plate to the Nats.

He reminded that the Nats had stated openly that the NRP was irrelevant and should disappear from the political scene.

Editorial attacks on the party have been scathing. Read one: "The NRP is so far from coming to grips with the real issue of our time that it merely clutters the political landscape. Their demise eliminates a distraction."

Read another: "It is sad indeed that the last spasms of a political movement to which so many South Africans once gave their allegiance should be so undignified."

With politicians predicting the September 29 Natal congress as the NRP swan song, with the Federal Executive meeting on November 3 likely to seal its fate, Mr Raw's confident predictions that with the support of die-hards he would be able to hold the party together appear remote.

It seems almost certain that the NRP, rudderless and adrift in a stormy political sea, has little hope of salvaging the wreckage of its battered image among either party leaders or disillusioned supporters. □

CSO: 3400/2141

LABOR PARTY'S POLITICAL TRACK RECORD EXAMINED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 25 Aug 84 pp 1, 2

[Article by David Braun: "High Noon in Parliament"]

[Text]

THIS week's general election proved the road to accommodating coloured political aspirations is going to be long and difficult to negotiate.

The percentage poll was high enough not to make the elections a flat rejection of the new constitutional dispensation, but too low for the forces of participation in the dispensation to claim a ringing endorsement by the electorate.

Parties taking part in the election said at various times that they would accept 30 percent (one leader said 25 percent) as a mandate to take their seats in the new House of Representatives. The boycott movement had indicated a poll as high as 30 percent would mean that its action had failed.

In the event, the poll was sufficiently close to 30 percent to put the outcome of the election in that grey area where both participants and boycotters could claim victory.

Those who wanted the elections to succeed claimed intimidation, negative publicity and a lack of party finances brought the poll down. The boycott advocates insisted the outcome was a genuine reflection of the contempt which the community had for the new constitution.

Political analysts point out, whatever the truth, the people voted in sufficient numbers to give the new system a flicker of acceptance.

The low poll does not affect the new Parliament from the point of view of the coloured MPs taking their seats. The Government had previously said the system would proceed, no matter what the outcome of any election or referendum in the coloured and Indian communities.

But the poll does affect the performance of the new Parliament in that there is now even more pressure on the Government and the victorious Labour Party to make the system work.

A constant criticism levelled at the participating parties by the boycott movement during the election campaign was the new system was merely a perpetuation of white *baasskap*. The "sell-outs" who stood for election would find they had no real power to improve the lot of their communities, let alone dismantle apartheid laws.

All the parties argued the opposite. They said they did not agree with the constitution, but they were ready to grasp the power offered to destroy the discriminatory system from within.

Just over a quarter of the electorate believed this strongly enough to risk voting, while many more voters clearly remained cynical.

The ball is now squarely in the Government's court. The Labour Party will be anxious to produce meaningful reforms as soon as possible to vindicate its role in the constitution.

An area which will receive urgent attention is the Cape Penin-

sula where one third of all South Africa's coloured voters are registered. The percentage poll in the 20 seats in this region was substantially lower than in the rest of the country, reflecting the success of the United Democratic Front in the predominantly poor, working-class area there.

Failure to produce results will be seized by the boycott movement to discredit the LP and the system so that in the next general election the percentage poll may be a single digit.

It is most unlikely that Labour, given its track record of protest and opposition, will allow itself to be eroded in such a manner and it is more likely that it will have a massive confrontation with the Government, leading to a possible collapse of the tricameral system if the party

walks out.

The Government will have to tread very carefully on this road if it wants to make a go of the Constitution. It must constantly bear in mind that a collapse of the system could leave the country in such a climate of confrontation and hostility that the Conservative Party could sweep into power to re-instate the "tried and tested" principles of Vwoerdian separate development.

The role of the boycott movement in the coming years will be to monitor closely the success or failure of the constitution. The boycotters enjoyed a high profile during the run-up to the elections and ran a sophisticated campaign in spite of harassment by the authorities.

As a result, and because of the

detention of many boycott leaders on the eve of the elections, the movement has undoubtedly prestige in the community. It will be able to capitalise on this in its opposition to the new Parliament.

For the losing parties in Wednesday's elections, the future looks hopeless. The coloured community is polarised between those who want to work within the system and those who don't. As the polls showed, the people who wanted "in" opted for the Labour Party, most likely because of its track record of tough dealings with the Government.

If the LP pulls off a better deal for its people it will flourish. If it fails it is difficult to see how any of the other existing parties will take its place and do better. □

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

MULDER'S POLITICAL FUTURE VIEWED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 2

[Text] THE re-entry of former Information Minister Dr Connie Mulder to public office--as a President's Councillor--could be bumpy.

Sections of the Transvaal National Party are manoeuvring to introduce a motion censure to Parliament when Dr Mulder is nominated for the President's Council on a Conservative Party ticket.

But Mr Alex van Breda, the NP's Chief Whip, said this week he had no knowledge of the move and could not comment on it.

Behind the proposed move lies a desire in some NP quarters to further embarrass the CP "crown prince hopeful" over his role in the Information scandal when he lied to Parliament about State funding of the Citizen.

There is some confusion, however, whether the House of Assembly would be competent to pass a vote of censure on a member of the President's Council--a separate body and not strictly part of the legislative arm.

Unrepentant

Had Dr Mulder been returning directly to Parliament he would almost certainly have faced a call for a select committee of inquiry into his actions in 1977 when as Minister of Information he told Parliament there was no State money in the Citizen--an Information scandal front publication.

The Conservative Party has nominated Dr Mulder as a member of the President's Council in terms of the constitution which allows opposition parties representation on the deadlock-breaking body.

The burley Dr Mulder was quite unrepentant at the Conservative Party congress in Pretoria this week. He said he had no regrets about his actions as Minister and would do the same again if necessary.

He also said he had been denied the opportunity to defend himself against charges and was looking forward to doing so in the future.

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

MELLLOWING OF CONSERVATIVES NOTED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Brian Pottinger]

[Text] THE infant Conservative Party is rapidly passing into premature middle-age.

From its boisterous adolescence it has grown into a quieter creature--the only shrillness remains in its policies.

This week the party's Transvaal faithful gathered again in Pretoria's City Hall--the same venue where many of them had sat year after year as delegates to National Party congresses.

But this congress was different from last year's first Transvaal provincial congress since the founding of the party in early 1982. Then the City Hall had positively dripped with the excitement and fervour of a new crusade--to save the whites of South Africa from Mr P W Botha's "dangerous liberalism".

Then the hall was packed to overflowing to hear Dr Andries Treurnicht's speech, the applause was deafening, the congress fired by endless motions of condemnation of the Government.

This year the hall showed bald patches in a thinning crowd, the chanted "AP, AP" as the leader entered sounded jaded and the Congress delegates--try as they might--could not quite rise to the same levels of ringing indignation at Government perfidy as before. Only a debate on SABC bias succeeded in echoing some of the old fervour.

Not even the fact that it has won three out of the four by-elections it has contested in recent months could completely hide the CP's condition. The party, it rapidly became apparent, was showing the signs of consolidation, maturity and retrospection.

All quite understandable given the major setback the opposition parties suffered during the referendum and the uncertain position in which all opposition parties stand.

All quite understandable given the major setback the opposition parties suffered during the referendum and the uncertain position in which all opposition parties stand.

The most the party leadership could share with its followers was defiance and this Dr Treurnicht did--quoting, with approval, Churchillian phrases of resistance and socialism. The new constitution--it was made abundantly clear--would be opposed to the last. A volk does not die without a fight.

But of substantive policy there remained little the CP could offer except the zany: the "white homeland" idea was canvassed and warmly received, thus putting the CP ideologically into the select company of the true political ecocentrists.

On financial policy the party remained as opaque as ever. Attacks on GST increases, bond hikes, the general economy and Government "mismanagement" were made. But at the same time the Indian and coloured "homeland" idea would cost an awful lot of money to implement.

And then there were those old shibboleths which the CPers had once grimly seen disappear from the National Party platform to make way for things like integrated post offices, black admissions to white universities and the "#permanence" of blacks in "white" South Africa.

In successive leaps backwards the CP is slowly resurrecting the old and harsher aspects of NP policy. In so doing it has melted the ideological gulf between itself and the Herstigte Nasionale Party, and there were glowing descriptions of the benefits to be gained by harnessing the conservative white vote for the benefit of all.

And as if to celebrate this new-found potential in joint action, the CP decided in principle to contest municipal by-elections under CP colours. In that crucial and most sensitive of areas it hopes to create the constituency that will project it from its northern fastnesses into the urban areas.

The tools for a major right-wing mobilisation are at hand--white dissatisfaction with the economy, the farmers' parlous financial state, the uncertainty of the new constitution.

But from the pale shadow of its former robust self, it is to be wondered if the party can really capitalise on the opportunities both man and drought have presented to it.

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

EAST-WEST CAPE LABOR PARTY POWER STRUGGLE REPORTED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 2

[Text]

THERE are behind-the-scenes moves among Peninsula Labour Party MPs to shift the power base of the party from the Eastern to the Western Cape.

This comes in the wake of the LP's runaway victory at the polls this week.

The very extent of the victory means the Labour Party will have virtually no opposition in the House of Representatives — and this alone could further increase tension within the party.

Now, in spite of the public image of the Reverend Allan

Hendrikse as the undisputed leader of the party, rumblings of discontent about his handling of party affairs from his Uitenhage base have become increasingly audible.

MPs unhappy

There is a feeling in the Peninsula — the heartland of the Coloured people — that the power-base of the Labour Party should be shifted from

the Eastern to the Western Cape.

There are only five constituencies in the Eastern Cape, compared to 20 in the Peninsula.

Many Labour Party members are still unhappy about the way the former national chairman of the Labour Party, Mr David Curry of Stellenbosch, was replaced at the last LP congress at Port Elizabeth.

Mr Curry resigned after attending a party caucus meeting, but the reasons for his exit have remained one of the party's best-kept secrets.

He was replaced by a man who was never known to be active in politics — the Reverend Andrew Julius, who lives in Keimoes but who was born in the Eastern Cape.

The deputy national chairman of the LP is also an Eastern Cape man — Mr Charles Redcliffe, who this week won the Schauderville seat for the party.

Mr Hendrikse, who, as leader of the LP and member

of the national selection panel, also disenchanted many veteran Labourites by choosing his 26-year-old son, Peter, as a candidate for the Addo seat against the choice of the Grahamstown branch of the party, Mr Ivan Daniels.

Now that the elections are over, there is talk of a new alignment, if not the possibility of a split between the Eastern Cape faction and the Western Cape faction.

One LP man said this week: "We can no longer be dictated to and ruled by remote control from Mr Hendrikse's Uitenhage home."

CSO: 3400/2141

LABOR'S ALLAN HENDRICKSE PROFILED

Cabinet Post Likely

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 25 Aug 84 p 11

[Article by Jaap Boekkooi: "The Prison Graduate Who Often Cries Alone"]

[Text]

When the then Minister of Justice, Mr Jimmy Kruger of Biko-leaves-me-cold fame, met the fair Mrs Terry Hendrickse in 1976 to discuss the release of her jailed Black Power advocate husband Allan, the Minister took one glance and exclaimed: "But Mrs Hendrickse ... you are not black!"

It was another Mr Kruger blunder, for this was the opening the Labour leader's wife was looking for.

"You have made me black by your laws," she shot back.

"Go to any post office. There are two entrances ... we enter through the door marked non-whites. That makes us all black."

The retort and the Minister's remark encapsulates a telling slice of local Africana. For the Hendrickse family is so typically indigenous, descended as it is from a sick comforter on a Dutch ship to Hottentots and Asian slaves, that it includes gone-for-whites (who may only be visited stealthily at night) all the way to former United Party leader Sir de Villiers Graaff, to whom the Hendrickses are related through Lord de Villiers.

At one time all this did not mean much, for the Uitenhage of Mr Allan Hendrickse's infant days was a relaxed place. The neighbours on both sides of the Hendrickse's large Cape-gabled house with its big comfortable stoep were white Afrikaners, and just down the street lived an Indian family and also the local rabbi.

Allan's mother employed a white woman, tenant of their first Uitenhage house, as her seamstress. The family was happy and well-off even in the Depression — the parents' salaries as teachers meant more then. Education made Allan's father a prominent personality and the first non-white moderator of the Congregational Church, a post in which Allan followed him.

But apartheid, in whatever guise, was already creeping up like a cloud of choking gas. Allan's first political experience, as told in Piet Coetzer's book "Awaiting Trial — Allan Hendrickse" (published by Librarius this week) was at the age of 11 when he and his father travelled to Port Elizabeth with a banner "Down With Segregation" on their car to protest against segregation plans by the Smuts-Hertzog coalition.

From there on, past the milepost of 1948 and legalised apartheid, the full weight of oppression came down on the Hendrickses. Under the Group Areas Act their Dale Street Congregational Church and the parsonage were taken away from them and demolished.

"Our history is one of dispossession," the Rev Hendrickse was to say later.

Humiliation became a way of life for all coloured people under apartheid's legal arrogance. His sister-in-law was the first coloured person to be charged with sitting on a "white" railway station bench. His brother John-Paul became a paediatrician and obstetrician in Britain and married a British woman. They could only come here on condition she was reclassified coloured, and he had to get special permission to visit his dying father, before he died himself in exile — a world authority on cancer — in Nigeria.

His youngest sister, trained at Fort Hare like he, gained two doctorates and emigrated to the United States.

While in solitary confinement during the 1976 riots and boycotts, every effort was made to break the reverend's spirit.

His Bible was taken from him because it contained "too many notes".

His son, Peter, now elected with him in the House of Representatives, was arrested, and hated whites.

He himself at one time "did not dare to invite whites to my home".

He was not allowed to read certain books in jail because their covers showed scantily-dressed girls. Warders banged doors to keep him awake.

As a teacher he had to work with inspectors who refused to sit on the same chair where a coloured person had sat unless the seat was covered with

paper. He admits he often cries, such as in jail when his Labour colleagues sent him birthday cards.

While in jail Prime Minister Mr John Vorster let it be known he would release Mr Hendrickse if the Labour Party decided to co-operate with the Government. But, as biographer Piet Coetzer puts it, Mr Hendrickse never reacts to threats or is "enticed by face-saving devices ... and he cannot be bribed or bought".

No longer bitter at a lifetime of dispossession and humiliation, Mr Hendrickse is quoted by his biographer as saying he will "give the new dispensation five years to see if it delivers

'Heavy Burden'

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 23 Aug 84 pp 12

[Editorial: "Mr Hendrickse's Heavy Burden"]

[Text]

IN the House of Representatives, the Labour Party's sweeping electoral success means that something akin to a one-party situation will prevail. That kind of unity is probably no bad thing for the coloured community at this stage of the political game. What is more disturbing is that the greater part of its constituency, 70 percent or more of the electorate, will not be represented, having stayed away from yesterday's elections for a variety of reasons.

The low percentage poll is what most realistic observers had expected in the circumstances: perhaps even a little better. It is nothing to crow over, however, and will be used continually to discredit the Rev Allan Hendrickse and his followers as unrepresenta-

tive "Government stooges". The best way to fight this label will be to intensify their fight against apartheid, against the ethnic basis of the constitution and its exclusion of blacks. Despite its minority support the Labour Party now represents the principal means of further constitutional reform.

Reasons officially suggested for the stayaway include apathy, ignorance, uncertainty; lack of funds, time and organisation; but principally intimidation. The strong anti-constitution lobby claims it is the result of a successful boycott movement. To draw a line between voluntary abstentions or those induced by fear is not easy. The strong police presence at polling stations yesterday helped to reduce overt intimidation and demonstrations. More subtle pressures

the goods. If there are no positive results the Government can forget about further Labour Party co-operation."

And among his requirements for the future are that "land and wealth must be redistributed".

Yet the particular mediatory role of his people is, in his words, "being in the middle of the sandwich, the meat between the two slices of bread, being products of both ... I want to remind ... white South Africa that yesterday is gone. We are prepared to forget it. We want to say to them that today cannot last forever and so we say, let us sit down together".

may well have prevailed, but in any case the end result is what has to be reckoned with — as in the highly politicised western Cape, where the turnout was an abject 4 to 5 percent in some seats.

The widespread detentions of boycott leaders were also designed to reduce intimidation, but may well end up having a counter-productive effect. They meant that the elections took place under the shadow of the big stick of the security laws. As the United Democratic Front said: "The hand that makes the cross in the elections is also the hand which locks up our leaders in Le Grange's cells — not only today but tomorrow." This overkill on the part of the authorities is another part of the Labour Party's burden.

NEW MP'S FACE HOUSING, LANGUAGE PROBLEMS

Search for Housing

Durban POST NATAL in English 15-18 Aug 84 p 10

[Text]

WITH less than a month to go before the new three-chamber Parliament comes into being, Government officials are working feverishly to find homes and prepare offices for the new politicians and their accompanying bureaucracies.

A virtual "army" of people — white, coloured and Indian — must be accommodated temporarily before the new enlarged Parliament starts functioning next month.

A Department of Community Development spokesman said this week the work to prepare temporary office accommodation and other parliamentary facilities for the new Houses was proceeding "full-steam and according to plan".

There was still uncertainty, however, about home accommodation for Ministers, Deputy Ministers and members of the House of Representatives and House of Delegates.

A detailed announce-

ment about this would be made by the Government, the spokesman said.

At this stage there are indications that some of the coloured and Indian MPs may live temporarily in Rygersdal, a posh racially-mixed block of diplomatic flats in Rondebosch.

The new coloured House of Representatives will sit in the old Senate chamber in the present Parliament building. Offices for coloured MPs are being prepared in that wing of Parliament.

This will be a temporary arrangement while extensions are built.

The Indian House of Delegates will be temporarily housed in Marks Building, where a debating chamber is being prepared. This arrangement is expected to continue until the new premises in extensions to the Parliament building have been completed.

The three Houses of

the new Parliament will comprise 174 white parliamentarians, 85 coloured MPs and 45 Indian MPs.

The coloured and Indian chambers will eventually be housed in huge extensions to the present parliamentary building.

The proposed extensions were announced earlier this year by the Minister of Community Development, Pen Kotze.

The new building will consist of five storeys south of the present Parliament building in the direction of Tuynhuys.

The new President's Council is to be housed in the Goede Hoop Theatre and a part of Tuynhuys.

The Community Development spokesman said it would be "impossible" for the Government to provide home accommodation for all the members of the new Parliament. Many of the future members would have to find their own accommodation.

Another problem is that of accommodating 60 white, coloured and Indian members of the new President's Council.

State houses originally built in Bellville South to accommodate executive members of the Coloured Representative Council (CRC) are being refurbished and will probably be used to accommodate officials of Parliament.

The spokesman said it was not the intention to use these houses for members of the Ministers' Councils.

Meanwhile, attempts are also being made to recruit suitable additional staff for the new Parliament and related services.

The secretary of Parliament has invited applications for various jobs, including committee clerks, Hansard reporters, translators, administrative officers, secretaries, typists and administrative assistants.

(Report by F S Esterhuyse,
122 St George's Street,
Cape Town.)

MP's Wives Profiled

Durban POST NATAL in English 15-18 Aug 84 p 11

[Article by Rashida Dhooma: "Will the Wives Accompany Their Husbands to Cape Town?"]

[Text] BHINDAMANTHEE Mohaniall is the wife of Ashwin Mohaniall, an NPP candidate in the Springfield constituency.

The couple have four children, aged 18, 16, 10 and 3:

"I will stay behind and look after the children. My husband will try and come down whenever he can during the six months.

"The children need at least one parent around. I help them with their homework, so will have to be with them, particularly during their end of year examinations. My eldest son is in matric."

VIJAYMA Reddy,
wife of Jayaram
"JN" Reddy, who is
standing as a Solidarity
candidate in the Glenview con-
stituency:

"I will join my husband in Cape Town. He is seeing to our accommodation arrangements.

"I have four grown-up children, aged 26, 25, 23 and 18.

"My 18-year-old son, who is still in school, will live with my married children while my husband and I are away."

THARAVATHI Ju-
muna and husband
Narantak (also
known as Shan Mo-
hangi) are both
standing for elec-
tion. Mrs Jumuna is
standing as an In-
dependent in the
Phoenix constitu-
ency, and Mr Jumuna
as an NPP candi-
date in the North
Coast Constituency:

"If we're successful my husband and I will set up home in Cape Town."

The couple have three children, Virashni, 10, Ishana, 9, and Nishan, 7.

"They will stay with my sister Renuka and her husband Jay. Shan and I do not think it will be fair to move them about.

"They are settled in their school and have lots of friends. We do not want to unsettle their lives."

"We will try and return to Durban as much as possible to visit our children."

She said she and her husband have given up their business interests and are devoting their time to their respective election campaigns.

CHANDERWATHIE
(Shirley) Dookie,
wife of Baldeo Doo-
kie, who is standing
as an NPP candi-
date in the Red Hill
constituency:

"My husband and I have not yet decided

whether I will accompany him to Cape Town or stay behind and look after our children, or all move to Cape Town."

The couple have three children, aged 24, 21 and 15.

GONUM Devan, wife
of Palanisamy "Pi"
Devan, Solidarity
candidate in the
Cavendish area:

"My husband and I have not fully discussed the matter but I think I will be going to Cape Town with him. My children are married, so there is no problem."

SILKUMARIE Pan-
day, wife of Ram-
charitar Panday,
who is standing as
an NPP candidate in
the Glenview con-
stituency:

"I will remain behind to look after my two children, aged 19 and 15. I will not allow their lives to be disrupted while they are studying.

"My husband and I have discussed the matter and I realise my family will have to make sacrifices in order for him to serve the people. I will go Cape Town for visits and he will also arrange to return to Durban whenever he can."

Crash Courses in Afrikaans

Durban POST NATAL in English 15-18 Aug 84 p 11

[Text]

IT will be back to school for most of the successful Natal candidates in this month's House of Delegates elections.

For them, it means quick lessons in Afrikaans.

For, according to Government sources and parliamentary correspondents, the majority party within the Indian chamber will have to nominate at least one member on each of the 25 different Select Committees, an important cog in the tricameral parliament.

And proceedings at these Select Committee sessions are mainly in Afrikaans.

Some of the August 28 hopefuls, anticipating victory, have already undertaken crash Afrikaans courses.

The leaders of the two major political parties — Jayaram Reddy of Solidarity and Amichand Rajbansi of the National Peoples' Party — have both said they will not accept proceedings in Afrikaans.

Said Mr Reddy: "We want the same privilege as in the old Parliament. Those MPs who did not understand Afrikaans were immediately given English trans-

lations. We want this arrangement to stand."

He said Cape and Transvaal politicians would not have any difficulty understanding or speaking Afrikaans because they regard it as a home language.

"But Natalians will face a big problem."

"We in Natal have a language problem and this must be accepted and respected by the Government. Those of us who are successful in the elections do not want to be part of the audience in the new set-up. We want to participate and represent our people and the only way this will be possible is if arrangements could be made to the satisfaction of all," he said.

Mr Rajbansi does not foresee any problems with Afrikaans because after the elections his party will hold a briefing seminar.

"We will ask that all documents handed to the Indian chamber, or in the Select Committee, be in English and any debate held in Afrikaans be immediately translated for the benefit of those members who cannot understand," he said.
(Report by K Asif of 85 Field Street, Durban).

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

STATEMENT OF REVENUE, RECEIPTS PUBLISHED

Pretoria GOVERNMENT GAZETTE in English/Afrikaans 17 Aug 84 pp 4-6

[Text]

DEPARTEMENT VAN FINANSIES

No. 1767

17 Augustus 1984

Staat van Inkomste ingevorder gedurende die tydperk
1 April 1984 tot 30 Junie 1984.

Tesourie, Pretoria.

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

No. 1767

17 August 1984

Statement of Revenue collected during the period 1 April
1984 to 30 June 1984.

Treasury, Pretoria.

Inkomstekosf	Head of Revenue	Begroting Estimates 1984/85	Ingevorder vir die jaar gedurende 31 Maart 1984		Maand Junie Month of June		Total 1 April tot 30 Junie Total 1 April to 30 June	
			1984	1983	1984	1983	1984	1983
Staatinkomstekosf	State Revenue Account	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
Douane en Alwyns—	Customs and Excise—							
Douaneerg.....	Customs Duty.....	1 146 000 000	1 085 018 806	118 251 068	79 513 300	340 409 845	218 414 474	
Alywynaar.....	Excise Duty.....	1 902 000 000	1 715 220 641	174 162 297	146 783 645	435 332 025	372 053 805	
Verkoops.....	Sales Duty.....	—	80 017	3 386	9 874	—	3 386	9 874
Bebouings.....	Surcharge.....	—	225 974 500	Dr 1 856 561	27 138 283	Dr 2 699 651	74 636 599	
Diverse.....	Miscellaneous.....	80 000 000	68 167 402	810 199	3 340 981	22 921 306	31 077 869	
		R 3 128 000 000	R 3 094 461 366	R 291 371 309	R 256 786 085	R 795 967 151	R 696 192 581	
Oording na Sentrale Inkomstefonds.....	Transfer to Central Revenue Fund (a)	Dr 250 000 000	Dr 250 000 000	Dr 21 000 000	Dr 21 000 000	Dr 63 000 000	Dr 63 000 000	
Bedings, ingeval: Douane-Uit- komstekosf.....	Payments in terms of Customs Union Agreements (b)	Dr 1 089 000 000	Dr 907 281 075	Dr 2 220 750	Dr —	Dr 286 705 250	Dr 183 011 250	
		R 1 339 000 000	R 1 157 281 075	R 23 220 750	R 21 000 000	R 349 705 250	R 246 911 250	
		R 1 789 000 000	R 1 937 180 291	R 268 150 599	R 235 786 085	R 446 261 901	R 430 181 731	
Buisklaars inkomste—	Inland Revenue—							
Belasting op inkomste.....	Tax on Income.....	12 413 730 000	10 805 546 892	784 063 796	747 175 995	2 155 058 127	2 079 446 997	
Algemene Verkoopbelasting.....	General Sales Tax.....	3 820 000 000	3 874 033 537	425 474 079	285 291 471	1 211 197 387	887 440 433	
Ander Belastings—	Other taxes—							
Belasting op buisklaars aan- deelhouers.....	Non-Resident shareholders' tax	260 000 000	259 270 991	22 453 112	30 727 423	39 786 806	61 523 131	
Buisklaarsbelasting op buisklaars.....	Non-Resident's tax on interest	20 000 000	20 698 305	2 002 451	1 622 278	6 936 219	3 818 720	
Ouvergemaakte winst.....	Underpaid profits.....	2 000 000	2 261 142	285 801	155 363	517 180	403 862	
Geldbelasting.....	Gold tax.....	3 000 000	3 322 932	251 301	373 135	583 774	820 536	
Boerd-Belasting.....	Estate duties.....	80 000 000	86 875 949	12 137 948	8 291 569	25 710 668	23 158 169	
Hendelsbelasting.....	Trade securities.....	50 000 000	40 945 545	3 536 576	3 350 922	8 687 150	12 744 391	
Sellings en gelds.....	Stamp duties and fees.....	235 000 000	209 495 394	22 473 652	14 713 269	70 504 498	41 374 516	
Herengte.....	Transfer duties.....	340 000 000	316 578 395	26 792 930	27 046 019	77 033 841	68 764 880	
Diverse.....	Miscellaneous.....	5 000	—	—	—	—	—	
Myverhuurings- en eiendoms- repte—	Mining Leases and Ownership—							
Goodmyne.....	Gold mines.....	385 500 000	520 428 369	10 436	Dr 689	11 315	6 970	
Diamantmyne.....	Diamond mines.....	1 300 000	9 765 379	24	240 165	482	259 954	
Ander mynes.....	Other mines.....	9 000 000	6 295 531	4 797	1 852	532 390	62 668	
Reste en Dividende- Heftings—	Interest and Dividends—	503 400 000	494 079 946	36 983 921	32 616 578	113 391 897	111 726 949	
Diamantmyvoerings—	Levies—	37 000 000	39 643 573	2 682 063	3 021 413	6 036 286	14 187 304	
Myspaktegrye en lisensies—	Diamonds export duty.....	2 190 000	2 127 220	140 317	73 396	333 869	305 041	
Lisensies—	Mining lease rights and licences.....	3 000 000	2 791 639	89 515	74 320	131 137	198 786	
Terugvoerung van lenings en voorskrifte—	Recovery of loans and advances.....	45 205 000	990 431 116	947 490	470 796	2 609 976	2 645 599	
Departementale Bedrywighede—	Departmental Activities—							
Koot en houtprodukte.....	Wood and wood products.....	48 500 000	55 125 040	4 768 666	5 832 107	8 722 449	8 893 614	
Bedryfseksange—	Trading Accounts.....	41 000 000	—	948 207	796 560	2 722 560	1 867 462	
Verhoring van staatsendom—	Leasing of state property.....	30 100 000	31 619 917	140 317	73 396	333 869	305 041	
Verkoop van staatsgrond—	Sale of state land.....	6 600 000	9 964 132	90 368	1 546 662	1 546 662	—	
Bloues en verbeurdverklarings—	Fines and confiscations.....	27 000 000	23 667 538	2 162 177	1 972 250	6 501 262	5 462 126	
Ander.....	Other.....	354 700 000	236 551 814	40 529 889	7 938 363	58 571 077	8 342 091	
		R 20 728 750 000	R 18 043 971 679	R 1 388 422 635	R 1 171 084 376	R 3 817 185 866	R 3 333 454 803	
		R 22 517 750 000	R 19 981 151 970	R 1 656 573 194	R 1 408 870 461	R 4 263 447 767	R 3 793 638 534	
Staatinkomstefonds.....	State Oil Fund.....	(c) 300 000 000	299 889 747	29 127 279	22 821 840	78 399 629	67 247 432	
Nasionale Padfonds.....	National Road Fund.....	(d) 172 000 000	164 051 472	15 951 505	12 380 131	42 120 327	35 973 521	
Suid-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsstu- fonds.....	South Africa Development Trust Fund.....	(e) 20 000 000	19 383 502	761 495	987 562	2 918 881	3 344 383	
Fond vir Sorghumberservis.....	Sorghum Beer Research Fund.....	(f) 1 800 000	1 725 555	—	—	—	—	
Suidwes-Afrika Gebiedsinkomste- fonds.....	South-West Africa Territorial Re- venue Fund.....	(g) 1 000	—	—	—	—	—	
Total.....	Total.....	R 23 011 551 000	R 20 466 208 246	R 1 702 415 473	R 1 443 059 994	R 4 366 846 604	R 3 890 105 872	

Rekomisarise met opgaaf gepubliseer by Governmentenkennisgewing 1472 in Staatskouern van 13 Julie 1964.	Reconciliation with statement published by Government Notice 1472 in Government Gazette of 13 July 1964.					
In Transit, 31 Maart 1984	In Transit, 31 March 1984	—	—	42 824 858	—	51 611 663
In Transit 31/5/84	In Transit 31/5/84	—	—	1 702 415 473	—	4 386 846 604
Invoerders soos hierboven	Collections, as above	R				
In Transit, 30/6/84	In Transit, 30/6/84	—	—	1 743 240 331	—	4 438 458 267
In Skatkousrekening ontvang	Received into Exchequer Account	R				
		—	—	9 081 656	—	9 081 656
		—	—	1 738 158 675	—	4 429 376 811

(a) Artikel 22 (1) (d) van Wet 25 van 1969.
 (b) Artikel 5 (1) (b) van Wet 1 van 1964.
 (c) Artikel 1 (1) (a) van Wet 36 van 1971.
 (d) Artikel 2 (1) (a) van Wet 54 van 1971.
 (e) Artikel 8 van Wet 18 van 1936.
 (f) Artikel 19(b) van Wet 63 van 1962.
 (g) Artikel 22 (4A) van Wet 25 van 1969.

(a) Section 22 (1) (d) of Act 25 of 1969.
 (b) Section 5 (1) (b) of Act 1 of 1964.
 (c) Section 1 of Act 38 of 1971.
 (d) Section 2 (1) (a) of Act 54 of 1971.
 (e) Section 8 of Act 18 of 1936.
 (f) Section 19(b) of Act 63 of 1962.
 (g) Section 22 (4A) of Act 25 of 1969.

No. 1768	-17-Augustus 1984	No. 1768	-17-August 1984
Staat van Ontvangste in en Oordragte uit die Skatkousrekening vir die tydperk 1-April 1984 tot 31 Julie 1984.	Statement of Receipts into and Transfers from the Exchequer Account for the period 1-April 1984 to 31 July 1984.	Treasurie, Pretoria.	Treasury, Pretoria.
		ONTVANGSTE—RECEIPTS	

Inkomsteboef	Head of Revenue	Maand Julie		Totaal 1 April tot 31 Julie	
		1984	1983	1984	1983
Skatkousaldo, 31 Maart 1984	Exchequer Balance, 31 March 1984	R	R	19 302	R
Skatkousaldo, 30 Junie 1984	Exchequer Balance, 30 June 1984	599 070 735	—	—	—
Staatkousrekening	State Revenue Account				
Docane en Alkyes	Customs and Excise	Dr	21 361 238	18 903 147	412 990 072
Binnelandse Inkomste	Inland Revenue	1 651 217 579	2 152 639 970	5 514 965 252	427 622 081
	R	1 629 856 341	2 133 736 823	5 927 975 324	5 960 539 825
Staatkouefonds	State Oil Fund	23 317 492	23 896 749	104 199 826	95 251 118
Natuurlike Paddoue	National Roads Fund	12 687 052	13 068 306	57 283 301	52 278 052
Suid-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsfonds	South African Development Trust Fund	761 000	988 000	6 538 005	8 032 258
Fonds vir Sogehoudervervaardiging	Southern Bass Research Fund	—	—	2 040	—
S.W.A. Gebiedsstaatkouefondse — Verkoopreg	S.W.A. Territorial Revenue Fund—Sales Duty	R	1 666 621 885	2 171 689 878	6 095 998 496
Ander Ontvangste	Other Receipts				
Stadtbiljetter, Brievenpost	Treasury Bills, Internal	1 227 220 000	—	4 988 023 000	—
Leesgeheue	Loan Levy	—	—	—	—
Binnelandse Effekte, Obligasies en Lenings	Internal Stock, Bonds and Loans Raised—				
Onderpakkie Termys Tresoor-obligasies	Indefinite Period Treasury Bonds	6 835 700	—	31 626 900	—
Onderpakkie Termys Nasionale Verdodigingsobligasies	Indefinite Period National Defence Bonds	3 775 200	—	8 352 900	—
Verdeeldingsbonussobligasies	Defence Bonus Bonds	13 713 295	—	42 046 023	—
Binnelandse Ongewisselde Effekte—	Internal Registered Stock—				
1984	1984	167 000 000	—	1 480 000 000	—
11,5%, 1985	10 260 000	50 000 000	—	226 850 000	—
14,5%, 1987	—	—	—	200 000 000	—
9%, 1988	—	—	—	30 000 000	—
Binnelandse Lenings en Krediete Oppervlak	Foreign Loans and Credits Raised—				
1984	1984	—	—	126 448 237	—
1985	—	333 333	—	609 058	—
1986	—	14 052	—	326 288	—
1987	—	—	—	101 804	—
1988	—	—	—	56 883 406	—
1989	75 511 640	—	—	75 511 640	—
R	3 209 025 305	—	—	13 356 759 754	—
Total (inclusief Aanvanksaldo)	R	3 808 096 040	—	13 356 779 056	—

Dienste	Service	Beproefde Estimates	Maand Julie		Totaal 1 April tot 31 Julie	
			1984/85	1983	1984	1983
Staatkousrekening	State Revenue Account	R	R	R	R	R
1. Staatspresident	State President	1 385 000	115 416	106 900	461 664	427 600
Staats Bedrig	Statutory Amount	84 000	7 000	5 233	28 000	30 932
2. Minister	Parliament	9 173 000	849 000	600 000	3 705 000	3 198 000
3. Erste Minister	Statutory Amount	6 566 000	547 000	385 000	2 190 000	1 522 000
4. Samewerking en Ontwikkeling	Statutory Amount	10 260 000	850 000	472 000	2 980 000	1 888 000
5. Vervoer	Transport	73 000	13 000	10 000	24 332	18 836
6. Finans	Finance	1 202 558 000	102 000 000	110 000 000	387 700 000	263 700 000
7. Staats Bedrig	Statutory Amount	226 985 000	18 000 000	29 678 000	133 000 000	206 971 000
8. Finans	Transport	343 893 000	60 400 000	25 200 000	119 213 000	110 300 000
9. Staats Bedrig	Statutory Amount	842 554 000	83 000 000	65 200 000	277 000 000	276 400 000
10. Audit	Audit	3 490 121 000	242 583 000	227 461 850	1 487 413 000	1 131 164 005
11. Staatkousrekening	Statistical Development and Planning	4 559 413 000	377 875 000	840 000	3 680 000	3 290 000
12. Buitelandse Sake	Foreign Affairs	651 632 000	40 050 000	25 000 000	1 547 487 000	1 351 487 000
13. Buitelandse Administrasie	Internal Affairs	120 512 000	10 040 000	10 050 000	158 204 000	160 200 000
14. Kommissie vir Administrasie	Commission for Administration	1 293 242 000	105 911 768	88 500 000	445 947 851	359 485 000
15. Verbetering van Dienstvoerwyses	Improvement of Conditions of Service	46 329 000	882 000	2 462 000	31 031 000	23 412 000
16. Politie	Police	267 000 000	11 000 000	4 730 000	—	4 730 000
17. Geesteswese	Health and Welfare	61 000 000	42 000 000	282 100 000	—	203 000 000
18. Gesondheid en Welsyn	Health and Welfare	1 722 468 000	162 000 000	122 000 000	585 000 000	453 000 000
19. Nasionale Onderwys	National Education	200 000	14 000	16 000	58 400	58 400
20. Weermag	Weermag	866 675 000	95 700 000	79 600 000	420 400 000	355 800 000
21. Geestesweseontwikkeling	Department of Arts and Culture	3 154 667 000	312 000 000	269 000 000	1 351 300 000	1 143 100 000
22. Onderwysontwikkeling	Education and Training	92 245 000	5 300 000	6 341 000	27 807 000	24 364 000
23. Landbou	Landbou	57 000 000	42 000 000	36 000 000	23 760 000	173 000 000
24. Mineraliese en Energiiese	Mineral and Energy Affairs	134 782 000	11 000 000	7 000	41 000 000	30 950 000
25. Onderwys en Opvoeding	Education and Training	6 123 000	750 000	490 000	3 370 000	1 970 000
Statutory Amount	Statutory Amount	311 592 000	27 366 000	19 455 000	125 343 000	86 500 000
Prisons	Prisons	1 269 900 000	98 000 000	94 500 000	327 000 000	334 500 000
Community Development	Community Development	392 400 000	32 700 000	27 800 000	131 100 000	117 400 000
Environment Affairs	Environment Affairs	68 778 000	87 700 000	90 000 000	267 700 000	230 000 000
Arts	Arts	4 000 000	48 000 000	42 000 000	140 500 000	203 050 000
Mineraliese en Energiiese	Mineral and Energy Affairs	537 637 000	60 000 000	42 000 000	249 000 000	169 000 000
Education and Training	Education and Training	709 257 000	—	—	—	—
R	25 356 812 000	2 037 596 867	1 822 222 692	8 837 315 247	7 476 013 433	—

Staatsleeffonds	South Afr Fund	(a)	—	23 317 492	23 806 749	104 199 826	95 251 118
Nationale Postfonds	National Road Fund	(b)	—	2 687 000	13 068 306	47 313 301	52 278 052
Suid-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsfonds	South African Development Trust Fund	(c)	—	761 000	988 000	6 534 005	8 032 234
Fonds vir Sorgelikheidsvoorsiening	Sorghum Beer Research Fund	(d)	—	—	—	—	—
S.W.A. Gebedieningsinkomstefonds—Verkoopreg	S.W.A. Territorial Revenue Fund—Sales Duty (e)	—	—	—	—	2 040	—
	R	—	—	26 765 544	37 953 055	138 023 172	155 361 431
	R	—	—	2 064 352 411	1 860 175 747	9 015 338 419	7 631 574 864

Dienst	Service	Begroting Estimates 1984/85	Maand Julie Month of July		Total 1 April tot 31 Julie Total 1 April to 31 July	
			1984	1983	1984	1983
Ander Uitbetaalings-						
	Other Issues					
Trouwbelasting van Staatshulpdienst: Binnelandse Belastingdienstplichtigen geduldig	Treasury Bills repaid: Internal.....	—	1 543 430 000	—	3 570 313 000	—
Leenheffing geduldig	Tax Redemption Certificates repaid.....	—	37	—	49	—
Dugbetaaladvocaten geduldig	Loan Levy repaid.....	—	1 365 790	—	5 265 337	—
Besluitende Echtes, Obligaties en Leasing Geduldig	Staking Fund Advances.....	—	—	—	1 325 456	—
Vijf-jaar-obligaties Na-levengeld	Internal Stock, Bonds and Loans Redemptions:					
Twede Rechts Nationale Verdedigingsobliga- ties	Five Year Non-Resident Bonds.....	—	354 000	—	3 427 000	—
8% Nationale Verdedigingsobligaties	Second Series National Defence Bonds.....	—	—	—	4 942 700	—
9% Nationale Verdedigingsobligaties	8% National Defence Bonds.....	—	1 246 300	—	2 981 250	—
7% Technische 8% Tenuiteitsobligaties	9% National Defence Bonds.....	—	1 250 000	—	1 037 700	—
Onderstaande Tenuiteits-obligaties	7% Technical Bonds.....	—	3 170 000	—	9 522 300	—
Onderstaande Tenuiteits-obligaties	Second Series 15% Treasury Bonds.....	—	569 000	—	2 156 600	—
Verdedigingsobligaties	Indefinite Period Treasury Bonds.....	—	4 226 800	—	16 172 900	—
Derde Rechts Nationale Verdedigingsobligaties	Indefinite Period National Defence Bonds	—	1 222 000	—	3 652 450	—
Besluitende Ongewenste Echtes:	Defence Bonds	—	16 872 440	—	50 927 380	—
7,5% 1984	Third Series National Defence Bonds	—	—	—	2 271 000	—
9,5% 1984	Internal Revenue Stock:					
Portugese Leningen en Crediten Redemptions:	Interest Receipts:					
1983/87	1984/85.....	—	—	—	50 000 000	—
1981/86	1985/86.....	—	—	—	335 277 700	—
1979/84	1979/84.....	—	—	—	—	—
1984	1984.....	—	—	—	20 667 989	—
	R		3 636 891 428	—	13 185 574 442	—
Statischesaldo, 31 Julie 1984.....	Bankbalance, 31 July 1984	—	171 204 612	—	171 204 612	—
Totale.....	Totals	R	3 808 096 040	—	13 356 779 055	—

- (a) Artikel 1 van Wet 38 van 1977.
- (b) Artikel 2 (!) (a) van Wet 54 van 1971.
- (c) Artikel 8 van Wet 18 van 1936.
- (d) Artikel 19bis van Wet 63 van 1962.
- (e) Artikel 22 (4A) van Wet 25 van 1969.

- (a) Section 1 of Act 38 of 1977.
- (b) Section 2 (1) (a) of Act 54 of 1971.
- (c) Section 8 of Act 18 of 1936.
- (d) Section 19(4) of Act 63 of 1962.
- (e) Section 22 (4A) of Act 25 of 1949.

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS SPEND ABOVE BUDGETS

Capetown THE CAPE TIMES in English 23 Aug 84 p 15

[Text]

JOHANNESBURG. — Government spending for the first four months of the current fiscal year is running at a rate of 18,4 percent above last year.

But in terms of what the average budgeted expenditure should be for four months, the departments have overspent to the extent of 4,5 percent. All the excess spending took place in March and April.

State departments spent R8,857 billion in the four months ended July 1984, compared with R7,476 billion for the same period of last year.

Increase

In his Budget speech, Mr Owen Horwood, the then Minister of Finance, said that he would try to hold the increase in this year's Budget to 11,7 percent above last year's.

Total expenditure in the original Budget for

the current year was estimated to be R24,946 billion but this was increased to R25,356 billion by additional expenditure which was approved by Parliament. This works out to an average of R2,113 billion a month.

Mr Horwood said that he would try to confine the State departments' monthly spending to one-twelfth of their annual budgets.

In April total spending was R2,45 billion, in May R2,316 billion, June R2,054 billion with R2,037 billion in July.

Underspent

While some departments were, in terms of the monthly average, underspent at the end of July, others appear to have spent a bigger-than-average amount of their budgets.

The Departments of Co-operation, Foreign Affairs, Community Development, and Minerals and Energy Affairs appear to be well within budget, but the Commission for Administration has spent three-quarters of its appropriation of R46m with eight months to go.

National Education

has spent R420m of its total budget of R866m.

Defence is about R100m over its average.

Industry and Commerce has spent R238m in four months against an annual budget of R575m.

Other departments which appear to be over budget at present are Agriculture and Education and Training.

Public servants

Some R267m appropriated for "improvement in conditions of service" — benefits for public servants — is as yet unspent.

With expenditure at R8,857 billion and revenue at R5,928 billion — very little changed from last year's collections — the deficit before borrowing, including repayments of past borrowing, amounts to R2,929 billion. This has been financed by the raising of R3,092 billion.

Bonds issued by the Treasury have brought in R1,937 billion, of which R1,48 billion has been raised by the new and most popular bond, the 13 percent 2005.

Some of this stock was raised by public tender, some by tapping stock into the bond market, and some by issues to the

Public Investment Commissioners.

In June the PIC took up stock to the value of R217m. It is believed that the PIC will take up bonds approximately at the rate of R200m a month.

Treasury bills have brought in R1,418 billion net.

The Defence Bonus Bond scheme appears to be running into heavy water. These bonds have raised R42m so far this year, but R51m has been repaid.

Credits

Foreign loans and credits raised amount to R253m while R110m has been repaid. Mr Horwood budgeted to raise R425m abroad this year.

A breakdown of revenue is available only to the end of June. At that stage income from customs and excise was at R446m slightly higher than it was at the same stage of last year.

Inland revenue at R3,817 billion was R484m ahead of 1983/84 and most of this increase came from general sales tax which, at R1,211 billion, was R324m more than last year.

CSO: 3400/2141

SECRET DETAILS OF SALEM OIL FRAUD DISCLOSED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 24 Aug 84 p 6

[Editorial: "Peering Beneath the Oil Slick"]

[Text]

SECRET details of the Salem oil fraud in 1980 were disclosed yesterday at a Johannesburg seminar on international maritime fraud. The matter is of obvious interest to South African taxpayers who were swindled out of R26 million. It is legitimate to ask why South Africans are being given these facts only now, several years after they became public knowledge abroad.

The latest revelations put our Government in a good light. Ironically it was its passion for secrecy that caused suspicion about its own role in the affair. Yet any Government which hides information from its people (there are always a dozen "good" reasons for doing so) deserves outright condemnation. Secrecy has become almost a norm in our bureaucracy — so much so that the public often fails to react when people discover they have been "conned" by slick manipulation of the news, or withholding of facts about embarrassing bumbles.

Unless the trend in censoring news about an increasing

number of "sensitive areas" is reversed, the nation's security as a whole will suffer — not to mention any sense of confidence and trust. For every good reason advanced for hiding the facts from the people, there are five better reasons for being frank, honest and open.

In the Salem instance it appears that the Government may have belatedly come to this same realisation — although as recently as last month the Minister of Energy Affairs was still berating the Press for its probing of oil scandals. What has happened to change official attitudes? The new frankness on one item in a taboo topic may be connected with South Africa's greater self-reliance through Sasol, or perhaps with attempts to recover the Salem losses through overseas courts. Whatever the motivation, it is a welcome development. It could well be followed in other spheres of government where secrecy rules for no good reason except obsessive habit.

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

MORE SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESSES LIQUIDATED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 25 Aug 84 p 1

[Article by Geoffrey Allen]

[Text]

SOUTH African businesses are currently being liquidated at the rate of 1,4 each hour of every working day — and that's before the Government's draconian anti-inflationary measures announced on August 3 have taken grip.

During the past four months, an average of 12 firms a day have been into final liquidation.

In addition, consumer hire purchase spending in the first six months of this year has risen 40% over the same period last year to a massive R9 900-million while total savings have dropped 1,5% to R4 700-million over the same time span.

The message from liquidators and a major international credit agency was: "You haven't seen anything yet."

Hold on to your hats is the firm signal.

In the first five months of this year, 1 195 firms were liquidated and leading liquidators say this is just a start.

A doyen of liquidators, Mr Albert Ruskin, said the increase in bank prime lending rate has not had time to take effect yet.

"But it will have a marked effect soon.

"A large part of the problem is that people start businesses on borrowed capital and run up overdrafts and then when this sort of thing happens they simply cannot pay the bills," he said.

Mr Neil Bowman of Westtrust said there had been a marked increase in liquidations over the past four months.

Normally it is small companies which go to the wall but, according to Mr Bowman, middle-range companies are now also feeling the pinch.

"If you consider that a business with a R2-million overdraft has to pay R500 000 in interest a year without redeeming a cent of the capital, you can understand the extent of the problem," he said.

One of the companies he is currently handling is the fertiliser company, Henhill.

"When the drought came along that was that. The company simply could not cope with the lack of demand," he said.

The statistics are startling:
● In May 1982, 138 companies were liquidated.
● In May 1983, 206 companies were liquidated.
● In May 1984, 273 companies were liquidated.

That's a 98% increase from 1982 to 1984.

Civil judgments for unpaid debts against companies rose 47%, from R1 800 000 in February 1983 to R2 700 000 in

February this year.

Mr Alan Mankoff, managing director of Dun and Bradstreet which monitors individual and company indebtedness and credit-worthiness, said the civil actions took place during a mini-boom towards the beginning of the year.

Since then, the Government has increased the bank prime lending rate from 22% to 25%.

Most lenders, however, can force the price as high as 28%.

"There will probably be a significant deterioration in payments in the coming months until say the end of 1985 or the first quarter of 1986," Mr Mankoff said.

"As a warning to small businesses the slogan 'Business as Usual' is going to be very dangerous.

"They are going to have to re-examine every transaction to ensure that they can be paid within the period stipulated in the terms of agreement," Mr Mankoff said.

Until April this year, voluntary personal bankruptcies rose 12% over last year to 335 246, with cash debts of R200-million outstanding

CSO: 3400/2141

MORE STRIKES LOOM

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 15 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Joshua Raboroko]

[Text]

MORE than 100 000 workers — black and white — in South Africa's gold mines and metal industries have threatened to go on legal strikes over wages and working conditions in the next two weeks.

This was disclosed to The SOWETAN by union leaders who said that the industrial action follows crucial deadlocks reached between them and managements in the industries.

Meanwhile several hundred of workers have been dismissed at other industries in Cape Town, Durban and

Johannesburg after strikes over wages and trade union recognition.

Industrial action is threatening at Highveld Steel Complex near Witbank, where several hundred of the approximately 5 700 black and white workers voted in favour of the strike by late last night.

Disputes

The strike ballot was being held jointly by the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (Mawu), the South African Boilermakers' Society and other unions recruiting

in the company, according to sources.

The unions declared disputes with Highveld during in-house negotiations which followed a deadlock in the Steel and Engineering Industrial Council.

A Mawu spokesman said that after the voting they will go back to workers to decide on an industrial action or to try to persuade management to go back to the negotiation table.

In the gold industry over 90 000 workers may go on strike following a deadlock in the crucial conciliation

board meeting between the Chamber of Mines and the National Union of Mineworkers (Num). The deadlock in the board's negotiations opens the way for the first legal strike by black mineworkers.

The union's spokesman yesterday said that they have started on their reportback meetings with members.

The spokesman said that he could not say what indications the workers have taken, but agreed that at the union's national conference the workers had resolved to go on strike if other means could not be reached to dissolve the dispute.

CSO: 3400/2129

400 WORKERS DISMISSED FOLLOWING STRIKE

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 16 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Joshua Raboroko]

[Text]

MORE THAN 400 workers employed at Simba Chips, Isando, have been sacked following a two-day strike in protest against the dismissal of three union shop stewards.

Mr Chris Dlamini, president of the Sweet Fruit and Allied Workers' Union representing the workers, said that management has refused on several occasions to resolve the matter with the union leaders.

The strike was sparked-off after workers had refused to work "double-jobs." Shop stewards took the matter to management in an attempt to resolve the issue, but met with no success.

A company spokesman confirmed that workers who went on strike, were given an ultimatum, and subsequently dismissed.

Meanwhile more than 750 workers at BB Bread in Natal, members of SFAWU, went on strike on Monday,

demanding wage increases other than those negotiated at the Industrial Council.

Raw deal

In another labour issue involving SFAWU, a wage dispute between the union and the Imbali Brewery in KwaZulu has been resolved, according to a statement by both parties. The workers demanded a minimum wage of R300 per month.

Regarding the Simba issue, Mr Dlamini, who is also president of Fosatu, said that he personally intervened in the matter, but was given a "raw deal" by management despite the fact that "we have a recognition agreement with the company."

"We are at the moment trying to find means of fighting the issue in court because we

feel management has not bargained with us in good faith," he said.

Two companies in Durban and Uitenhage — Tongaat Oil Products and Volkswagen — have successfully negotiated with trade unions representing over 4 000 workers to return to work following strikes. The unions are the National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union and the African Food and Canning Workers' Union.

However the director of the Centre of Applied Social Sciences, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, has announced that only between 16 and 20 percent of South Africa's labour force presently belongs to trade unions. He has predicted more strikes will take place and that unemployment will escalate.

CSO: 3400/2129

SOUTH AFRICA

SURVEY LASHES HOMELANDS

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 17 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Joshua Raboroko]

[Text]

BLACK trade unionists have been detained beaten, harassed and intimidated by police under various labour and security laws in the so-called homelands.

This view is expressed by the associate director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Ms Carole Cooper, in a survey entitled "Homelands and Trade Unionism" released this week.

In the survey she says

homelands have different labour legislation and security laws which they use to curtail the operations and movements of unions, especially those that have their base in South Africa.

Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and KwaZulu have so far experienced the most trade union activity, although unionism in those areas is still in its "embryonic stage."

Transkei and Venda have passed their own labour legislations which have categorically refused to accept trade union activity within their borders, thus making it virtually impossible for workers to hold legal strikes.

In Ciskei trade unionists have been detained and harassed in their hundreds, especially during the bus boycott in the territory. Among them are Mr Thozamile Gqweta and Mr Sisa Njikelane of the South African Allied Workers' Union (Saawu).

Both Bophuthatswana and Ciskei have banned unions in terms of the territories' laws. Saawu has been accused of having links with the African National Congress, although the union has refuted these claims.

The continued actions of these areas against the unions has made them gain strength and support, the report says.

The unions have rejected the policy of homelands and regard workers in those territories as citizens of South Africa.

The unions should continue to operate in the areas to improve workers' wages and working conditions.

CSO: 3400/2129

INKATHA MAY BOYCOTT INDIAN SHOPS

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 21 Aug 84 p 7

[Text]

THE possibility of staging a mass boycott of Indian-owned shops and buses if the Indian community showed support for the new constitution, came under discussion by delegates to the Inkatha Youth Brigade's annual conference at Ulundi at the weekend.

The idea was raised during the conference's group discussions, but was not taken further.

When delegates passed their resolutions, the resolutions which tackled the issue of the new constitution only went so far as to call in Indians and coloureds not to vote in the forthcoming elections and to continue the struggle against apartheid.

In his address to the conference, which drew about 8 000 delegates from 2 000 Inkatha branches during the

weekend, the president of Inkatha, KwaZulu Chief Minister Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, warned that black people were angry at having the new constitution foisted on them.

"We feel betrayed because so many of our coloured and Indian brothers and sisters are rushing forward with their tongues hanging out to endorse the white rejection of us in the referendum."

Chief Buthelezi

pointed to the crisis in the South African economy and said countless thousands of blacks were becoming desperate in their fight to survive.

"We are coming to a most dangerous phase in the history of our country," he said.

"Comrades, it is our duty to harness this build-up of anger and direct it in tactics and strategies which work."

(News by R Smith, 85 Field Street, Durban).

CSO: 3400/2129

RENT ANGER IN SHARPEVILLE

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 21 Aug 84 p 5

[Article by Joshua Raboroko]

[Text] MORE than 1 500 angry Sharpeville residents have resolved not to pay new house rents and service charges increases to be introduced by the Lekoa Town Council as from September 1.

The resolution was taken at an emotion-charged meeting held at St Cyprian Church at the weekend when residents also called for the boycott of shops and other concerns owned by councillors, whom they asked to resign.

Members of the Security Police in two vehicles watched the proceedings from a distance amid shouting of black power slogans and chanting of songs by the crowd which crammed the church.

Several leaders from various political and civic associations, including the United Democratic Front,

Azapo, Azanian National Youth Unity, Soweto Civic Association and trade unions, launched a scathing attack on the councillors for increasing the rents.

Mr Tom Manthata, of the Soweto Civic Association, said that when councillors campaigned under the new Black Local Authorities Act, they had promised that rents would not be hiked, but now they have increased rents.

He asked the council and the Government to pay the rents in the black residential areas because "they are re-

sponsible for building apartheid houses for blacks."

Azanyu's Patrick Baluka said most blacks were already reeling under the escalating cost of living and could not afford to pay high rents. The delays in receiving Unemployment Insurance Fund payments, the increase in the General Sales tax and the high rate of unemployment have "frustrated most blacks."

"The increase in rents will be a heavy blow to them," he said. "We are being robbed of our rights."

CSO: 3400/2129

CUTS IN AID FOR HOMELANDS ANTICIPATED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 23 Aug 84 p 13

[Article by Malcolm Fothergill: "Homelands Aid, 'First for Axe'"]

[Text]

The homelands will probably be first in line for any Government spending cuts — thanks in part to a little help from the opposition Press, Institute of Race Relations director Mr John Kane-Berman said last night.

Delivering a special senate lecture at the University of the Witwatersrand, Mr Kane-Berman said an alarming change was taking place in the way the homelands were regarded.

Even those who opposed apartheid were beginning to accept that the homelands were no longer part of South Africa.

"It is alarming enough that the Government should regard the taxpayers' money which it channels to the 10 homeland administrations as foreign aid rather than the legitimate right of the people who happen to be living in those areas, some of course by choice, others because they are confined there by influx control or have been removed there under the population relocation campaign.

"What is doubly alarming is the increasing tendency of even those who do not support

the Government's separate development policy to see the financial relationship between the central exchequer and the homelands in the same light as the practitioners of 'grand apartheid' see it.

"The opposition Press has thus recently run a series of headlines that tacitly accept the Government's ideological categorisation of the homelands as no longer part of South Africa.

"Thus we have The Star proclaiming 'South Africa injects millions into homelands' and the Rand Daily Mail saying 'Homelands hit South Africa's pockets'."

ABSURD

Mr Kane-Berman said the Opposition had been right to point out recently in Parliament that some of the money channelled to homeland administrations was squandered on absurd projects.

However, the way the opposition Press seized on the attack was clumsy.

Whatever one's political

views about the policy of separate development, "one should never overlook the fact that there are nearly 12 million people living in the homelands".

The campaign to portray the homelands as a burden on the taxpayer would have had a desirable effect if it led to cuts in amounts spent on projects such as international airports.

But it would be unfortunate, even tragic, if the homelands were also forced to cut back on education, pensions, welfare, housing and general development.

"There are already pressures on the Government to cut back on public spending, and it seems likely that in South Africa, as in other countries, the axe will fall first on people unable to retaliate politically."

The homelands were in the weakest position when it came to pressing their demands.

Mr Kane-Berman said a Cabinet committee had been set up early last year to look at political rights for black people outside the homelands.

"What is implicit in this seems to be that the political rights of black people in the homelands are already catered for, which in my view is not the case."

CSO: 3400/2141

NEW PLANS FOR REMOVALS REPORTED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 24 Aug 84 p 7

[Article by Eugene Saldanha]

[Text]

The Government has no intention of stopping removals from "black spots" and is devising new and sophisticated measures for carrying out relocations, says the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (Trac) in its latest newsletter.

The committee, which monitors developments in areas threatened with relocation, says the authorities have persistently refused to deal with the elected leaders of communities threatened with removal.

"These removals are taking place at a time of recession. There is simply no validity in the Government's claim that removals are economically justified."

IDEOLOGY

"There is no moral justification — the only justification can be in terms of the apartheid ideology," says Trac.

The committee has documented the latest developments in the "black spots" in the Transvaal and Northern Cape.

• **Mathopestad:** This is a fertile, well-watered area in the Western Transvaal near Boons. Its inhabitants have held title deeds to the land since 1910. The intention is to move the community to Onderstepoort near Sun City — an "unhealthy bushveld unsuited to agriculture and, since the severe drought, completely devoid of water". Trac reports that the community is determined not to move.

• **Bethanie:** In February this year the Bakwena tribe were forcibly loaded onto government trucks and taken from their tribal land of Mogopa to the resettlement camp of Pachsdraai near Groot Marico. The Bakwena refused to stay in this arid area, and began the long trek to Bethanie, land belonging to their paramount chief.

In Bethanie they were given places to stay as refugees. The community, which lives in temporary shacks, is presently facing water problems. Trac says the loss of Mogopa still hangs heavily over the community, who are now trying to build a school and provide water.

OFFICIALS

• **kwaNgema:** Trac reports that a discredited leader, Gabriel Ngema (whom officials were dealing with) died in February. Since officials failed in their attempts to take his coffin to a proposed resettlement area, they have been "ominously" silent, says the committee. The popularly elected Ngema Committee is determined to stay in the area.

• **Driefontein:** There has been a leadership void since Saul Mkhize was shot and killed last year. "Mr Mkhize's death united the community, and has made them more determined not to move. In late February Co-operation and Development

officials had a meeting at Driefontein with three chiefs from surrounding areas and told them to recruit followers. Now young men in the area cannot renew their contracts unless they have the stamp of one or the other of these chiefs in their passes," says Trac.

● Badplaas: In November last year the people of Embhuleni village, near Badplaas, were told by notice to remove from Badplaas before January this year.

REFUSED

The notices said the people were required to take up residence in the resettlement camps of Eerstehoek, Tjakastad or Honingklip. "Some of the families threatened with removal have lived there since 1846. The people refused to move. Since November last year the removal squad with all its lorries has been camped at the entrance to the village. The Badplaas people live in daily fear that they will be removed by force," reports the committee.

● Leandra: In this urban black township people's urban qualifications are being used by the Administration Board as the basis on which to separate out the population. "The removal is being resisted by the Leandra Action Committee. But the Administration Board is intent on pressing ahead. Late in May

the first families were moved into the new township and many more are to follow," says the newsletter.

● Bethal: This area has been the scene of numerous individual evictions over the last year. "Families have been evicted one by one, in the dead of night, rather than en masse. There are no public plans to move the whole location, but the board justifies the evictions on the grounds that people are illegally in the area."

POLICY

● Valspan: This Northern Cape community is attached to the town of Jan Kempdorp. The community, mostly Tswana, is supposed to move to Pampierstad in Bophuthatswana. Dr Piet Koornhof has said this is according to "long-standing Government policy."

● Winterveld: This is a densely populated area 30km northwest of Pretoria. There are approximately one million people in the area and 90 percent are said to be Tswana speaking. Most people moved to the area to be close to the factories and employment. "The authorities have tried to harass residents into 'voluntary' relocation. But all attempts by the authorities have been resisted," reports Trac.

The committee says the communities of Lothair, Huhudi, Hartebeesfontein, Moutse, Ekangala, Bethal and Machakaneng are also determined to resist efforts to remove them.

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

ANC'S FREEDOM COLLEGE IN TANZANIA VISITED

Durban THE DAILY NEWS in English 8 Aug 84 p 11

[Article by Brendan Seery]

[Text]

THE young man on duty at the boom across the rutted track was hearty in his greetings: "Hello, Comrades!" Nearby, a tanned, blond-haired Scandinavian civil engineer was directing Tanzanian labourers working on a new high-level bridge.

We clattered over the rickety low-level bridge and into the campus of the ANC's Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO) — home to more than 1 200 people and one of the largest communities of South African exiles on the African continent.

Although visits by foreign journalists and observers are fairly common in the community, an invitation to a journalist from a South African newspaper group to come and have a look around was rare.

Having driven 200km along the potholed main road inland from Dar-es-Salaam to Morogoro and seen ample evidence that Tanzanians are among the poorest people in the world, entering the ANC community was a surprise.

An abandoned sisal estate at Mazimbu, about 10km from Morogoro has been turned into a small town. There were electric lights, a sewerage system, telephone and telex to the outside world, a tarred road with culverts, and more than 100 new buildings — including a senior school and hostels, factories, workshops and staff houses.

During the visit to the community, the reporter was allowed a fairly free rein to see what he wanted, although at no time was he left without an ANC "chaperone". Taking of photographs was always strictly supervised.

No weapons in sight

There were no signs of military activity or any indication that any weapons, defensive positions or uniforms had been removed before the visit.

SOMAFCO itself began to take shape in early 1979 on 100ha given to the ANC by President Julius Nyerere. When an ANC building team, led by one of their engineers, arrived at the site, they found no electricity, no running water or sewerage systems and the old sisal estate buildings dilapidated.

Building has been directed by the ANC's team, aided by expatriates, while big sections of the road and civil engineering have been done by a Norwegian firm. Tanzanian labour is used. When the project is complete, it will be home to more than 2 000 people.

The secondary school complex, which is at the core of the concept, provides for students from Form One to Form Five (Matric) and teaches a range of subjects including mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, English and geography. Students sit external examinations of the London University Examination Board in these subjects and are often sent for university or college education on scholarships to African, American, West and East European institutions.

Subjects such as history, the development of societies, music and culture are taught with the ANC's own ideological interpretation, and students are tested in them by the organisation's own examiners.

Emphasis is placed on mathematics and science, because they have proved to be weak areas for South African-educated students, said a teacher.

Political discussions

Students were obviously highly-politicised. Two days each week are set aside for "political discussion", and senior students prepare a nightly "news bulletin", compiled from radio news programmes from the West and socialist countries, and reflecting events around the world from the ANC's ideological standpoint.

Staff at the school were reluctant to give their approach any particular ideological label, however.

Headmaster Mr Tim Maseko said: "Of course we teach politics. Politics is the science of living. And we teach about the important contributions made to society by people like Marx and Lenin.

"But I wouldn't say that we teach any particular line. We let the students decide. After all, we have many different schools of thought within the ANC itself — some very radical and some very conservative."

Religious instruction and observance have no place in the school's timetable.

The day's activities start at 6am, and include lessons and afternoon programmes of sport, culture, political discussion or labour.

There are just over 300 students in the high school and 23 staff members, although the school will be able to house 1 000 pupils eventually.

A primary school, for about 200 pupils, has been set up in temporary quarters in one of the former estate buildings, while more classrooms are being built.

The children are mainly those of ANC exiles, and many have parents who were kicked out of Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique recently in the wake of the Nkomati Accord.

ACADEMIC VIEWS NATION'S 5-YEAR FUTURE

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 12 Aug 84 p 24

[Article by Lawrence Schlemmer, director of the Center for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal: "These Days of Living Dangerously"]

[Text]

IN five years South Africa will be much as she is today — only more so.

No revolution will have occurred, but we will still be living dangerously. This hazardous prediction is offered simply to stimulate debate.

The National Party will still be governing the country, with the PFP and the Conservative Party still the major white opposition parties, saying much the same things as they are saying today.

We will still have separate schools and, with a few exceptions, separate residential areas for different groups.

The Zulus, our largest and potentially most significant black language group in political terms, will still be rejecting independence.

Ciskei and Transkei will be managing and mismanaging their own affairs much as they are today. Sun City might well have attracted Michael Jackson and his brothers.

We will remain among the worst drivers in the world. We will still have a high inflation rate. Western Province will probably still

be the rugby Currie Cup favourites.

Zola Budd will no longer feel homesick and will have been refreshed by a visit to us to promote her own brand of running shoes.

Life will go on full of braaivleis and Toyotas when we can afford the boerewors and the beer.

Image

Some changes will have occurred. Over five years the National Party will have overcome most of its elaborate fears of the right wing and have established a new image as a centre-conservative party.

Most of its Verwoerdian ideology will have dissipated and, like most conservative parties the world over, it will be prepared to adapt if kicked or pushed.

Reforms will be introduced, but not according to grandiose blueprints. It will most probably lurch from precedent to precedent, hoping each concession to be the last.

The PFP over the next five years will scoop up a good deal of the political capital that the new constitutional arrangements will spill.

The three-chamber parliament will deliver a great

deal of noisy rhetoric and messy compromises between the NP and the brown parties, giving the PFP a great deal to criticize.

Although almost half the English-speaking whites will be supporting the NP, towards the end of the five-year period the PFP will win over more and more Afrikaans graduate and professional support, and so remain the major white opposition party.

The Conservative Party and the HNP will combine fully within five years, but even that will not prevent their very gradual decline.

Notwithstanding their scattering of right-wing professors, their support base is dominantly white working-class, lower-middle class and aggrieved minor farmers.

As these classes shrink in relative size, so the right-wing strength will decline, bolstered somewhat by inflation and high consumer prices. The right wing will survive as a minor party of white protest.

The NP will remain sufficiently conservative for the bulk of the new middle and upper-middle class Afrikaans-speakers.

Coloured and Indian politics are much less predictable, and therefore also the

new constitutional dispensation. There are three possibilities over the next five years.

One is that after a brief honeymoon the major coloured and Indian parties will clash sharply with the Government over housing and group areas.

The Government will dig in its heels after a few minor concessions, leading to a spate of resignations and perhaps even a Labour Party walkout.

Brown politics will withdraw, some of it to the streets but most of it into the political wilderness.

The new constitution will then survive dolefully on the efforts of a few empty yes-men remarkably attached to their MPs' salaries, hoping that they will be voted in again on a 10-percent poll in the next elections.

Another possibility is that the National Party and the coloured and Indian majority parties will discover the benefits of coalition. This will mean a substantial shift in group-areas policy, with the emergence of some new mixed areas.

The Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act will go, and three or four coloured and Indian politicians will be appointed to the Cabinet.

A coalition of major par-

ties could pave the way for a later consolidation of all three chambers into one (although that will take more than five years).

Ferment

It will also at long last lead to the unification of white and brown Afrikaners, giving the Afrikaans language and culture an injection of new life.

A third possibility will be something between the two described above. This would be the least stable possibility and would deteriorate into the first or reformulate itself into the second.

The outcome of the new constitution is totally in balance at the present moment, however, completely at the mercy of the wisdom and judgment of the Cabinet and the brown parties involved.

Black politics will re-emerge over the next five years to take centre stage again. The texture of these politics is already apparent and some trends are fairly inevitable.

The major issue will be black youth, as in the late Seventies. The black high-school system is overstressed and black youth unemployment will not decline.

Expectations are rising all the time, however. The

political yeast in the youth will ferment community politics all over the country.

Older people with jobs will hold back and hedge their bets, but from now until the end of the decade and beyond we are likely to experience a procession of school boycotts, university unrest and bus boycotts and rent strikes in which the youth carry the action far beyond the initial precipitating causes.

Strife

The need for an immediate outlet for political energies will also augment the internal strife in black politics.

Conflict between Inkatha and the UDF and perhaps between Azaso and Azapo and the UDF and urban black councils will rage on.

All this will leave whites and the Government pretty much unaffected. In some ways it will play directly into the hands of the Government by dividing its opposition and ultimately confusing the hard-working black working classes.

There will be a large number of black political refugees leaving the country for training as insurgents, but, provided the Government prevents the establishment of base facilities in neighbouring states, the effects will not be critical.

What could build up greatest pressures for reform and change in the short to medium term would be a strategic coalition or alliance of rank-and-file constituency black organisations like Inkatha, urban black municipal parties in the Transvaal, other non-independent homeland-based political organisations and including church-based and even trade-union-linked organisations.

Such a coalition or alliance could mount an impressive show of potential strength and yet be sufficiently pragmatic for the Government to be willing to risk negotiation with it if specific and realistic demands were pressed.

The current state of black politics does not augur well for this kind of pressure, however.

Much of the action vacillates between specific issues and long-range goals and ideals, with a neglect of intermediate strategies which can be sustained beyond specific grievances and outbursts.

Five years hence there may well have been much sound and fury, signifying very little.

At the end of five years the issue of black rights will be an even bigger and darker cloud on our horizon than it is at the moment.

Compromise

Furthermore, we will be constantly reminded of this by increasingly punitive external criticism and sanctions, and by increasingly costly alternatives like inefficient and mismanaged non-viable independent homelands.

It is probable, however, that in five years the old NP ideology of ethnic autonomy will have been eroded by the continuing experience of our economic interdependence and our need for more cost-effective routes to development.

The Government will most probably be ready to consider the alternative of federalism, but, as one would expect, given an infinitely more clumsy name.

Five years hence we may well be on the brink of establishing an inclusive political forum on which the white/coloured/Indian cabinets or cabinet, non-independent homeland governments and black local governments could conduct an increasing measure of joint decision-making with safeguards against domination.

This could be the beginning of a more stable future, notwithstanding the probable confusion in black politics which I have suggested.

This possibility will not be inevitable, however. It depends on all of us being willing to compromise.

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

INCREASED STUDENT UNREST REPORTED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 21 Aug 84 p 2

[Text]

A POLICE VEHICLE was slightly damaged by rioting pupils and police used tear-gas to disperse 400 pupils in Parys yesterday morning.

And in Thabong and Tembisa, unrest erupted again when pupils stormed a school. The unrest has spread to Sharpeville and Seshego.

At Tembisa, near Kempton Park, where the suspension of classes was lifted yesterday, pupils refused to be readmitted at three of the township's secondary schools — Jiyana, Boitumelang and Tembisa.

Pupils from five secondary schools in Daveyton and Wattville, near Benoni, turned out in great numbers but without their books when the suspension of classes was lifted yesterday.

Pupils from the five schools said yesterday they were willing to return to classes today.

At the Mabopane East Technikon in Soshanguve, classes have been suspended until September 3 after boycotts and student clashes with the police.


One student, Mr Hendrik Nkuna, died in the GaRankuwa Hospital's intensive care unit of a bullet wound.

A police spokesman said last night the Parys incident happened at 10:40am.

He said pupils at Tumahole High School in Pheheling Township climbed over the fence when they saw police approaching.

Police used teargas and sjamboks to disperse the group of pupils who were throwing stones at the police.

At Boitumelang Secondary School a large group of pupils forced the principal of the school to hand over undertakings signed by some pupils and endorsed by their parents.



Chaos broke out at the school when pupils then burnt the undertakings in front of the principal's office.

The issue of the signing of undertakings not to boycott classes has been a source of contention among boycotting pupils.

Pupils from Jiyana and Boitumelang secondary schools then marched through the streets and converged on Thutu-ke-Maatla Secondary School.

They pulled down the school's security fence and stormed the school, dispersing when the police arrived.

In Thabong, near Welkom, pupils from the township's three secondary schools again refused to enter their classrooms and a large group stoned primary schools in the

area. Primary school pupils were sent home early.

On Friday nine of 10 pupils suspended from the Thabong schools were readmitted to school after a governing council's disciplinary hearing.

The Department of Education and Training (DET) yesterday suspended classes indefinitely at the three secondary schools in the township.

Classes have also been indefinitely suspended at Minerva High School in Alexandra after unrest.

In Sharpeville yesterday about 1 000 pupils from the Lekoa-Shandu Secondary School boycotted classes in protest against rent increases in the township.

A group of pupils left the

school and stoned Putco buses, but by 10am they were back in the school grounds, the chief liaison officer for the DET, Mr Job Schoeman, said yesterday.

More than 880 pupils at Masedibu Senior Secondary School in Seshego, near Pietersburg, boycotted classes yesterday in protest against a circular issued by the Lebowa Department of Education asking for an R8 contribution towards the building of a library.

In Cradock, in the Eastern Cape, pupils from four secondary and three primary schools have been refusing to attend school for more than five months, while in Atteridgeville 6 000 pupils have been barred for the rest of the year.

PM PROMISES TO INVOLVE MORE ENGLISH-SPEAKERS

Johannesburg THE STAR REVIEW in English 25 Aug 84 p 6

[Article by Michael Green in the "View From Natal" column: "Open More Posts to the English Speakers"]

[Text]

THE Prime Minister's promise to involve more English-speakers in the running of the country is of course welcome news, especially here in Natal, the English heartland (to adapt an Afrikaans phrase) of South Africa.

In one sense he has already shepherded a large flock of English-speakers into the corridors of power. When the new constitution comes into effect the House of Delegates will be entirely English-speaking. Afrikaans is Greek to 99,9 percent of our Indian community.

But I don't think that's what Mr P W Botha had in mind. No doubt he was thinking of successors to Messrs Owen Horwood, John Wiley, Frank Waring, Alf Trollip, Denis Worrall and the rest of the thin red line of white English-speaking Nationalists. Thin in numbers, that is, not necessarily in health or wealth.

If Mr Botha proposes opening more public posts to English speakers he deserves every encouragement. For more than 30 years "The English" have been virtually excluded from the government and its agencies, and the loss has been South Africa's. A vast reservoir of ability has been left untapped while men of distinctly modest talents have fumbled with the country's problems.

The more reasonable attitudes adopted by the Government today, amid plaudits from its propagandists, have been largely brought about by the values doggedly sustained for years by English speakers and institutions.

It is not a coincidence that the strongholds of liberal ideas in this country are still English-speaking constituencies, and that the fortresses of the right-wing are still in the Northern Transvaal.

I don't doubt Mr Botha's sincerity. The trouble is that there has always been an unspoken condition to be fulfilled before English speakers could enter the portals of power. They had to join the National Party, and in practice most of them balked at this.

Why? Because a great many of us allegedly supine and non-political English speakers still cannot stomach the Immorality Act, the Mixed Marriages Act, forced removal of people, detention without trial and interference with a free flow of information.

I can understand that it may not be realistically possible to be a white Cabinet Minister unless one is a member of the National Party. But there are plenty of non-political jobs in the gift of the Government, from the Banana Control Board to the board of the SABC, jobs in which English-speakers could make a conspicuous contribution.

If Mr Botha wants to give the English a fair deal he could start right there. Some of the beneficiaries might even be grateful enough to join the National Party and stand for public office.

But if he is really looking for widespread and overt English support and participation in government, I suggest that he turn his mind to the nasty laws and practices listed above. If he can find a way of eliminating or at least moderating them, he might indeed win English support, with an unexpected bonus: The National Party as a whole could rest with an easier conscience.

SOUTH AFRICA

MSINGA TRIBAL FEUD DESCRIBED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 25 Aug 84 p 8

[Article by Emilia Jaroschek]

[Text] NOTHING, it seems--not even the latest police reinforcements--can stop the lust for blood and revenge in the tribal war-torn countryside of Msinga in KwaZulu.

Small squads of hit-men who pounce on Zulu wards are the latest in vengeance killings. They replace the traditional clashes of the warrior-like impi groups who had at least eight men on either side.

The squads are armed with sophisticated weapons such as R1 rifles, R4 rifles and a variety of shotguns and handguns--usually stolen from the Reef area.

And although the new, reinforced police Firearm Squad, housed in permanently pitched tents on the banks of the Tugela River, has effectively crushed mass killings since the March clash in which 35 died on one day, death still rules.

Some 206 men have been shot dead and 44 wounded in the lonely, peaceful-looking hills of Msinga this year.

The latest weapons of Msinga are deadlier than ever: an Uzzi machinegun, a Ruger machinegun, 13 R1 rifles, two R4 rifles, 19.303 rifles and 13 shotguns are among the 140 weapons seized in the sparsely populated hills by the new squad since mid-April this year.

And the police themselves, since the formation of the new squad, have twice come under heavy gunfire from warriors.

In the first attack a policeman was shot through the head with a bullet from a R1 when an impi fired upon a group of 20 policemen walking through the hills before dawn.

That same day a helicopter sought out five of the attackers. Police were told that, because of the darkness, they were not recognised as policemen by the impi. Then they were fired on again...in daylight. No one was injured.

Msinga is the haven for gun-runners to the trigger-happy warriors. Assegais were outdated long ago and home-made guns are also things of the past.

But Msinga, according to the locals, is only one battlefield of death. There is another, equally bad: Johannesburg.

If ever a reason is given for the revenge killings in the Msinga hills where everyone is too afraid to talk then it is that there had been a death in Johannesburg.

Miners and nightwatchmen are gunned down in Johannesburg's streets because they are members of one of the six Msinga tribes. The killers are either from another tribe or from another ward engaged in in-fighting within the tribe.

The bodies of the dead are brought home--and seen. Lust for revenge takes over among the victimised. More blood will then flow in the hills. That is a certainty.

The killers are always known to the victims' relatives. The bush telegraph is extremely effective, so effective that if a police patrol sets out in the morning to reach a certain ward their arrival is awaited long before they get there.

Coded messages--such as "the donkey is in the mielie field" or "it is read"--are shouted by women across the hills, police disclosed this week.

Captain Gideon van der Westhulzen--who has headed the new squad since its formation--says he has been told by countless bereaved windows at their huts that as long as bodies are brought from Johannesburg there will be more bloodshed in Msinga.

Killings in Johannesburg are the cause, locals claim.

Yet Johannesburg killings are also revenge killings resulting from deaths in Msinga.

Nobody knows how it all started and usually nobody wants to say or identify the killers for fear of death. But there are stores--true ones--such as the one of ownership of a cat which caused a dispute ending in dozens of bloody deaths.

So did a bitten-off piece of ear. Two opposing tribesmen had a fight in which one bit a piece off the other man's ear and spat it on to the ground.

His tribesmen later ordered the opposing tribe to collect the piece of ear. Their pride hurt by this challenge, they refused. Sixty men died in ensuing hot-blooded battles.

A widow in the hills said this week that an induna's son was killed two years ago. Since then, about 100 people have died, including her own husband...one of six people gunned down by a hit squad.

"Six men came running across the hills. There were three on either side of my husband. I do not know who they were. He ran several hundred years before he fell," the widow recalls.

And where do the killer guns come from? If your firearm has been stolen it could have been used, Capt Van der Westhuizen says.

The weapons recovered by the police speak for themselves:

--A 12-bore shotgun--reported stolen in Honeydew.

--A .303 rifle--reported stolen in Booysens.

--A .38 revolver--reported stolen in Booysens.

--A .32 Special--reported stolen in Bramley.

--A 7,65mm pistol--reported stolen in Hillbrow in June.

--Several R1 rifles--never reported stolen.

--A .303 rifle--reported stolen in Durban in June.

--A .38 revolver--reported stolen in Brakpan in May.

Capt Van der Westhuizen's detailed records of every firearm recovered (there have been 140 since mid-April) show that most firearms in Msinga are stolen on the Reef.

This month the 27 weapons seized included five R1 rifles.

A map in one of the many tents which house the Firearm Squad at Gugela Ferry graphically shows the location of each Msinga tribe--the Majorzi, the Mtembu, the Mabaso, the Bowvu, the Mmicunu and the Zondi.

Life is rough for the squad. In summer the tent poles get so hot that they cannot be touched. Working at a desk or outside near mid-day is virtually impossible. So patrols often set out before sunrise.

The latest problem that Capt Van der Westhuizen faces is in-fighting among wards within each tribe itself.

The Mtembus are the latest victims of such in-fighting.

Capt van der Westhuizen's dearest wish is to stop the endless killing.

"There must be some way, but I can't think of it. I have stayed awake at night trying to find the ultimate solution. Maybe it will still come to me," he says.

But the fighting has already gone on for hundreds of years and noone has yet solved the problem.

PHOTO CAPTION

Basins and boxes full of dagga seized by the squad at Tugela Ferry. The weed is exchanged for costly firearms bought for between R 900 to R4 000 each

CSO: 3400/2141

HEUNIS EXPLAINS 'CONSENSUS JOURNALISM'

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 26 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Chris Heunis: "What I Meant When I Called for Consensus Journalism"]

[Text]

THE new South African constitution represents a development away from the traditional Westminster-type "winner-takes-all" democracy towards a new kind of politics, with the emphasis on consensus and co-operation between the different groups in South African society.

This new political dispensation and style must be supported by a common desire for the politics of consensus to succeed.

These changes and the precondition of a positive disposition are the relevant factors when the role of the media in the new dispensation is discussed.

The freedom of the media to report and articulate, and to facilitate the necessary flow of information, is as important and necessary to maintain a consensus style of democracy as is the case with a majority democracy.

On the one hand, the media act as a "watchdog" on behalf of the public to ensure that government and political leaders act in the public interest and not their own.

On the other, they provide the free and continuous flow of information and opinion necessary to ensure that the state does not act dictatorially.

Media freedom is therefore an important and intrinsic part of a modern democracy. Free media are essential for effective communication between the different groups, the building of good relations and the fostering of positive attitudes towards one another, which are vital for the process of consensus.

Conflict

The modern media evolved within the Western democracies and the media in South Africa have developed according to the British model which grew out of the Westminster variant of majority democracy.

Not only are politics in this type of democracy characterised by intensely competitive political parties, but the media usually align themselves with

some or other political party.

The result is that they reflect the competitive style of the different parties and tend to define situations in conflict terms. The nature of majority democracy and the accenting of conflict by the media contributes to a perception of politics as zero-sum competition.

Western societies are largely ethnically homogeneous and there is sufficient consensus about the nature of the political process to prevent "winner-take-all" politics and the emphasis on conflict by the media from plunging society into continuous and violent ethnic conflict.

But, in societies characterised by a diversity of aware ethnic groups, history and experience have shown that majority democracy usually leads to ethnic conflict and democratic instability.

The problem is that politics is perceived as zero-sum "ethnic" competition, and this perception gives rise to an "all-or-nothing" attitude, especially in circumstances of risk and uncertainty, and because cultural

groups usually have strong feelings about their cultural identity.

Consensus-style democracy, rather than majority democracy, is being suggested as a democratic system for the ethnically divided society. In other words, politics must not be perceived as zero-sum ("the one's gain is the other's loss") ethnic competition, but as competitive co-operation based on common grounds, from which all can benefit.

In this kind of society the media should contribute towards this perception. This means that more emphasis must be placed on communalities and co-operation than on differences and conflict.

Balanced

And, should the media, as a result of journalistic practice and structure, emphasise conflict and differences of opinion and disputes between groups as the "best" news, they will contribute to conflict rather than co-operation.

This does not mean that the media must ignore conflict, because there will always be conflict, and it is important that the causes of conflict and problems which are detrimental to consensus are identified by the media.

But, in their presentation, the conflict must always be balanced with the existing potential and opportunities for consensus and co-operation.

The handling by some of the media of the recent negotiations over the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, is an example of the conflict style that has to be replaced with a new media style.

From the outset the situation was defined in conflict terms, the parties were shown as being at loggerheads, and that regardless of the outcome, it had to result in one of the negotiating parties losing face.

While the negotiations were under way, some of the media predicted that the outcome would have grave consequences for the political careers of the chief negotiators and after consensus had been reached, concluded that one of the parties had to be the loser.

This way of handling the issue could have hardened attitudes and wrecked the whole exercise. Fortunately the desire for consensus was strong enough.

The aim of the constitution is not only to create a consensus democracy for the whites, coloureds and South Africans of Indian origin, but to facilitate a change of political style for the broader South African society.

In this respect, the moving away from the Westminster-style of politics is a watershed in the political development of South Africa.

In view of the previous analysis and aims, a new media style is necessary to complement and reflect the new political style. The media have an extremely important role to play in the new dispensation, for they have to introduce the different groups to each other, not as conflict-generating stereotypes, but as fellow human beings with human requirements, desires and fears.

Research has shown that the use of members of the various groups as reporters, the use of community reporters, the covering of everyday events in the various communities, and the provision of more background information about problems of which the general public has little knowledge, can contribute towards breaking down and removing prejudices and mistrust between ethnic groups.

The latter is essential for successful co-operation on common problems within the framework of a consensus democracy.

It is however, essential for these innovations to be conducted voluntarily by the media if they have not done so already.

Care must also be taken that the practice of providing different publications for the various groups does not lead to ignorance of each other, thus making it difficult for members of the different groups to meet on common ground.

However, each group has the right to be informed and entertained in its own language. In a consensus democracy the media must be free to perform their democratic functions. But free media also mean diversified media, with as many different and independent publications and institutions as possible.

Only then can the public expect a flow of balanced information to the greatest possible degree. The individual also has to be educated and motivated to become a sophisticated media consumer and to read more than one newspaper.

The new dispensation will also put a greater strain on the editorial and journalistic resources of the media. Where in the past they only had to report on the proceedings of one House of Parliament, they will now have to cover the activities of three Houses and the President's Council.

The fact that the State President will also be the chief executive will also put a greater strain on their resources.

The reason for the joint standing committees doing their work in camera is not to limit media freedom, but to promote consensus by giving members the opportunity to negotiate without the media defining every issue as one of insoluble conflict and the actions of members as losing face or giving in.

Members will also be prevented from endangering the consensus process at this delicate stage of negotiation by playing, via the media, to an outside audience.

The media will get the opportunity to report on the issues when the committees' reports are tabled in the Houses of Parliament.

The media in South Africa played a big role in bringing about necessary reform. I believe that in future they will continue to probe, to question and to help the peoples of South Africa to reach consensus

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LANSERIA AIRPORT MARKS 10TH ANNIVERSARY

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 27 Aug 84 p 4M

[Article by Zenaide Vendreiro]

[Text] Lanseria Airport, near Randburg, quietly celebrated its 10th birthday this month.

Since it was officially opened on August 16 1974 it has grown phenomenally to become Africa's busiest airport.

In the past financial year it handled 110 010 aircraft movements and 147 458 passengers and sold almost 6,3 million litres of fuel.

Latest figures for Jan Smuts Airport and Rand Airport are not available, but in the 1982/83 financial year they recorded 71 442 and 98 552 aircraft movements respectively.

About 78 aviation companies and more than 400 aircraft are based at Lanseria.

It has 22 large hangars with five more being built or planned, and 31 T-hangars, so-called because they are built in that shape, that can accommodate one aircraft each. Plans are underway to build 70 more T-hangars.

Last year the runway parallel to the main runway and a large section of the cross runway were reconstructed at a cost of about R1 million.

The management also wants to reconstruct the 3 km-long main runway in the near future.

Another recent development has been the construction of a new control tower.

Lanseria Airport is owned by the Roodepoort City Council, the Krugersdorp Town Council and the Peri-Urban Board.

The acting airport manager, Mr Evert van Eeden, says two members from each body sit on the Lanseria Management Board and the executive committee consists of the two town clerks and the secretary of the Peri-Urban Board.

At one stage the financial burden became too much for the municipalities, particularly Krugersdorp, and the airport was offered to the State which declined to take it over.

Lanseria has been the subject of controversy ever since the bulldozers first moved into the area.

Local residents said the airport should never have been built in its present location.

The noise disturbed their peace and their animals and they threatened to launch barrage balloons to stop the aircraft flying over their farms.

In recent years the storm has abated considerably, although the trickle of protest letters to newspapers and many calls to the airport suggest that residents have not yet resigned themselves to the airport's continued--and thriving--existence.

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SAMC OFFICIAL SEES 'FREE PRESS IN DANGER'

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 28 Aug 84 p 6

[Text]

CAPE TOWN — Free and independent news media are an endangered species, threatened from without and within, Mr Bob Steyn, conciliator and registrar of the South African Media Council, said yesterday.

Delivering his interim report for the period November 1983 to August 1984 at the council's third meeting in Cape Town, Mr Steyn said the structure and activities of the Media Council were designed to help counter threats from both sources for the benefit of society as a whole.

He said 89 complaints had been received by the council since last November.

Of these 23 had been resolved through conciliation and mediation, two adjudicated in favour of the complainant and 17 rejected.

Adjudication was pending in 11 cases and the complainants had been referred to the editor for direct settlement in 10 cases. Other complaints had been withdrawn or had lapsed.

Among complaints resolved through mediation were some received from the Department of Education and Training, the Office of the Prime Minister and the South African Police.

The role of the Media Council was "to

ensure accurate and responsible reporting and to achieve the necessary clarification and correction when there has been a departure from commonly accepted journalistic standards and norms, rather than to censure or punish — a step resorted to only as a last resort when all else has failed and there is a justifiable need for action in the interests of the media and the public", Mr Steyn said.

The Media Council had held "continuing constructive dialogue" with the South African Society of Journalists which might eventually result in some form of association between the two bodies.

Efforts to have discussions with the Media Workers' Association of South Africa (Mwasa) had been less successful, he said.

At its meeting yesterday the council decided to implement a standing committee to review developments which restrict the free flow of information of public interest and importance.

A report was tabled on the South African Broadcasting Corporation's attitude towards and possible future connection with the council.

"Friendly and co-operative" discussions with the SABC had been held.

However, the SABC experienced problems from the way in which the constitution, rules and code of conduct of the Media Council had been framed.

CSO: 3400/2141

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

ESCOM INTELLIGENCE UNIT--JOHANNESBURG--Security fears have led the Electricity Supply Commission, (Escom), to establish South Africa's first non-State secret intelligence organisation. Escom says it will work closely with State intelligence bodies. And a small item in Escom's annual report but what Escom would not elaborate on yesterday reveals that security is a major concern. "Essential security measures at all Escom's installations account for a significant percentage of total expenditure the report says. Last year Escom spent R1.6-billion but would not say how much of that was on security. The new super-sleuth section is being incorporated into the existing security organisation which protects all Escom's installations. Another Escom report says: 'The intelligence section will determine specific threats against the people of Escom and its installations, so that the necessary preventative measures may be taken in good time.' The same report says the signing of the Nkomati Accord and other political successes 'could incite our enemies to violent deeds.' A spokesman said Escom was bound by legislation to organise its own security but close contact was maintained with police and State security organisations. Escom's annual report also discloses that it had 'continuous liaison' with security organisations in other parts of the world.
[Text] [Kimberley DIAMOND FIELDS ADVERTISER in English 15 Aug 84 p 9]

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BULGARIAN EDUCATION ASSISTANCE HAILED

Lusaka THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 17 Aug 84 p 7

[Text]

ZAMBIA has welcomed Bulgaria's assistance in offering political education to UNIP cadres.

Freedom House deputy administrative secretary Mr Franklin Malawo said this yesterday when he presented certificates to candidates who attended a 10 month political and economic education course in Bulgaria.

Mr Malawo told the Bulgarian ambassador Mr Ivan Petrov at the ceremony that his country's offer came at a time when Zambia was trying to follow the footsteps of socialist countries to achieve its revolutionary goals.

As a developing nation, Zambia could only progress if it was armed with knowledge. He was grateful to the leadership of Bulgaria for sacrificing to share what they had.

"Genuine friends are those who provide services at a time they are required."

He said the training being offered was serious and meant a great deal to the nation because it was being given in areas where the country had little facilities.

Mr Malawo hailed the existing friendship between the two countries and hoped it would continue for the benefit of the peoples of the two nations.

"We assure you that we cherish your work dearly both in the field of manpower, training and the support you are rendering to Southern Africa in general."

Mr Petrov said it was important that such training continued because it gave the nation self-confidence which was a prerequisite to the acquisition of knowledge.

He hoped that the training of these individuals would benefit the nation as a whole and wished the country prosperity under the leadership of UNIP.

The course, which was conducted at the academy for social sciences and management was attended by 29 Party leaders drawn from various levels in the country.

Since 1976, the Party and its Government have been able to send leaders as well as trainees in other fields to Bulgaria and the programme still continues.

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INDIA PLEDGES AGRICULTURAL AID

Lusaka ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL in English 24 Aug 84 p 5

[Text]

INDIA will continue to assist Zambia in her efforts to revamp the agricultural sector as a way of resuscitating the ailing economy, Indian High Commissioner, Mr Krishan Mohan Lal pledged yesterday.

Speaking when he paid a courtesy call on Livingstone district governor, Mr Mathew Mkandawire, Mr Lal said after attending the Third National Convention he sent a letter to his government asking them to invest in Zambia's agricultural sector.

He said the Indian government would provide farming equipment and machinery and help train agricultural officers.

The High Commissioner was confident that Zambia was going to succeed in her endeavours because of the stable political system in the country.

"Zambia will continue to develop economically and socially because of the stable government and wise leadership of President Kaunda," he said.

He said a country which frequently changed leadership was unstable in all ways and would not establish a better and firm base for development.

"My government believes in south to south co-operation which calls on developing countries to assist each other in the face of mounting pressure from the developed north," the High Commissioner said.

In reply, Mr Mkandawire said Zambia had a lot to learn from India because it was the first country to break from the yoke of colonialism.

"As pioneers of democracy, Zambia has high respect for India and its Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, who is a personal friend of President Kaunda," he said.

Meanwhile, a member of the Central Committee, yesterday commended the German Democratic Republic (GDR) for its great achievements in agricultural development, ZANA reports.

Speaking on arrival at Lusaka International Airport, Chairman of Rural Development Committee, Mr Reuben Kamanga said the GDR had done a lot in the development of agriculture.

Mr Kamanga who was accompanied by Lusaka member of the Central Committee, Mr Fines Bulawayo and their families said they were highly impressed with the general development in that country.

CSO: 3400/2142

CONSTITUTION SEEN AS STUMBLING BLOCK TO NEW LEGISLATION

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 24 Aug 84 p 6

[Article by Brendan Seery: "Lancaster House Deals Mugabe Another Blow"]

[Text]

The Zimbabwean Government has made no secret of the fact that the country's British-drafted Lancaster House constitution is a thorn in its side.

It was accepted, argues Mr Robert Mugabe's administration, only as a necessary part of the deal to bring the bloody Rhodesian bush war to an end in 1979. That it will be replaced at the earliest possible opportunity there is no doubt.

The constitution, say its detractors, unnecessarily restricts the politicians' plans to implement their version of a socialist Utopia in Zimbabwe and prevents them from dealing effectively with the serious security problems which have arisen since independence.

Last week, in the Supreme Court in Harare, the constitution's Bill of Rights guarantees on freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest effectively shot down a government emergency declaration granting immunity to security force members and officials on security operations.

The decision — that the indemnity regulation contravened the constitution and was therefore void — was handed down by a full "constitutional bench" of five judges, including Chief Justice Enoch Dumbutshena.

And, for the third time since independence, the Government saw a piece of its security legislation rejected through the safeguard mechanisms in the constitution.

In 1982, repeated legal tussles on behalf of detained Zapatista chiefs Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku led to a Supreme Court ruling that they were being held illegally.

Although they were not released the case forced the Government to revise its detention procedures.

To comply with the provisions of the constitution, the Government is now required to give a detainee reasons for detention within seven days and allow a detainee access to a review tribunal headed by a judge.

Last year, Bulawayo businessman Colin Bickle (52), who was accused of illegally flying a South African spy into Zimbabwe, took the authorities to court to have his confiscated property returned to him.

The direct challenge made by Mr Bickle's legal team was to the Emergency Powers regulations on the forfeiture of "enemy property". A Ghanaian-born High Court judge, Mr Justice Roger Korsah, ruled that the regulations contravened the constitution and that, in the absence of an official declaration of war, South Africa could not be considered an "enemy". The Supreme Court upheld the judge's view and the offending legislation automatically became void.

The latest case also has potentially far-reaching implications.

The action was brought by Harare lawyer Mr Dennis Granger, who claimed damages for alleged assault, abuse and impairment of dignity after he was arrested and detained for some hours by members of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), who believed he was a spy.

Under the emergency indemnity regulations, the authorities issued a certificate saying the CIO men had acted in good faith in connection with the security of the country and therefore could not be prosecuted or sued in a court of law.

Mr Granger's legal team argued that the regulations contravened the Bill of Rights, which allows all citizens to claim compensation for wrongful arrest.

Ironically, Mr Mugabe's Government introduced the indemnity legislation only two years after it had removed from the statute books a similar law enacted by Mr Ian Smith's Rhodesian Government. The last man to avail himself of that law was Zanu radical Mr Edgar Tekere, who used its provisions to claim he acted to combat "terrorism" when he and his men were involved in the killing of a white farmer in 1980.

Legal experts in Harare feel that the ruling party will have a difficult time in pushing through replacement indemnity legislation which does not conflict with the tightly worded

safeguard clauses in the constitution. The way could therefore be open for many people, who have more allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of security forces, to sue the Government. At the hearing of Mr Granger's case, Government lawyers admitted there were at least 15 such matters pending in the courts.

The Lancaster House document also provides strict safeguards and compensation clauses which are aimed at protecting landowners from the seizure of their properties.

It is already becoming obvious that, with the resettlement programme moving far too slowly for the liking of the politicians and land-hungry peasants, the property protection clauses are being looked on as a major stumbling block to the redistribution of white-owned commercial farming land.

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